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**Chairmanship: Albania****1279th PLENARY MEETING OF THE COUNCIL**

1. Date: Thursday, 3 September 2020 (in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference)

Opened: 10.10 a.m.  
Suspended: 1 p.m.  
Resumed: 3.10 p.m.  
Closed: 6.30 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador I. Hasani

Prior to taking up the agenda, the Chairperson reminded the Permanent Council of the technical modalities for the conduct of meetings of the Council during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Chairperson welcomed the new Permanent Representative of Belgium to the OSCE, H.E. Ambassador Didier Nagant de Deuxchaisnes, the new Permanent Representative of the European Union to the OSCE, H.E. Ambassador Rasa Ostrauskaite, the new Permanent Representative of Uzbekistan to the OSCE, H.E. Ambassador Abat Fayzullaev, and the new Permanent Representative of Latvia to the OSCE, H.E. Ambassador Katrina Kaktina.

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: REVIEW OF OSCE CO-OPERATION WITH OSCE ASIAN PARTNERS FOR CO-OPERATION

Chairperson, Chairperson of the OSCE Asian Partners for Co-operation Group (Slovakia) (PC.DEL/1132/20 OSCE+), Director of the Office of the Secretary General (SEC.GAL/113/20/Corr.1 OSCE+), Afghanistan (Partner for Co-operation) (PC.DEL/1121/20 OSCE+), Australia (Partner for Co-operation), Japan (Partner for Co-operation), Republic of Korea (Partner for Co-operation), Thailand (Partner for Co-operation), Germany-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade

Association countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (PC.DEL/1161/20), Russian Federation (PC.DEL/1123/20), United States of America (PC.DEL/1122/20), Turkey (PC.DEL/1126/20 OSCE+), Kazakhstan (PC.DEL/1128/20 OSCE+), United Kingdom

Agenda item 2: REVIEW OF CURRENT ISSUES

Chairperson

- (a) *Russia's ongoing aggression against Ukraine and illegal occupation of Crimea:* Ukraine (PC.DEL/1127/20), Germany-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia and Moldova, in alignment) (PC.DEL/1166/20), Switzerland (PC.DEL/1143/20 OSCE+), United States of America (PC.DEL/1124/20), Turkey, Canada (PC.DEL/1125/20 OSCE+), United Kingdom
- (b) *Situation in Ukraine and the need to implement the Minsk agreements:* Russian Federation (PC.DEL/1130/20), Ukraine
- (c) *Violation of freedom of expression by Internet platforms of the United States of America:* Russian Federation (PC.DEL/1129/20), United States of America (PC.DEL/1133/20)
- (d) *Twelve years since the start of full-scale military aggression against Georgia by the Russian Federation:* Georgia (PC.DEL/1150/20 OSCE+), United States of America (PC.DEL/1134/20), Germany-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, in alignment) (PC.DEL/1167/20), Czech Republic (also on behalf of Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) (PC.DEL/1156/20 OSCE+), Ukraine (PC.DEL/1155/20), Russian Federation (PC.DEL/1135/20)
- (e) *Eighty-first anniversary of the beginning of the Second World War:* Russian Federation (PC.DEL/1151/20), Belarus (PC.DEL/1142/20 OSCE+), Germany-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; as well as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, in alignment) (PC.DEL/1163/20), France (PC.DEL/1141/20 OSCE+), Poland, United Kingdom, Lithuania (PC.DEL/1137/20 OSCE+)
- (f) *Attacks on freedom of opinion and expression and media freedom in Belarus:* Germany-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area; as well

as Andorra, in alignment) (PC.DEL/1162/20), United States of America (PC.DEL/1138/20), United Kingdom (also on behalf of Canada), Switzerland, Norway, Belarus (PC.DEL/1145/20 OSCE+)

- (g) *International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances, observed on 30 August 2020*: Germany-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, in alignment) (PC.DEL/1168/20), United States of America (PC.DEL/1136/20), United Kingdom, Switzerland (also on behalf of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) (PC.DEL/1144/20 OSCE+), Ukraine (PC.DEL/1153/20), Turkmenistan, Belarus, Russian Federation (PC.DEL/1152/20)
- (h) *Poisoning of Mr. A. Navalny*: Germany-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia and Ukraine, in alignment) (PC.DEL/1165/20), Norway, Canada, United Kingdom, Switzerland (PC.DEL/1147/20 OSCE+), Russian Federation, Ukraine (PC.DEL/1154/20), United States of America (PC.DEL/1139/20), Germany (Annex 1)

Agenda item 3:           DECISION ON THE EXTENSION OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF OSCE OBSERVERS TO TWO RUSSIAN CHECKPOINTS ON THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN BORDER

Chairperson

**Decision**: The Permanent Council adopted Decision No. 1375 (PC.DEC/1375) on the extension of the deployment of OSCE Observers to two Russian checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian border, the text of which is appended to this journal.

Russian Federation (interpretative statement, see attachment 1 to the decision), Ukraine (interpretative statement, see attachment 2 to the decision), Germany-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association country Norway, member of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra and Georgia, in alignment) (interpretative statement, see attachment 3 to the decision), United Kingdom (interpretative statement, see attachment 4 to the decision), United States of America (interpretative statement, see attachment 5 to the decision), Canada (interpretative statement, see attachment 6 to the decision)

Agenda item 4:           REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CHAIRMANSHIP-IN-OFFICE

- (a) *2020 Chairmanship OSCE-Wide Cyber/ICT Security Conference, to be held in Vienna and via video teleconference on 7 and 8 September 2020, and the 2020 Chairmanship OSCE-wide Counter-Terrorism Conference, to be held in Vienna and via video teleconference on 14 and 15 September 2020*:  
Chairperson

- (b) *1278th special plenary meeting of the Permanent Council, held on 28 August 2020: Chairperson*
- (c) *Ambassadorial retreat, to be held in Lower Austria on 28 and 29 September 2020: Chairperson*

Agenda item 5:           REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SECRETARIAT

- (a) *Announcement of the distribution of a written report of the Secretariat: Officer-in-Charge/Secretary General*
- (b) *Distribution to OSCE Secretariat staff members of an inter-office memorandum providing an update on the OSCE's response to COVID-19: Officer-in-Charge/Secretary General*
- (c) *Participation of the Officer-in-Charge/Secretary General in the Bled Strategic Forum, held in Bled, Slovenia, on 31 August 2020: Officer-in-Charge/Secretary General*
- (d) *Virtual meeting of the OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings with high-level Finnish officials, held on 2 and 3 September 2020: Officer-in-Charge/Secretary General*
- (e) *Call for nominations for the position of Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro: Officer-in-Charge/Secretary General*
- (f) *Work of the OSCE Secretariat in the absence of a Secretary General: Russian Federation (Annex 2), Chairperson, Officer-in-Charge/Secretary General*

Agenda item 6:           ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a) *Samarkand Human Rights Web Forum on "Youth 2020: Global Solidarity, Sustainable Development and Human Rights", held in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, on 12 and 13 August 2020: Uzbekistan*
- (b) *Parliamentary elections in Montenegro, held on 30 August 2020: Montenegro (PC.DEL/1140/20 OSCE+), Germany-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Moldova, in alignment) (PC.DEL/1164/20), United Kingdom (PC.DEL/1148/20 OSCE+)*

4. Next meeting:

Thursday, 17 September 2020, at 10 a.m., in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference



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**1279th Plenary Meeting**  
PC Journal No. 1279, Agenda item 2(h)

## **STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF GERMANY**

Mr. Chairperson,

Since my Russian colleague mentioned Germany in his statement, I should like to exercise my right of reply.

Mr. Alexei Navalny has been undergoing medical treatment in Berlin since 22 August 2020 at the request of his family.

Prior to this, Mr. Navalny had been taken ill in Russia. He was treated in Omsk, in Russia, where he presented with symptoms of having been poisoned. The German Government subsequently made it possible for him to be transferred to Germany on humanitarian grounds.

The hospital administering treatment, the Charité in Berlin, asked specialist toxicologists from the German armed forces (Bundeswehr) to examine various samples taken from Mr. Navalny. The Bundeswehr's specialist laboratory has reached a clear conclusion: Alexei Navalny was the victim of a crime, namely of an attack involving a chemical nerve agent from the Novichok group. There is unequivocal proof of the presence of this poison in the samples.

The Federal Government briefed the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Germany about the test results on the afternoon of 2 September at the Federal Foreign Office. We conveyed to him in no uncertain terms the Federal Government's demand that the Russian Government clarify in full and with complete transparency the background as regards this now proven poisoning of Alexei Navalny. There are now very serious questions that only the Russian Government can and must answer.

On the basis of the toxicological tests we know that the cause of Mr. Navalny's illness was an attack involving a chemical nerve agent.

The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits any use of chemical weapons whatsoever. We have therefore informed the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague about the results of the toxicological tests. We have also

informed our partners in the European Union and in NATO through the channels available for such purposes and put them in the picture as regards the latest findings.

The Federal Government condemns in the strongest possible terms this attempt on Alexei Navalny's life.

I request my esteemed Russian colleague not to engage in groundless speculation about alternative scenarios. The Russian Government should, rather, do all it can to solve this dreadful crime as quickly as possible and to identify the perpetrators.

The Federal Government continues to hope for Mr. Navalny's full and speedy recovery.

I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Permanent Council**

PC.JOUR/1279  
3 September 2020  
Annex 2

ENGLISH  
Original: RUSSIAN

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**1279th Plenary Meeting**  
PC Journal No. 1279, Agenda item 5(f)

**STATEMENT BY  
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Mr. Chairperson,

We feel obliged to draw attention to a gross violation by the OSCE Secretariat of our Organization's protocol and of generally accepted international practice. On 2 September, the Permanent Representation of the European Union to the OSCE announced that the new Permanent Representative of the European Union, Rasa Ostrauskaite, had presented her credentials to the Director of the OSCE Secretariat's Conflict Prevention Centre, Tuula Yrjölä. To our knowledge, the Permanent Representatives of Belgium and Latvia have already done the same and other permanent representatives intend to do so over the coming days.

In accordance with our Organization's rules, new permanent representatives are meant to present their credentials personally to the OSCE Secretary General when they take up their posts in Vienna. The Secretariat issued a separate clarification to that effect in October 2019 (SEC.GAL/76/19/Rev.1, dated 23 October 2019). I may also cite here the Sofia Ministerial Council decision on the role of the OSCE Secretary General (MC.DEC/15/04): "[T]he Secretary General derives his/her authority from the collective decisions of the participating States." Accordingly, the presentation of credentials to the Secretary General, who should be appointed by a consensus-based decision of all 57 OSCE participating States, implies that the new head of a diplomatic mission accepts the fundamental principles of our Organization's work, the most important of these being the sovereign equality of all of its participants.

On account of the unwholesome situation that arose at the OSCE when the participating States failed to ensure a continuity of adequate leadership for the Secretariat, the Chairmanship took the decision to assign provisional technical managerial functions to the Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), Ambassador Yrjölä. In a letter dated 17 July (CIO.GAL/122/20), the Chairmanship announced that the Director of the CPC would exercise the "essential functions" of the OSCE Secretary General from 19 July until the appointment of a new Secretary General. Further on in that letter it was clarified that those functions referred to "ensuring the uninterrupted management of the human, financial and material resources of the OSCE". By no means does this include the functions of political

representation of the Organization, which may be exercised solely by a Secretary General duly appointed by a decision of all the OSCE participating States.

New permanent representatives should therefore present their credentials to the Secretary General once he or she has been duly appointed and assumed the post. We have conveyed our understanding of the matter to the OSCE Chairmanship separately.

We should like to receive explanations from the Chairmanship and the Secretariat as to why the aforementioned violation of protocol occurred. Are we to understand that the European Union, not being an OSCE participating State, felt that it was entitled not to observe the Organization's established rules and international practice?

We call on the Chairmanship to make every effort to ensure that the OSCE Secretariat scrupulously adheres to our Organization's rules. That is of cardinal importance for the OSCE's authority and effective functioning.

I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.





**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Permanent Council**

PC.DEC/1375  
3 September 2020

Original: ENGLISH

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**1279th Plenary Meeting**  
PC Journal No. 1279, Agenda item 3

**DECISION No. 1375  
EXTENSION OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF OSCE OBSERVERS TO  
TWO RUSSIAN CHECKPOINTS ON THE  
RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN BORDER**

The Permanent Council,

Recalling its Decision No. 1130 of 24 July 2014 on the deployment of OSCE observers to two Russian checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian border (PC.DEC/1130),

Decides:

1. To extend the mandate of the deployment of OSCE observers to the two Russian border checkpoints of Donetsk and Gukovo on the Russian-Ukrainian border until 31 January 2021;
2. To approve the arrangements and the financial and human resources for the Observer Mission as contained in document PC.ACMF/48/20 of 1 September 2020. In this respect, authorizes the use of 468,000 euros from cash surplus to fund the proposed budget for the duration of the mandate to 31 January 2021.

PC.DEC/1375  
3 September 2020  
Attachment 1

ENGLISH  
Original: RUSSIAN

**INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER  
PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE  
OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND  
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE**

By the delegation of the Russian Federation:

“The Russian Federation has joined the consensus regarding the Permanent Council decision on the extension of the mandate of the team of OSCE observers at the two Russian checkpoints of Gukovo and Donetsk on the Russian-Ukrainian border for four months (until 31 January 2021), viewing the work of this team as a voluntary confidence-building measure outside the context of the fulfilment by the parties to the internal Ukrainian crisis – the Ukrainian Government, Donetsk and Luhansk – of their commitments to reach a settlement.

We reaffirm the immutability of the mandate and the places of work of the team, which were clearly laid down in Permanent Council Decision No. 1130 of 24 July 2014. That decision was based on the invitation made on 14 July 2014 by the Russian Federation in the wake of the Berlin Declaration issued on 2 July 2014 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Russia, Germany, France and Ukraine. The organizational modalities of their work, which are laid down in the mandate of the team of OSCE observers, do not provide for functional co-operation with OSCE field operations in other States.

The Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014 in no way mentions the deployment of OSCE observers on the Russian side of the border with Ukraine. Nor is there any reference to this in the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements adopted on 12 February 2015 and subsequently endorsed by United Nations Security Council resolution 2202. The decision to allow OSCE observers on Russian territory and Ukrainian border guards and customs officers to be present at Russian checkpoints is solely a gesture of goodwill on Russia’s part.

I request that this statement be attached to the adopted decision and included in the journal of the day.”

**INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER  
PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE  
OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND  
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE**

By the delegation of Ukraine:

“Mr. Chairperson,

In connection with the Permanent Council decision on the extension of the deployment of OSCE observers to two Russian checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian border, the delegation of Ukraine would like to make the following interpretative statement under paragraph IV.1(A)6 of the Rules of Procedure of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

The delegation of Ukraine consistently reiterates the importance of having a substantial and broad OSCE monitoring at the segment of the Ukrainian-Russian border adjacent to the Russia-occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine. We urge the Russian Federation to lift all restrictions, which undermine efficiency of the Mission’s monitoring in ‘Gukovo’ and ‘Donetsk’ checkpoints.

Having signed the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014, the Russian Federation committed to ensure permanent monitoring of the Ukrainian-Russian State border and verification by the OSCE with the establishment of a security zone in the border areas of Ukraine and the Russian Federation. As a part of the implementation of this provision, the mandate of the OSCE Observer Mission at the Russian border checkpoints ‘Gukovo’ and ‘Donetsk’ must be expanded. This will greatly contribute to sustainable de-escalation and peaceful resolution of the situation in the Donbas region of Ukraine.

We recall the Russian Federation to allow expansion of the mandate of the border Observer Mission to all sections of the border that are temporarily not under control of the Ukrainian authorities. We deeply regret that the Russian Federation continues to strongly resist it. Such persistent reluctance on the part of Russia can be attributed only to its unchanged intention to continue intervention in Ukraine’s Donbas, including by sending heavy weapons, military equipment, regular troops, fighters and mercenaries, sponsoring the terrorist activities in the territory of Ukraine. We consistently continue to urge Russia to cease immediately these internationally wrongful acts.

The delegation of Ukraine recalls that Russia has not responded to numerous requests for explanations regarding presence in the temporarily occupied parts of Donbas of modern

Russian weapons and military equipment including the electronic warfare systems recorded by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine during these years.

We call upon the Russian Federation to demonstrate its full commitment to the implementation of the Minsk arrangements in good faith and to allow proper and comprehensive permanent monitoring by the OSCE of the Ukrainian-Russian State border adjacent to the temporarily occupied areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions with establishment of a security zone in border areas of Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

The delegation of Ukraine requests that this statement be attached to the decision and registered in the journal of the day.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.”

**INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER  
PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE  
OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND  
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE**

The delegation of Germany, in its capacity as EU Presidency, passed the floor to the representative of the European Union, who delivered the following statement:

“In connection with the decision of the Permanent Council on the extension of the deployment of OSCE observers to two Russian checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian border, the European Union would like to make the following interpretative statement under the relevant provisions of the Rules of Procedure.

The European Union’s views on the vital importance of the monitoring of the Ukrainian-Russian State border are well known. Effective and comprehensive monitoring of this border is an integral part of a sustainable political solution in line with OSCE principles and commitments, which re-establishes full Ukrainian control over its sovereign territory, including the border. We recall that the Minsk Protocol calls for permanent monitoring of the border and verification by the OSCE and that the Minsk Package of Measures includes a commitment to reinstate full Ukrainian control over its entire international border.

The OSCE Observer Mission’s currently very limited mandate and its small size does not provide for a comprehensive border monitoring. We therefore reiterate our call for a significant expansion of the Observer Mission to all border crossings on the Russian-Ukrainian State border currently not under control of the Ukrainian Government as well as monitoring between these border crossings. This should be supported and co-ordinated with border monitoring on the Ukrainian side of the border by the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) and we reiterate the need for the SMM to be assured safe and unhindered access to all parts of the border currently not under Ukrainian Government control since border and ceasefire monitoring are very closely interlinked. Further, we underline the need for sufficient equipment and sufficient freedom of movement for the Observer Mission at the current crossing stations in order to monitor movements on the border more effectively.

We do not see any grounds for the Russian Federation’s continued resistance to the long overdue expansion of the Observer Mission, including the improvement of its equipment and urge it to reconsider its position.

We welcome the mandate extension by four months, and would support an extension to a longer period of time, increasing the Mission’s continuity and consistency.

We request that this interpretative statement be attached to the decision and to the journal of the day.

The candidate countries the Republic of North Macedonia<sup>1</sup>, Montenegro<sup>1</sup> and Albania<sup>1</sup>, and the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, as well as the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Andorra align themselves with this statement.

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1 The Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

**INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER  
PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE  
OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND  
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE**

By the delegation of the United Kingdom:

“In connection with the decision of the Permanent Council on the extension of the deployment of OSCE observers to two Russian checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian border, the United Kingdom would also like to make the following interpretative statement under paragraph IV.1(A)6 of the OSCE Rules of Procedure.

We very much share the views expressed by the European Union and others that the establishment of genuinely comprehensive monitoring of the entire segment of the Ukraine-Russia State border outside Ukrainian Government control, as well as the restoration of full Ukrainian control over that border, is essential.

While joining consensus on this decision, we wish to reiterate that the Mission’s limited scope, as well as the excessive restrictions placed on it by the host country, mean that it is a far cry from the comprehensive border monitoring foreseen under the Minsk agreements.

The Mission is only present at two checkpoints along an over 400 kilometre stretch of the Ukraine-Russia State border which is outside of Ukrainian Government control; and even at those two checkpoints, its freedom of movement is severely limited. This impedes its ability to observe certain categories of crossing (such as people in military style outfits) and the trains at the Gukovo border crossing point. The Mission’s observation is further hindered by Russia’s refusal to allow the observers to use monitoring tools such as binoculars.

The United Kingdom joins the many other calls on Russia to end all undue restrictions placed on the Observer Mission and end its objection to the expansion of the Mission to the entirety of the uncontrolled section of the border. We also reiterate the importance of full, safe and unimpeded access for the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine to the entire territory of Ukraine, including the border.

Let me also take this opportunity to reiterate the United Kingdom’s unwavering support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, including its territorial waters.

I request that this statement be attached to the decision and to the journal of the day.”

**INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER  
PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE  
OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND  
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE**

By the delegation of the United States of America:

“In connection with the adoption of the decision for the extension of deployment of OSCE observers to two Russian checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian border, the United States would like to make the following interpretative statement under paragraph IV.1(A)6 of the OSCE Rules of Procedure:

The United States finds it deeply regrettable that Russia continues to block the expansion of the geographic scope of the Observer Mission, despite the clear, strong, and continued support from other participating States to do so. We once again must accept an inadequate, limited-scope mission covering just two border checkpoints, which together account for only a few hundred metres of the 2,300 kilometre Ukrainian-Russian border, much of which Ukraine does not control.

Due to Russia’s unwarranted restrictions of the border Observer Mission’s work, the Mission fails to ascertain the full extent to which Russia participates in or facilitates the flow of arms, funding, and personnel to support its proxies in eastern Ukraine.

We note that point 4 of the Minsk Protocol delineates a clear role for the OSCE to monitor and verify both sides of the Ukrainian-Russian international border, and to create a security zone in the border areas of Russia and Ukraine. There are strong linkages between ceasefire monitoring and border monitoring, and it is to the detriment of all efforts to resolve the conflict that the OSCE approach to these activities has been impeded by one participating State. Russia’s repeated refusal to allow expansion of the scope of this mission demonstrates, regrettably, once again, Moscow’s unwillingness to take its Minsk commitments seriously.

Mr. Chairperson, I request that this interpretative statement be attached to the decision and to the journal of the day.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.”



PC.DEC/1375  
3 September 2020  
Attachment 6

Original: ENGLISH

**INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER  
PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE  
OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND  
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE**

By the delegation of Canada:

“Mr. Chairperson,

In connection with the decision of the Permanent Council on the extension of the deployment of OSCE observers to two Russian checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian border, Canada would like to make the following interpretative statement under paragraph IV.1(A)6 of the OSCE Rules of Procedure:

Canada strongly believes that a comprehensive and substantial OSCE Observer Mission mandate would include the Russian side of the border adjacent to the Russia-occupied parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine. The request for expanding the mandate to all sections of the border that are currently not under control of the Ukrainian authorities has been reiterated several times by participating States, with the exception of one. We regret that the Russian Federation continues to resist an expanded geographical mandate and much needed equipment for the OSCE border observation mission.

As ceasefire and border monitoring are closely interlinked, Canada reiterates the call to allow OSCE monitors the necessary freedom of movement for the implementation of their mandate, with assurances of the SMM’s safe and unhindered access to all parts of the border currently not under Ukrainian Government control and the Observer Mission access to the current crossing stations to monitor movements more effectively. We urge the Russian Federation, as part of its Minsk Protocol commitments, to lift all restrictions, which undermine the efficiency of the Mission’s monitoring in ‘Gukovo’ and ‘Donetsk’ checkpoints.

Canada requests that this statement be attached to the decision and reflected in the journal of the day.

Thank you.”