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Euro-Turks:

A Bridge, or a Breach, between

Turkey and the European Union?

RESEARCH REPORT

A Comparative Research of German-Turks and French-Turks

by
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Introduction

European Union: A Peace Project for Turkey

Engulfed by several political, ethnic, religious, and political predicaments in her neighbouring countries, Turkey is going through one of the steadiest periods in history. In the Helsinki Summit (December 1999), the European Heads of State and Government for the first time offered Turkey a concrete prospect for full membership into the European Union, more than four decades after its application for association with the European Economic Community in July 1959. The decision given in Helsinki was almost the opposite of the decision held in Luxembourg Summit of 1997. The Luxembourg Summit decision was meant to turn down Turkey's hopes for the EU. The response of the public in Turkey was remarkably immediate and harsh. Popular nationalism, minority nationalisms, Kemalism, religiosity, Occidentalism and Euroscepticism reached the hit the highest point just in the aftermath of the Luxembourg Summit. Thank to the December 1999 Helsinki Summit, the destructive atmosphere in Turkey did not last so long. The European Union perspective given to Turkey in Helsinki has radically shaken the deep-rooted political establishment in the country, opening up new prospects for various ethnic, religious, social and political groups. For instance, Kurds and Islamists in Turkey have become true advocates of the European Union in a way that affirms the pillars of the political union as a peace project. The EU stands as a great motivation for several groups in Turkey reinforcing their willingness to coexist. What lies beneath this willingness of coexistence no longer seems to be the *retrospective past* full of ideological and political disagreements; it is rather the *prospective future* embracing differences in a democratic way. The EU seems to be the major catalyst at the moment accelerating the process of peaceful coexistence of differences in Turkey.

"If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay." said in the conclusions of the European Council, summoned in Copenhagen in December 2002. However, both the political establishment and public in each of the European Union countries are aware of the fact that Turkey's membership into the Union shall stimulate further the discussions of "European identity" and "the limits of Europe". Recently, there are heated public debates in several countries on Turkey's membership into the Union, mostly disfavouring the membership of a large state like Turkey with its overwhelmingly Muslim population and socio-economic conditions below the European average. Some put forward socio-economic disparities between Turkey and the EU, some underline Islamic character of Turkey, some put emphasis on Turkey's undemocratic and patrimonial political culture, and some even raise the clash of civilizations in order to resist Turkey's membership. Nobody can deny the fact that it is not an easy task to include Turkey in the Union. However, a more constructive discourse ought to be generated with regard to Turkey's full membership in order to revitalize the fundamentals of the European Union, which are known to be addressing at "a peace project". There is no doubt that a peace project requires a constructive discourse, but not a destructive one. The discourse developed by the Independent Commission on Turkey is of this kind, which deserves admiration.[1]

The decision given in the 1999 Helsinki Summit brought about a great stream of reforms. Turkey, for instance, has achieved more reform in just over two years than in the whole of the previous decade. Several laws were immediately passed in the National Parliament to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria; strict anti-inflationist economic policies have been successfully put into force; institutional transparency and liberalism have been endorsed; both formal nationalism and minority nationalism were precluded; and socio-economic disparities between regions have also been dealt with. However, there are still a lot to be done and to be implemented. Despite all these reforms and good will, the public in the EU countries are not convinced with the prospective Turkish membership. The only feasible way to have a positive impact on the European public opinion regarding Turkey's entry into the Union, objective and constructive data should be produced away from prejudice and clichés. There is no doubt that the EU states will not only say 'Yes' or 'No' to Turkey's prospective full membership option, but they will also decide on the future of the Union. The decision on Turkey is actually more complex than it seems. By this decision, the EU will essentially find out where to go: "No to Turkey!" will retrieve the conservative stream in the Union, which tends to define Europe and the EU as a Christian, holistic, static, essentialist, culturalist and civilizational block, while "Yes to Turkey!" shall wave the progressive flag in the EU, addressing at the political, economic, syncretic, dynamic and postnational fabric of the Union.

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[1] The Independent Commission on Turkey was established in March 2004 with the support of the British Council and Open Society Institute. The Commission is composed of Anthony Giddens, Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, Michel Rocard, Albert Rohan (Rapporteur), Martti Ahtisaari (Chairman), Kurt Biedenkopf, Emma Bonino, Hans van den Broek and Bronislaw Geremek. Their purpose was to examine the major challenges and opportunities connected with Turkey's possible accession to the Union.They met regularly for intensive discussions, visited Turkey and analysed expertise from various sources.Close contact was maintained with European institutions.The Independent Commission's work programme did not include issues under review by the European Commission for its forthcoming Progress Report on Turkey. See the Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, Brussels (September 2004).

The leaders of the EU countries will probably give a decision in the Amsterdam Summit in December 2004 concerning the date to start accession negotiations. However, there are still strong popular stereotypes among the public of each member country in the Union, claiming that Turkey does not politically, economically, socially, and culturally fit into the EU. These stereotypes mostly spring from the ways in which Euro-Turks have been perceived in the West by majority societies. The stereotypical judgements on the Euro-Turks often point to that Turks do not integrate in the European way of life; that Turks are radically Islamist, nationalist, culturalist and conservative; that the Turks in Turkey are looking forward to seeing the opportunity to flee to the EU once the full membership is done; and that Turks do not have a democratic political culture based on equality, human rights, free market economy and participation. Conversely, the data gathered through the structured interviews, in-depth interviews, and focus group discussions held in Germany and France reveal another picture, which is quite different from the one explained above.

Aims of the Research

This research aims to investigate if the Euro-Turks living in Germany and France could set up a driving force for Turkey in the process of integration into the European Union. Social, political, and cultural discourses of Turkish diasporic subjects concerning Turkey-EU relations in the two European countries shall be mapped out. Turkish origin migrants and their descendants constitute a rather heterogeneous group of people in Europe with respect to their recent economic, political, cultural, ethnic and religious dispositions. Thus, one of the premises of this work was that these separate groups would pose both strong support and reservation to Turkey's EU membership. Figuring out the public opinion among the Turkish diaspora groups in Western Europe may help us find out if diasporic Turkish communities may provide the Turkish society with new opportunities and prospects in the formation of a more open and democratic society in Turkey. Another premise of this work is that boundaries between Turkey and the diaspora are no longer that strict, they are rather blurred. For instance, it has lately been realized that the Islamic resurgence in the diaspora has resulted in the reinforcement of religious organisations in the homeland. The same process is also applicable to the Kurdish and Alevi revival in Turkey, because both social movements are to some extent constrained by the modern diasporic formations. Hence, these phenomena make it clear that diasporic formations may have a strong impact on the homeland formations.

Rationale of the Project

There is a common belief in western European countries that the Turkish origin migrants and their children do not integrate into social, political, economic and cultural life of their settlement countries. According to the same common belief, Turks' political motivations in their countries of settlement are primarily shaped by their homeland. However, there are recently many indications and academic works displaying an alternative picture. Contemporary Turkish origin migrants and their descendants in Western Europe can no longer be simply considered temporary migrant communities who live with the 'myth of return', or passive victims of global capitalism who are alienated by the system and swept up in a destiny dominated by the capitalist west. They have rather become permanent settlers, active social agents and decision-makers. For instance, today's German-Turks have little in common with the old "guest-worker stereotypes" of the past. They are a recognised and highly active section of the population. For instance, around 5,000 Turkish businesses in Berlin currently employ approximately 20,000 workers in 90 different areas of activity. Only 30 percent of Berlin's Turkish businesses now work in the restaurant and catering field, 37 percent are involved in trade, and 18 percent in the services sector. They form a dynamic and flexible business sector that benefits the whole country. There is enough evidence that the German-Turkish intellectuals who have recently appeared in the German public space have a great impact on the formation and articulation of these active agency roles and identities. Along with the worldwide emergence of the postcolonial literature and discourses, Turkish diasporic groups have also had the opportunity to express themselves in the German public space through the means of their spokespeople, intelligentsia. This project refrains from conceiving the Euro-Turks of being passive, obedient, powerless and incompetent; it rather recognizes their reflexivity, activity, subjectivity and significance. Hence, the researchers have a strong belief that Euro-Turks should be recognized with their reflexive subjectivities.

There is also a lack of awareness in both homeland and 'hostland' concerning the characteristics of migrants and their children. Euro-Turks have been stereotypically represented as *Almancı* (German-like) in Turkey and 'foreigner' in the west. It is still commonly believed in Turkey that Turkish origin migrants and their descendants in the west are *Gurbetci*[2] who have a great orientation towards the homeland and will someday return home. On the other hand, they are also called *Almancı*, a term which depicts such people as being rich, eating pork, having a very comfortable life in the west, losing their Turkishness, and becoming increasingly Germanized, Anglicized, and Frankified etc. They are also stereotypically called as 'foreigner' in their own countries of settlement. The common stereotypical labelling of 'Turk' in the west strongly indicates that Turks are conservative, religious, veiling, poor, nationalist, longing for homeland, un-integrating, and violent. This research aims to reveal that Euro-Turks are highly diversified and have very little in common with the '*Almanci*',

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[2] The term '*gurbetçi*' refers to someone in '*gurbet*' (diaspora), which is an Arabic word deriving from *garaba*, to go away, to depart, to be absent, to go to a foreign country, to emigrate, to be away from one's homeland, to live as a foreigner in another country.

'guestworker' or 'foreigner' stereotypes of the past. It uncovers invisible Euro-Turks who also identify themselves as Turkish origin migrants and their children originating from Turkey like those who somehow fit into the category of stereotypical 'Turks' visible in the public space with their outer looks and clothing styles.

This research aims to understand if the Euro-Turks have developed certain commitments vis-à-vis the European Union and Europeanness; what sort of a political culture they generated in the west; what kind of incorporation strategies they constructed vis-à-vis their countries of settlement; and what they contemplate about some essential issue such as citizenship, democratization, political participation, globalization, human rights, equality, rule of law, justice, religion, multiculturalism, interculturalism, coexistence and political institutions. These questions are all addressed in a way that could make us compare their views about the homeland and the hostland. This research turns out to be much more important in a conjuncture characterized by intensive discussions in Turkey and abroad concerning the EU integration process, the European Constitution, the European enlargement process, the Cyprus question, the secularism debate, and religious fundamentalism. The conjuncture is also unique in the sense that there is a shift in the west from multiculturalist discourse to interculturalist discourse.

A separate note is also needed for the contextual use of the terms 'Euro-Turk', 'German-Turk' and 'French-Turk' in this work. Such identifications are neither used by the Turkish origin migrants to identify themselves, nor is it used in the political or academic debate in Germany. We prefer using these terms with reference to our findings in both qualitative research and quantitative research. As could be seen in the interim report around 60 % of the German-Turks identify themselves as European/Turkish, or Turkish/European (Turkish/German, or Turkish/French), and around 70 % of the French-Turks define themselves as such. Thus, instead of Euro-Turks, the notion of 'European Turks' can also be used. Furthermore, such a hyphenated identification also addresses at the hybrid form of cultural identity of the universe of the research. Hence, such notions are helpful term for our purposes for two reasons: the terms distance the researcher from essentializing transnational migrants and their descendants as 'Turkish'; and it underlines the transcultural character of these diasporic subjects.

Aims and Objectives

The purpose of this study is to:

- Make an inventory of the Euro-Turks to provide the user groups with an updated information concerning their discourses about Turkey's entry into the European Union;
- Take a snapshot of the heterogeneous Euro-Turks;
- Contribute to the dissolution of the stereotypical image of Euro-Turks in the imagery of EU citizens and politicians in a way that may change their negative public opinion concerning Turkey's entry into the E U;
- Create an incentive for those of rural origin Euro-Turks to contribute to the formation of a positive image of western Europe among their fellows back in the homeland;
- Contribute to the growing knowledge on transnational communities and ethnic studies;
- Understanding the major parameters of the transnational space developed by the Euro-Turks;
- Develop and refine the theoretical understanding of cultures in fluidity;
- Develop an alternative perspective in researching minority cultures and cultural diversities;
- Contribute to the development of a new project in the aftermath of the discontents of the ideology of multiculturalism generated by the state *vis-á-vis* minorities;
- Contribute to the peaceful coexistence of culturally and ethnically diversified populations   by unfolding and uncovering the stereotypes produced mutually and proposing an intercultural form of life between the majority society and Euro-Turks.

Fieldwork and Methodology

The research has been carried out in various steps. In the first step, an extensive literature survey has been conducted covering the related literature composed on the Euro-Turks, including the MA and PhD dissertations submitted recently. There is an extensive literature on the German-Turks while there is a limited one on the French-Turks. In the course of the literature survey, several sources by Turkish, German, French, German-Turkish and French-Turkish scholars have been scrutinized. In the second stage of the research focus group discussions and in-depth interviews were held. Between September 2003 and October 2003, 13 focus group discussions were held in groups composed of participants between eight and ten interlocutors (Berlin 4, Köln 2, Essen 1, Munich 1, Paris 3, and Strasbourg 2).[3] Besides, 35 in-depth interviews were conducted in both countries. While the focus group discussions were held with common people, the in-depth interviews were

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[3] The researchers are very sensitive in not calling the participants of the research as neither 'respondent' nor 'informant'. We believe that both terms are problematic as the former corresponds to the inherent power relations in the expence of the participants and infavor of the researcher, and the latter puts the participants in a role leaking out infromation from within their communities. The term 'interlocutor' is preferred to make it clear that the researchers take the participants as their equal partners. For a detailed analysis of this discussion see, Horowitz, 1983, 1986; Adler et al., 1986; Alasuutari, 1995: 52-56.

conducted with the opinion leaders such as politicians, businessmen, academics, students and artists, whose thoughts cannot be evenly represented in the structured interviews.

The third stage of the research involves conducting structured interviews. Questions were prepared by Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel, and later they were discussed with some colleagues, representatives of the Open Society Institute, Heinrich Böll and also with some of the related academics during the qualitative research period in Germany and France. The research team together with the assistance of the Veri Araştırma Data Processing Company have set up a *quota sampling* in both countries paying attention to the density of Turkish origin population in the urban space and rural space (See, Table 1).[4] The quota sampling covered the variables of age, gender, occupation and region in order to get a representative picture of the Euro-Turks.

Table 1. Sampling Distribution

Germany	Number of Questionnaires	Number of Questionnaires	France
Niedersachsen-Bremen	82	222	Ille De France
Nordrhein – Westfalen	381	41	Centre
Hessen	121	150	Rhone Alpes
Baden – Württemberg	233	32	Franche Comté
Bayern	184	109	Alsace
Berlin	64	46	Loraine
Total	**1065**	**600**	**Total**

1.065 pcs. interviews were conducted in Germany and 600 pcs. in France by the teams of the local research companies collaborating with the Veri Araştırma. These companies are Gelszus Gmbh (Hamburg) and Socioscan (Paris). The selection of the interviewers and the ways in which the interviews were made were supervised by Veri Araştırma to make it sure that bilingual Turkish interviewers were being employed and that interviews were properly held. Veri Araştırma has organized orientation programmes in both countries for the interviewers to equip them with some essential interviewing techniques and information. The number of the questions included in the interview was 90, and it has been reported that the average duration for the interviews was around 30 minutes. Interviewers were also given a German/French translation of the questions in case anybody would prefer to communicate in either language. Genderwise and agewise we tried to get a representative selection of the Euro-Turks. 73 % of the German-Turks have reported to be born in Turkey, and approximately 27 % in Germany. 70 % of those who were born in Turkey originate from the countryside, and 30 % from the cities.

Structured interviews were composed of five essential sections of questions: a) demographic information, b) orientation towards the homeland, c) orientation towards the "hostland"[5], d) orientation towards the European Union, and e) identity related issues. The questions were designed in such a way that gives us strong clues about the status of the Euro-Turks, whether they constitute a *bridge*, or a *breach* between Turkey and the European Union, between the East and the West, or between Islam and Christianity.

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[4] See the Annex 1 and Annex 2 for sampling plans made in each country.
[5] We are aware of the fact that the term 'hostland' is problematical as it connotes that migrants could never become permanent settlers and that they are always destined to remain as guests. However, the term will be used as a categorical phrase.

CHAPTER 1

Migratory Process in Germany and France

Germany and France have long histories of importing labour from other countries –especially from eastern and southern Europe, but also involving other parts of the world- during periods of labour shortages. In spite of this fact, Germany has generally been viewed as a labour exporting, rather than importing, nation. In the late 1880s, for instance, Germany sent a million people overseas, mostly to the United States. By the beginning of the World War I, there were over three million Germans overseas, and Germany, in return, had received one million foreign workers, mostly from Poland (Sassen, 1999: 52). In contrast, France suffered from persistent labour shortages, and thus the French were considerably less inclined to emigrate than their German counterparts. Immigration played a far more important role in nineteenth century France than emigration. The maintenance of a significant agricultural sector until well into the twentieth century ensured the possibility of a livelihood in the countryside, and created a demand for immigrants (Ibid.). Since 1945, both countries have become major immigrant-receiving countries of continental Europe. Today, almost 8 to 9 percent of the population in both countries correspond to immigrants. Muslims, who are predominantly Turks in Germany and Algerian in France, represent large numbers in both countries: 3 percent in Germany and 7 percent in France.

Migratory Process in Germany

Migration into post-war Germany started as labour recruitment to mitigate shortages in specific industries. Between 1955 and 1968, the FRG concluded intergovernmental contracts with eight Mediterranean countries: first Italy (1955), then Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961 and 1964), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). The German Federal Labour Office (*Bundesanstalt für Arbeit* -BFA) set up recruitment offices in the countries concerned. Employers seeking workers had to apply to the BFA and pay a fee. The BFA then selected suitable workers, tested their work skills, gave them medical check-ups and screened police and political records.[6] Migrants were recruited at first for agriculture and construction, later by all branches of industry, where they generally had low-skilled manual jobs (Castles and Kosack, 1973). Guest-worker programmes were designed to solve immediate labour shortages in Germany by recruiting workers on temporary, short-term residence and work permits (Castles *et al.*, 1984). The Turkish population in the FRG rose from 6,700 in 1961 to 605,000 in 1973 (Table 1).

Year	Non-German Population	%	Turkish Minority	%
1961	686,200	1.2	6,700	1.0
1970	2,600,600	4.3	249,400	16.5
1973	3,966,200	6.4	605,000	15.2
1977	3,948,300	6.4	508,000	12.9
1987	4,240,500	6.9	1,453,700	34.3
1989	4,845,900	7.7	1,612,600	33.3
1990[a]	5,342,500	8.4	1,675,900	32.0
1991[b]	5,882,300	7.3	1,779,600	30.3
1992	6,495,800	8.0	1,854,900	28.6
1993	6,878,100	8.5	1,918,400	27.9
1994	6,990,510	8.6	1,965,577	28.1
1995	7,173,900	8.7	2,014,311	28.1
1996	7,314,000	8.9	2,049,060	28.0
1997	7,365,800	9.0	2,107,400	28.6
1998	7,319,600	9.0	2,110,223	28.8
1999	7,343,600	8.9	2,053,600	27.9
2000	7,296,800	8.8	1,998.500	27.3
2001	7,318,600	8.7	1,947,900	26.6
2002	7,335,592	8.9	1,912,169	26.2
2003	7,334,765	8.7	1,877,661	25,6

Table 1. Germany's Non-German population and Turkish Minority
Sources: Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2004.

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[6] The story of migration from the 'developing' countries to the FRG was successfully exhibited by John Berger *et al.* (1975) in the book, *A Seventh Man*. The photographs in the book taken during the journey from home to Germany can partly express the difficulties, which the immigrants had to experience during the migration. The photos taken during the medical check-ups, for instance, evidently prove how degrading was the way the selection of the workers was conducted by the 'experts' of the recruiting country.

In the early stages of the migration, Turkish migrants were mainly men between the ages of 20 and 39, relatively skilled and educated in comparison to the average working population in Turkey, and from the economically more developed regions of the country (Abadan-Unat, 1976; Abadan-Unat and Kemiksiz, 1986; Martin, 1991). The ratio of rural migrants at this stage was just 17.2 %. In the second half of the 1960s, recruitment primarily consisted of rural workers (Gökdere 1978). Berlin was relatively late in recruiting Turkish workers. Since the textile and electronics sectors demanded cheap female labour, it was conversely the women who first migrated to Berlin in 1964. Turkish workers who migrated to Berlin by 1973 were primarily from the eastern provinces and from economically less-developed regions of Turkey. As shown in Table 1, there has been a continual increase in the non-German population through the post-war period. The exceptions are the figures for 1977, because the entry of non-European Community workers was banned in November 1973 by the German government due to the oil crisis, consequent economic stagnation and political considerations. Since 1973, the composition of Turkish migrant population has tended to become a more general population migration in the form of family reunification and political asylum rather than mainly labour migration.

Despite the significant transformation and upward mobilization that they had undergone, German-Turks have been continually misrepresented both in Germany and Turkey. The labels, which are attached to them, include derogatory terms such as 'in between', 'foreigner', 'German-like' (*Almancı*), 'degenerated', 'conservative', 'radical', 'nationalist' and/or 'lost generations'. All these problem-oriented representations have acquired wide popularity in both countries. It seems that the popularity of these labels springs from the traditional notion of culture which has a wide usage in both countries –a point to which I shall return shortly.

Turkish workers have generally been addressed in the official German discourse as '*Gastarbeiter'* (guestworker), '*Ausländer'* (foreigner), and/or '*Mitbürger'* (co-citizen) –terms which underline their 'otherness' and/or 'displacement' (Kaya, 2001). On the other hand, they are officially defined in Turkey as either '*gurbetçi'*, or '*Almanya'daki vatandaşlarımız'* ('our citizens in Germany'). German-Turks are stereotypically defined by their compatriots in Turkey as either '*Almanyalı'* or '*Almancı'*. Both terms carry rather negative connotations in Turkey. The German-Turks are depicted as being rich, eating pork, having a very comfortable life in Germany, losing their Turkishness, and becoming increasingly Germanised. Implicitly derogatory in its markedness, in its explicit differentiation from a non-emigrant Turk, the labels correspond to a combination of difference, lack of acceptance, and rejection. Their Turkish and the way they dress also contribute to the construction of an '*Almancı'* image in Turkey. "Here we are called *yabancı* (foreigner), and there in Turkey they call us *Almancı*" is a refrain one hears frequently especially amongst the German-Turkish youth.

Towards a limited hyphenated citizenship: German-Turks

The Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) constitution, the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*), recognizes two categories of rights: general and reserved. General rights apply to all individuals in the FRG and include freedom of expression, liberty of person, and freedom of conscience (Art. 2,3,4 and 5). Reserved rights are restricted to German citizens, and include the right of peaceable assembly, freedom of movement, freedom of association, and freedom of occupation (Art. 8, 9, 11 and 12). The Basic Law does not prescribe how citizenship is recognized or conferred, but the criteria are based first and foremost on ethnic nationality. The rules governing the acquisition of citizenship are defined by the Basic Law Article 116, the preamble to the Basic Law, and the 1913 Imperial and State Citizenship Law (*Reichs- und Staatsangehörig-keitsgesetz*), and provide that citizenship is passed by descent from parent to child.[i] Article 116 of the Basic Law reads as follows:

(1)... A German within the meaning of this Basic Law, unless otherwise regulated by law, is a person who possesses German citizenship, or who has been received in the territory of the German Reich as of 31 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German stock or as the spouse or descendant of such a person.

(2) Former German citizens who, between 30 January 1933 and 8 May 1945, were deprived of their citizenship on political, racial, or religious grounds, and their descendants, shall be granted citizenship on application...

The Imperial Naturalization Law of 1913 was designed to make the acquisition of German citizenship difficult for aliens out of fear that the Reich was being invaded by immigrants from the East, especially Poles and Jews. At the same time, the law sharply reduced the barriers to the repatriation of ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*) from outside the *Reich* (Brubaker 1992: p.114-119; Klusmeyer 1993: p. 84; Marshall 1992).

The claim for naturalization has always been difficult for the non-EU 'foreigners' in the FRG, and has required repudiation of the citizenship of the country of origin. The non-EU 'foreigners' have usually been denied the right to dual citizenship; even the children of migrants born and raised in Germany could not automatically receive the rights of citizenship until January 2000.[7] The 'foreigners' who are willing to renounce

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[7] It was common for Turkish applicants to re-apply immediately after their German naturalisation for their temporarily-lost-Turkish citizenship. Turkey allows dual citizenship once the military service of the applicant has been resolved.

their previous citizenship can be naturalized only after they had lived in Germany for at least fifteen years. In contrast, the *Volksdeutschen* (ethnic Germans defined by Article 116 of the Basic Law) -primarily Poles and Russians who can prove German ancestry- have a constitutional right to naturalization.

However, the current German government, the so-called Red-Green coalition of the Social Democrats and the Greens, recently established two mechanisms that, for the first time, endow the migrants with the right to acquire citizenship. According to the new *Ausländergesetz* (1991) and the *Gesetz zur Änderung Asylverfahrens, Ausländer- und staatsangehörig-keitsrechtlicher Vorschriften* (1993), two groups of *Ausländer* have been legally entitled to naturalization (paragraphs 85 and 86 of the *Ausländergesetz*). Paragraph 85 declares that 'foreigners' between the ages of 16 and 23, who have been residents of Germany for more than eight years, attended a school in Germany for at least six years and who have not been convicted of serious offences, have the right to be naturalized. On the other hand, paragraph 86 introduces that those 'migrants', who have been residents of Germany for at least 15 years and possess a residence permit, have the right to naturalization. The absence of a conviction on a serious criminal offence and financial independence of the applicant are also crucial for the acquisition of citizenship according to this paragraph.

Non-European Union immigrants, or resident aliens, have mostly been given what T. H. Marshall (1992) defined as social and civil rights, but not political rights. The immigrants built a very real political presence in Germany where their political participation in the system was not legally allowed. The legal barriers denying political participation provided the ground for the Turkish immigrants in Germany to organize themselves politically along collective ethnic lines. As a response to the German insistence on the exclusionary '*Ausländerstatus*', Turkish migrant communities have tended to develop strong ethnic structures and maintain ethnic boundaries. The lack of political participation and representation in the receiving country made them direct their political activity towards their country of origin. In fact, this home-oriented participation has received encouragement from Turkey that has set up networks of consular services and other official organizations (religious, educational and commercial). Homeland opposition parties and movements have also forged an organizational presence in Germany.

The new law, in force since the 1st of January 2000, partially changes the principle of descent (*jus sanguinis*) that has so far been the country's traditional basis for granting citizenship. Now, it will also be possible to acquire German citizenship as a result of being born in Germany (*jus soli*). According to the new law, children who are born in Germany to foreign nationals will receive German citizenship when one of the respective child's parents has resided lawfully in Germany for at least eight years and holds entitlement to residence, or has an unlimited residence permit for at least three years. Under the new law, such children acquire German citizenship at birth. The new law brought a transitional arrangement for children up to the age of 10, who were born in Germany before the 'Act to Amend the Nationality Law' was enacted. Accordingly, those children could be automatically naturalised if they applied. In most cases, they will also acquire their parents' citizenship under the principle of descent. Such children will have to decide within five years of turning 18 - before their 23rd birthday- whether they want to retain their German citizenship. They must opt for one of their two nationalities.

It is apparent that the number of 'foreigners' applying for naturalization has remarkably increased after the introduction of the new citizenship laws. Following the introduction of the new laws the number of naturalizations rose by around 30 percent in the year 2000 compared with 1999. According to the information provided by the *Länder* governments 186,700 foreigners were granted German citizenship in the course of the year 2000, compared with 143,267 in 1999. Subsequently, a total of 178,100 foreigners were naturalised in 2001. That was a decline of 8,600 or 4,6 percent from 2000. On the contrary to the increase of naturalisation of foreigners in general, the rate of naturalisation of Turks in 2000 decreased by around 20 percent compared with 1999. This trend remained the same in 2001, decreasing by around 9 percent compared with 2000 (Table 2).

Year	Number of Naturalisation
1972-1979	2.219
1980-1989	10.361
1990	2.034
1991	3.529
1992	7.377
1993	12.915
1994	19.590
1995	31.578
1996	46.294
1997	42.240
1998	59.664

1999	103.900
2000	82.800
2001	75.600
2002	64.631
2003	56.244
Total	**625.981**

Table 2. Naturalisation of German-Turkish Population
Source: Federal Statistical Office Germany, Weisbaden, 2004

There are two essential points to be raised in the table. The first point is the decline in the number of Turkish-descent people being naturalized between 2000 and 2001. In 2000 the new citizenship law started to be effective. In general, naturalisation became easier. There was a rule that the children of foreign-descent in between birth and 10 years of age could be naturalised right away, without any waiting period. This rule was limited to one year. Hence, the naturalisation rate was higher than in 2001. The second point is a more complex one and needs further inquiry. Yet, I shall briefly touch upon this point as I have no substantial evidence to demonstrate my hypothesis. As could be seen in the table, there is a considerable increase in the rate of naturalisation in 1999 compared with 1998, and a significant decline in 2000 compared with the previous year (Kaya, Forthcoming).[8] The general trend for foreigners to naturalise was upwards: from 143.267 in 1999 to 186.000 in 2000. Yet, German-Turks posed an exception in contrast to Greeks, or ex-Yugoslavs although the new citizenship law was more liberal and inclusionary (Table 3).

Year[ii]	Greece	Italy	Yugoslavia[iii]	Croatia[iv]	Poland	USSR[v]	Spain	Turkey	Hungary
1980	376	1 010	3 475	.	3 303	4 138	217	399	1 868
1981	281	972	3 131	.	4 206	3 583	181	534	1 895
1982	235	1 084	3 201	.	7 807	3 243	211	580	1 669
1983	350	1 134	3 117	.	7 182	2 446	261	853	1 570
1984	264	946	3 334	.	5 988	1 704	323	1 053	1 432
1985	246	797	2 815	.	5 925	1 146	191	1 310	1 200
1986	173	597	2 721	.	7 251	945	171	1 492	1 105
1987	199	551	2 364	.	9 439	1 111	135	1 184	1 203
1988	191	618	2 119	.	13 958	4 810	155	1 243	1 157
1989	179	548	2 076	.	24 882	13 557	108	1 713	1 556
1990	158	437	2 082	.	32 340	33 339	103	2.034	1 532
1991	194	679	2 832	.	27 646	55 620	107	3.529	1 178
1992	285	1 947	1 947	269	20 248	84 660	168	7.377	1 425
1993	301	1 154	1 988	2 196	15 435	105 801	224	12.915	1 663
1994	341	1 417	4 374	3 695	11 943	164 296	185	19.590	1 902
1995	428	1 281	3 623	2 695	10 174	214 927	189	31.578	1 305
1996	493	1 297	2 967	2 391	7 872	194 849	152	46.294	1 027
1997	418	1 187	2 341	1 914	5 763	179 601	172	42.240	911
1998	427	1 156	2 881	2 373	5 151	170 381	141	59.664	652
1999	375	1185	3 608	1 648	2 865	89 372	152	103.900	537
2000	1 413	1 036	9 776	3 316	1 604	11 358	190	82.800	561
2001	1 402	1 048	12 000	3 931	1 774	12 254	183	75.600	593

Table 3. Naturalisation of Foreigners between 1980 and 2003
Source: *Statistisches Bundesamt* 2004.

There may be several reasons for such a decline. It may be that German-Turks are already pleased with the *denizenship* status, which gives them civil, social, and cultural rights but political rights. Another reason may be that German-Turks had expected a more democratic citizenship law to be put into effect without any limitation for dual citizenship. But perhaps their expectations diminished, and they did not see any further benefit in acquiring German citizenship. A third possible reason may be that Turks, who are mostly residents in the urban space, preferred to ignore the new nationality law, which relatively required more bureaucratic workload in city-states such as Berlin. This may have had a discouraging impact on the German-Turks in the

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[8] The main reason of the higher naturalisation rate of Turks in 1999 compared to the previous years is the shortening of the required duration of residence from 15 to 8 years by law.

process of naturalisation. A fourth justification may be that there is already a decline in the voting habits of German-Turks, who have not been given the right to vote in the Turkish general elections. The right to vote in their own residential areas is a great issue for Turkish citizens living abroad.[9]

The last, but not the least, explanation would be the processes of 'globalisation from below' (Brecher *et al.* 1993), which sets up the pillars of modern diasporic identity (Clifford, 1992, 1994, 1997; Hall, 1991, 1994; Gilroy, 1987, 1993, 1994, 1995; Kaya, 2001). The wide networks of communication and transportation between Germany and Turkey play a crucial role in the formation and maintenance of a diasporic identity among transnational communities. The modern circuitry connects the diasporic subjects both to the homeland and to the rest of the world. This is the reason why it becomes much easier for German-Turks to live on 'both banks of the river' at the same time. German-Turks exemplify a growing stream of what Brecher *et al.* (1993) have called '*globalisation from below*'. This constitutive entanglement has become a characteristic of modern diaspora networks. The expansion of economic, cultural and political networks between diaspora and homeland, for instance, points to this growing stream. In the context of the diasporic condition, 'globalisation from below' refers to the enhancement of the access of transnational migrants and their descendants to those social, cultural, political and economic mechanisms enabling them to transcend the exclusionary conditions imposed upon them by the German nation-state. To put it differently, diasporic identity symbolically enables diasporic subjects to overcome the limitations and oppression of the country of settlement. In this context, traditional national citizenship discourse loses its accuracy and legitimacy for contemporary diasporic subjects. Therefore, this obsolete rhetoric should be replaced with new forms of citizenship such as double citizenship, multiple citizenship, post-national citizenship, transnational citizenship, or diasporic citizenship.

The question here is, if the new laws leave space for such progressive forms of citizenship in Germany. The new citizenship laws permit the descendants of the Turkish migrants to acquire dual citizenship for at least a certain period of time. The present legal reforms equip the Germany-born 'foreigners' with the capacity to go beyond their previously defined 'denizen' status. They can thus enjoy political rights as well as civic, social, cultural and environmental rights. Hence, the present German citizenship laws open up a new room for the introduction of a kind of limited "hyphenated" citizenship for the non-European 'foreigners' as well as for the Turkish origin population. The partial introduction of the principle of *jus soli* clearly indicates that the definition of Germanness is no longer limited to ethnic descent. It also suggests that ethnically non-German and non-European members of the Federal Republic can be incorporated into the political sphere through civic channels. These legal changes, in a way, refer to the transformation of the culturally defined nation project towards a rather Habermassian 'post-national society' project, which requires the political recognition of newcomers (Habermas, 1999). In other words, the new laws partially distance us from the hegemony of the once essentialized ethnic identities such as 'German', 'Turkish', 'Kurdish', 'Iranian', etc. They hold the potential of opening the way for the construction of hyphenated civic identities such as 'German-Turkish' (in Turkish language it literally means a Turk from Germany, *Almanyalı Türk*), 'German-Kurdish', or 'German-Iranian'.

Yet, it should be pointed out that those hyphenated civic identities and/or hyphenated citizenships are distinct from their equivalents in the American case. In the North American experience, when the hyphenated identities are spelled out the emphasis is made on the ethnic origin of individuals as in Irish-American, or Italian-American. The fact that the emphasis is on ethnic origin does not refer to that Americanness is undervalued. On the contrary, what is implicitly celebrated is the Americanness into which the particularist ethnicities are embedded. Hence, the explicit celebration of ethnic origins implicitly implies the celebration of Americanness. In contrast, in the German experience the emphasis is on the 'German' component of the hyphenated identity. Therefore, it seems that the precondition of granting a hyphenated identity such as 'German-Turk' in Germany is integration into the German way of life. In the United States of America, on the other hand, the granting of the hyphenated identity is relatively less unconditional since the USA is by definition an immigrant nation. The usage of the German hyphenated identities in both official and public discourses is an indication of the discursive shift in the perception of Germany as an immigration country by the German authorities. This has actually been confirmed by the changes in the citizenship laws as well as by the report prepared by the Independent Commission on Migration to Germany.[10] Citizenship laws do not only spring from legal concerns, they are also culturally formed. Thus, in what follows the cultural elements defining the nature of citizenship laws in Germany should be depicted. In doing so, I shall also briefly touch upon the changes in academic discourse, or paradigm shift, in respect to research on German-Turks. The reason why I outline the paradigm shift is to address the similarity of changes in both citizenship laws and related scientific researches.

Migratory Process in France

Like Germany, France experience labour shortages in the aftermath of the World War II. In response to this

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[9] For a detailed account of the discussions of citizenship law in Germany see, Kaya (Forthcoming).

[10] Independent Commission on Migration to Germany was chaired by Rita Süssmuth, MP; and the report prepared by the Commission was submitted to the Federal Minister of the Interior on the 4th of July 2001.

situation, she became an active recruiter of migrant workers from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s. However, only part of the post-war discussions about migration revolved around the need for labour; another part revolved around the need for population growth in the face of a declining birth rate. By unlinking residence permits from work permits, the government opened up the doors to jobseekers who had not yet been hired and to families. This encouraged immigrants to view themselves as permanent settlers than labour sojourners (Kivisto, 2002: 172). Although no ethnic quotas were laid down, French governments sought as far as possible to encourage European rather than African or Asian immigrants. Algerians, Portuguese, Moroccans, Italians, Spanish, Tunisians and Turks followed each other in terms of recruitment order and numbers. First, French nationals living in Algeria, commonly known as *pieds-noirs*, fled to France, who were followed later by the *harkis*, who were the Algerians who fought on the side of the French during the independence struggle. After the French defeat, many of these French allies were executed by the Algerian nationalists, but many managed to flee to the mainland. Shortly after the independence of Algeria, both states signed a recruitment agreement recruit further labour, resulting in the concentration of Algerians in Paris, Lyon, and Marseille. Spaniards, Italians, Moroccans, Tunisians and Turks followed the Algerians in relatively smaller numbers.

France signed a recruitment treaty with Turkey in 1966. The first workers coming to France were actually those who had applied to the Turkish Employment Office (*İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu*) in order to go to Germany (Kastoryano, 1986: 165; Fırat, 2003: 76). As German labour market was saturated by the Turkish labour force, some of the Turkish applicants had the opportunity to go to France after the recruitment treaty was in force. This stage of migration from Turkey is called *anonymous migration*. The next stage of migration from Turkey to France is called *nominal migration*, when the workers were recruited upon private calls (Strasburger, 1995). Nominal migration was rather more popular in France compared to Germany, and it has led to the rise of chain migration. Such form of migration inevitably resulted with intensification of migrants from certain ethnic and geographical origins.

Country of Origin	Population
Algeria	1,550,000
Morocco	1,000,000
Tunisia	350,000
Black Africa	250,000
Turkey	315,000
Converts	40,000
Asylum Applicants/Illegal	350,000
Asians	100,000
Other	100,000
Total	4,155,000

Table 4. National Origins of the Muslim Population[11]

Although the recruitment process in France was terminated by the conservative government of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in 1974, migration from Turkey lingered on through the means of family reunification and illegal overstay of the tourists coming into the country. Recently, migration still continues in the form of marriages from Turkey and asylum seeking in the country. The conservative government also wanted to reduce the number of foreigners in the nation via a campaign of voluntary repatriation that involved monetary inducements to leave. Between April 1977 and November 1981 France gave an allowance of 10.000 Francs to unemployed immigrants who agreed to return for good to their home country with their family. While it was primarily directed at the non-EU nations, in fact very few Third World immigrants took up the offer. It was the Spanish and Portuguese who complied with the offer to go back to their countries, in which democratic regimes were back in place. The result of these measures taken together was that, for the last quarter of the twentieth century, the size of foreign population remained steady (Kivisto, 2002). Germany may have drawn some lessons out of the French experience. Between the 30 October 1983 and 30 June 1984 unemployed immigrants were encouraged to return to their country with their family by 30 September 1984. Although 300.000 persons left Germany, the government decided not to conduct such a kind of operation again due to its overwhelming financial cost (Kaya, 2001).

Acquisition of citizenship and the rise of anti-immigrant nationalist discourse in France
France has historically defined citizenship on political rather than ethno-cultural terms since the French Revolution, and invited all foreigners, "friends of Liberty", to join the French State. The decree of 26 August 1792 granted French citizenship to foreigners who by their writings or acts had defended liberty and the

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[11] Best estimates of an interior ministry source in "l'Islam dans la République," Haut Conseil à l'intégration, Nov.2000, p.26; these figures are widely seen to undercount the number of illegals.

principles of the revolution. Besides the principle of *jus sanguinis* attributing automatically citizenship to those born in France to French parents, the revolutionaries attributed to the principle of jus soli specific conditions which guaranteed attachment and loyalty to France. The dominance of the principle of *jus soli* has remained the same since the revolution. While 1851 citizenship law gave French citizenship to third-generation immigrants, the 1889 citizenship legislation attributed automatically French citizenship to second-generation immigrants (Brubaker, 1992: 85-86). 1889 law, with small modifications, exists until nowadays.

French citizenship law contains two provisions embodying the principle of *jus soli*: Article 23, attributing citizenship at birth to third-generation immigrants, and Article 44, attributing citizenship at age of 18 to second-generation immigrants who were born in France and have resided there since age 13, provided that they have not opted out of French citizenship during the preceding year and that they have not been convicted of certain crimes. French citizenship law also permits double citizenship. However, French citizenship law has been lately criticized by the nationalists for turning foreigners into French citizens on paper without making sure that they were "French at heart" (*Français de Coeur*). Nationalist critiques of *jus soli* principle have even become stronger since the early 1990s when the so-called Islamic fundamentalism is at stake in the west.

The French saw themselves as an assimilationist nation, but they were unprepared for the presence of large numbers of people of colour and large numbers of Muslims. Alec Hargreaves (1995: 26-7) summarized the situation in the following passage:

"The seeming invisibility of past generations of immigrants and of those who are today descended from them is often regarded as proof of the success with which they have been incorporated into French society. Immigrants who have settled in France during the post-war period, and more particularly those who have come to the fore during the past twenty years, are often felt to threaten this tradition. It is widely claimed that people of Third World origins much harder to 'integrate' than Europeans. Far from disappearing without a trace, they have actually increased in visibility at a time when successive governments have been claiming that immigration is at an end… the fear is that immigration is leading remorselessly to the formation of permanently distinct minorities within French society."

For a century France has defined second generation immigrants as citizens. This practice was uncontested until recently. In the mid-1980s, however, *jus soli* came under sharp attack from the far right. "*Etre Français, cela mérite*" (to be French, you have to deserve it), proclaimed Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front. Under pressure from the National Front, the centre right parties took up the theme during the 1986 legislative campaign, proposing in their joint platform to denounce 'automatic' acquisitions of French citizenship. Second generation immigrants no longer would become French *jus soli*, they would have to demand French nationality expressly, and that would have to be accepted by the state. The new government of Jacques Chirac proposed to limit the *jus soli* principle as far as the immigrants were concerned. Yet the proposal provoked strong opposition, and eventually it was withdrawn from the legislative agenda. A commission was set up to inquire the issue, and the Commission even came up with the idea to enlarge access to French citizenship rather than restricting it (Brubaker, 1992: 138). The Commission's report formed the bases for the Law No 93.933 from July 22nd, 1993. The most important reform introduced the notion of consent by stating that "persons born in France of foreign parents can acquire French citizenship between the ages of 16 and 21 by declaration if the five years residence requirement and the non-convictions required are satisfied". Persons who have expressly declined French citizenship during the year preceding their majority and persons who have been convicted of certain crimes are excluded from this provision.

Naturalisation becomes secondary to the acquisition of citizenship in France. In contrast to the declaration, the naturalization procedure is discretionary, i.e. subject to the control and approval of the administration. The naturalisation procedure in France requires five years of permanent residence, majority, linguistic competence, assimilation to the French community, and good moral and customs which means no sentences to more than six months or to offences or crimes against the State's security. Unlike many other countries, France does not require from the candidates to naturalization to renounce their original citizenship. The requirements to naturalization are founded on the presumptions of the assimilation, attachment and loyalty of foreigners settled in France. That is why the administration usually rejects demands of naturalization by foreigners whose family members live abroad.

Year	Acquisition of French citizenship			
	By naturalization		By declaration	
	Total	Spouse and children of a naturalized person	Total	By marriage
1985	26 902	11 978	19 089	12 634
1986	21 072	10 344	22 566	15 190
1987	16 205	7 848	16 052	9 788
1988	16 762	7 948	27 338	16 592
1989	19 901	10 178	26 468	15 489
1990	*	*	*	*
1991	*	*	*	*
1992	22 792	12 349	32 249	15 601
1993	23 283	13 157	32 425	15 246
1994	29 106	15 396	43 633	19 493
1995	24 718	12 041	21 017	16 659
1996	34 650	16 923	21 880	19 127
1997	35 703	18 471	23 191	20 845

Sources: Direction de la Population et des Migrations - André Lebon - 1990 and 1997

Table 5. Naturalisation in France

Sociologist Michéle Tribalat (1996) made a comparative field study among Algerian, Moroccan, Spanish, Portuguese, Southeast Asian, and Turkish migrants in France.[12] Her conclusion was quite striking in pointing out that the Turks set up an exception. According to him, French-Turks migrants were the most resistant groups against integration, or assimilation. French-Turks do not prefer to speak French at home although they are rather competent in French; they set up parallel communities to the majority society in their own ethnic enclaves; they more oriented to religiosity compared to the other Muslim communities; they do not prefer intermarriage with the French; and they are less inclined with education. These were some of the conclusions of Tribalat (2002). Tribalat's holistic conclusions deriving from a quantitative work have been strongly criticized by scholars (Fırat, 2003).

The French Republican ideal is recently under attack in several fronts. On the one hand, there are some changes in French public life challenging the conventional assumption that "the French Republic is one and indivisible". The 'Territorial Laws' for New Caledonia and French Polynesia and the granting of legislative powers to the Corsican Assembly have already demonstrated that the French Republic is still one, but no longer 'indivisible'. On the other hand, explicit discrimination in public space experienced and expressed by the Muslims (especially Algerians) confront the national education apparatus programmed to reproduce the French citizen, and thus the homogenous French nation, allured to republican consciousness. As Tribalat (2003) put it "what is the point in working hard for success at school if you are going to be discriminated against".[13] She reports that the presence of discrimination raises the problem of coherence between republican principles and the reality of French society. Until recently, it was a taboo in France to talk about discrimination because of the threat it poses to republicanism (Tribalat, 2003: 135). Pierre Sadran (2003: 53)'s words very well display the current legitimacy crisis of the French Republican ideology:

"Contrary to Astérix' village of incapable Gauls, the French have become less receptive to the myth of exceptionalism. First, because the nation-state has been destabilized from above and below: by the dynamic of decentralization and that of European Integration. Second, because French universalism has had to lower its ambitions and be content to embody one particular version of the universal ideal… Finally, because the French model of social integration based on the republican school, does not work in the same way as in the past. Distinctive cultures have become legitimate in a France which showed in the World Cup of 1998 that it felt more at home with a *Black-Blanc-Beur* team (Blacks-Whites-French of North African origin) that with the blue, white and red of the national flag."

It is doubtless that the myth of republicanism in France is under attack in several matters. There is a paradoxal situation in the country. On the one hand, the French state is changing through decentralization and European Integration; on the other hand, social and political culture of the country is still shaped by the myth of unitary and republican state. As far as the migration policies are concerned, it seems that migrants are still subject to the idea of universalism, which actually requires assimilation into the conventional political values of the French

[12] This research was held in 1992 by the Institut National d'Études Dénographiques with the assistance of the Institut National des Statisques et Études Économiques.
[13] Our data affirm Tribalat's findings concerning the discrimination faced by immigrant populations and those of foreign origin. French-Turks, when asked, mostly address at the problem of discrimination in France (17 %).

nation. Assimilationist integration, to which migrant groups are subject, is likely to result in the rise of politics of identity, and culturalism among the migrants. The politics of identity is expected to reinforce ethnic, cultural and linguistic boundaries between the majority and minorities.

Chapter 2
Profile of the Sample

Over 2,5 million of German-Turks live in Germany, and around 400 thousand French-Turks live in France. The total population of the Euro-Turks dwelling in the EU countries is around 4 million. The sample was made by the researchers in order to reflect a representative picture, in terms of age, gender, occupation and region.

Gender distribution

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Female	480	45,1	276	46,0
Male	585	54,9	324	54,0
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

Gender distribution of the structured interviews reflects that equal gender representation has been aimed at.
Age distribution

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
15-19	130	12,2	60	10,0
20-29	**297**	**27,9**	157	26,2
30-39	264	24,8	**170**	**28,3**
40-49	119	11,2	92	15,3
50+	255	23,9	121	20,2
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

Age distribution of the structured interviews also reflects that equal age representation has been aimed at.
Sampling Distribution

Germany	Number of Questionnaires	Number of Questionnaires	France
Niedersachsen-Bremen	82	222	Ille De France
Nordrhein – Westfalen	381	41	Centre
Hessen	121	150	Rhone Alpes
Baden – Württemberg	233	32	Franche Comté
Bayern	184	109	Alsace
Berlin	64	46	Loraine
Total	**1065**	**600**	**Total**

Sampling distribution reflects a representative picture in terms of the density of Euro-Turks' population from region to region. In Germany, a greater proportion of the interviews was held in Nordrhein-Westfalen (35 percent); and in France in Ille de France (37 percent).
Occupational Distribution

	Germany		France	
	Count	%	Count	%
Employed	415	39,0	328	40,5
Students	69	6,5	45	6,6
Unemployed	120	11,3	17	10,5

Unfeed labour, housewive, retired	461	43,3	210	42,5
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

Occupational distribution has also been made in line with the actual population number of the Euro-Turks in order to get a representative picture.

Language of the structured interviews

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Turkish	854	80,2	409	68,2
German/French	**211**	**19,8**	**191**	**31,8**
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

It was possible for the interviewers to conduct the structured interviews in one of those three languages (Turkish, German and French) depending upon the will of the person interviewed. The number of the interviewed people who preferred the language of the hostland remarkably differs in both countries (20 % in Germany, and 32 % in France). This gives us an idea about the competence of the Euro-Turks about written Turkish. Combining the quantitative data with the qualitative data it could be argued that French-Turks are less competent than the German-Turks, although they have a shorter migrancy period. Another essential point to make here is that French-Turks prefer the Turkish language as a medium of communication in the family though the youngsters are very much competent in French, and the French tradition is very assimilationist in that respect. However, there is not a very resistant act of speaking Turkish in the German-Turkish families. The difference which lies here could be the resistance developed by the French-Turks against the French ideal of assimilation, in a way that places a border between public space and private space in terms of using the French language (Tribalat, 2002).

Where were you born?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Born in Turkey	772	72,5	487	81,2
Born in **Germany**	289	**27,1**	7	1,2
Born in **France**			106	**17,7**
Born in another European Country	2	,2		
Born in another country outside European countries	2	,2		
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

More than 1/4 of the German-Turks were born in Germany, and 18 % of the French-Turks born in France.

Where were you born in Turkey?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
City centre	202	26,2	170	**34,9**
Town	311	**40,3**	165	33,9
Village	217	28,1	152	31,2
Total	**772**	**100,0**	**487**	**100,0**

A great number of the French-Turks (35 %) have urban origin in Turkey, while a lower percentage of German-Turks (26 %) are urban origin. German-Turks who were born in Turkey are predominantly rural origin (68 %). The data indicate that German-Turks are overwhelmingly uprooted peasants who have been turned into

proletarians.[14]

Is there anybody in your family preceding your coming here?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
No, I am the first to come	182	**17,1**	154	**25,7**
Yes	883	82,9	444	74,0
No response			2	,3
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

This table shows us that chain migration has been the main form of migration among the German-Turks, while the French-Turks have less been subject to that. However, it should also be noted here that there are remarkable differences between the migration patterns of German-Turks and French-Turks. French-Turks often express that they came to France because they could not make it to Germany. When Turkish migration started to France, Germany had already taken a long way in recruiting Turkish workers. Several of the French-Turks even state that they were planning to pass to Germany after spending a few years in France. Migration to Germany has always been regulated by the German state, while the French state has delegated it to individual companies willing to recruit foreign labour. Thus, individual companies prompted those first migrants to recommend their own fellowmen to come to France. This is why French-Turks originating from the same region in Turkey tend to concentrate in particular places in France (Fırat, 2003: 76; Heckmann and Unbehaun, 1999: 82). Such a background makes it more practical for the French-Turks to carry on their traditional solidarity networks for a longer period of time in comparison to the German-Turks.

Who was the first comer in your family?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Grandparents	80	9,1	19	4,3
Parents	536	60,7	222	50,0
Partner	172	19,5	102	23,0
Other relatives	156	17,7	101	22,7
Total	**883**	**100,0**	**444**	**100,0**

Parents have the highest percentage among the relatives who preceded the interviewees. The number of the grandparents of the German-Turks is higher than those of the French-Turks. This is the indication of the rising number of the third/fourth generation descendants in Germany. However, there is also a similar sign in France.

What is your reason to come to Germany/France?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Came to work	225	21,1	**180**	**30,0**
Came for education	66	6,2	18	3,0
Born and raised here	**279**	**26,2**	96	16,0
Came to marry (My partner was living here)	**247**	**23,2**	**162**	**27,0**
Came for political reasons	17	1,6	23	3,8
Came for family unification	223	20,9	131	21,8

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[14] Oscar Handlin's (1973) classic account of "the uprooted" point to the peasants who were turned into proletarians in the American context.

Touristic purposes	17	1,6	7	1,2
Because I don't like Turkey			1	,2
Personal Reasons			3	,5
No response			1	,2
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

Majority of the German-Turks reported that they came to Germany for the purpose of family unification (marriage or family reunification, 44 %). And those who came to Germany to work correspond to about 21 %. Those born in Germany constitute 26 % of the German-Turks. On the other hand, 30 % of the French-Turks came to France to work, while around 49 % of those reported that their main motivation to come to France was either family reunification (22 %), or marriage (27 %).

Marital status?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Married	715	67,1	419	69,8
Cohabitating	9	,8	15	2,5
Single	289	27,1	133	22,2
Widow, divorced	52	4,9	33	5,5
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

The number of the married people among those interviewed is similar in both countries. As the German-Turks are relatively younger, those who have 'single' status in Germany are higher than that of France. Although cohabitation is rarely seen in both countries, a slightly higher percentage of French-Turks experience it compared to the German-Turks.

Is your partner Turkish?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Turkish	680	93,9	402	92,6
German	41	5,7	1	,2
French	1	,1	26	6,0
Other European Countries			4	,9
Somewhere outside Europe	2	,3	1	,2
Total	**724**	**100,0**	**434**	**100,0**

Today, those who marry their children to French/German men or women are very rare. Most of the people interviewed are married to Turkish origin persons. Approximately 6 % of the Euro-Turks are married to either French or German origin persons. Intermarriage is known to be one of the indicators of amalgamation, and this is lately increasing among the Euro-Turks. On the other hand, to make some comparisons in the French context, among Algerian men in France who live with a partner or spouse, half of them share their life with a French woman, the proportion among the young Portuguese origins is around 59 %. As expected, unions with a native French man are more difficult and rare among the young Algerian women (24 % as compared to 47 % of young Portuguese women) (Tribalat, 2002).

Do you have children?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent

0 No	376	35,3	192	32,0
1	116	10,9	56	9,3
2	195	18,3	96	16,0
3	185	17,4	114	19,0
4	110	10,3	83	13,8
5	55	5,2	34	5,7
6	20	1,9	16	2,7
7 +	8	,8	9	1,5
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

German-Turks are likely to have fewer children than the French-Turks. While the percentage of the German-Turks who have at most three children is 47 %, this number goes down to 44 % in France.

How many are you in the household?

	Germany			France		
	Count	Percent	Cumulative Percent	Count	Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	61	5,7	5,7	59	9,8	9,8
2	175	16,4	22,2	93	15,5	25,3
3	230	21,6	43,8	92	15,3	40,7
4	277	26,0	69,8	137	22,8	63,5
5	194	18,2	88,0	137	22,8	86,3
6	85	8,0	96,0	56	9,3	95,7
7	25	2,3	98,3	16	2,7	98,3
8 +	18	1,7	100,0	10	1,6	100,0
Total	**1065**	**100,0**		**600**	**100,0**	

Generally speaking the households in both countries are composed of 4 members. It is also remarkable that the number of single people in France (9,8 %) is almost as double as the one in Germany (5,6).

Do you own the house you live in?

	Germany, %	France, %	Total, %
My own property	12,4	24,7	13,6
Rental	84,5	68,7	83,0
Belongs to the family, paying no rent	2,9	4,8	3,1
Lodging	0,2	1,8	0,3
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

How many m^2 is your house?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Smaller than 50 m2	108	10,1	94	15,7
50-74 m2	386	**36,2**	152	**25,3**
75-99 m2	380	**35,7**	219	**36,5**
100-124m2	127	11,9	80	13,3
125-150 m2	46	4,3	31	5,2

Larger than 150 m2	18	1,7	23	3,8
No response			1	,2
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

Do you own immovable in Turkey?

	Germany, %	France, %	Total, %
No, I don't.	34,3	20,8	33,0
Yes, I have.	65,7	79,2	67,0
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

If yes, then what kind of immovable?

	Germany, %	France, %	Total, %
Apartment Flat, or house	87,9	83,8	87,4
Summer cottage	11,0	13,5	11,3
Working place	7,9	8,2	7,9
Field	45,9	46,9	46,1
Store	1,3	1,3	1,3
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

Euro-Turks do not seem to be integrated in the housing market. 83 % of the Euro-Turks live in rental flats, while only 13,6 % own their own apartments. 72 % of the German-Turks live in the houses ranging between 50 m^2 and 100 m^2 and this is around 62 % for the French-Turks. However, 67 % own immovable in Turkey (87 % apartments, 11 % summer cottages, 46 % fields). This may have several explanations. It may be that it is more reasonable to make such investments in Turkey as German-Germans are also increasingly doing the same. As Bianca Kaiser (2001) stated in her latest work, there are more than 20 thousand German immovable registries in Turkey. Thus, investments made by the Euro-Turks in Turkey do not necessarily spring from their 'unquestionable' orientation to the homeland, it may also be a rational form of investment as performed by the German-Germans.

Do you have auto?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
No	645	60,6	413	68,8
Yes	420	39,4	187	31,2
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

Automobile ownership among the French-Turks (69 %) is higher than the German-Turks (61 %). French-Turks seem to be more prosperous compared to the German-Turks.

How often do you go to Turkey?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
More than once a year	132	**12,4**	52	8,7
Once a year	572	53,7	222	37,0
Once in every 2-3 years	278	26,1	235	**39,2**
Rarely	46	4,3	45	7,5

	Count	%	Count	%
Nearly not at all	37	3,5	46	7,7
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

The high ratio of the German-Turks visiting Turkey at least once a year (66 %) affirms one of the previous findings that German-Turks have a great sense of attachment to Turkey. This ratio is lover for the French-Turks (46 %). The difference between the German-Turks and French-Turks may also be resulting from the fact that Germany is better connected to Turkey in terms of transportation facilities.

What is the purpose of your visits to Turkey?

	Germany		France	
	Count	%	Count	%
Holiday, seaside, sun	498	46,8	338	56,3
Visiting relatives, homeland (village, town, city)	1000	93,9	519	86,5
Professional	43	4,0	18	3,0
Others	7	,7		
No response	16	1,5	46	7,7
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

Almost all the Euro-Turks are likely to go to Turkey in order to visit their relatives and hometowns (94 % G-T; 87 % F-T). However, around 47 % of the G-T and 56 % of the F-T also go to the holiday resorts. This is a great indication exposing the volume and dynamics of transnational space between/beyond Turkey and Germany/France. However, the transnational space between/beyond Turkey and Germany is much greater the one between Turkey and France.[15] Euro-Turks remain actively involved in their homeland often by maintaining the ties of kinship and friendship, but also by remaining involved politically, economically, and culturally in the larger homeland society. For Euro-Turks, transnationalism is aided by geographic proximity that makes frequent trips home feasible. They have also become global villagers by taking advantage of communication and transportation technologies to forge transnational identities.

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[15] The volume of transportation, trade, communication, politics, and academic studies between Turkey and Germany indicate that the transnational space between the two countries is highly developed and efficient compared to the one between Turkey and France.

Chapter 3
Euro-Turks and Social Classes

Both qualitative and quantitative data explicate that Euro-Turks are no longer solely manual workers working in the low-skilled jobs without having any agency to represent them in the public space. On the contrary, they have many politicians, artists, artisans, businessmen, poets, novelists, bureaucrats, journalists, singers and teachers representing them in one way or another in the public space. Most of the Euro-Turks no longer need the tutelage of their German/French mentors to represent them in the public space; rather they are being represented by their own organic intellectuals. This has of course something to do with the fact that Turks are socially mobilizing upward, and now having a large number of middle-class people inside the communities. However, there is also a parallel phenomenon to this, and that is the rise of the unemployed people who cannot be affiliated with any formal job. A number of those people have the right to benefit from the welfare system by getting their unemployment benefit from the state. But, an increasing amount of people cannot have the same right as they were not in a position to contribute to the welfare system due to their narcotic unemployment status. Unemployment is of course an outcome of the global recession. Those unemployed Euro-Turks whom one could easily come across in places like Kreuzberg (Berlin), Keupstrasse (Köln), Villier le Bel (Paris)[16], are in general against Turkey's candidature to the EU. The Euro-Turks dwelling in those segregated ethnic enclaves are truly disadvantaged. The world not only continues to be segregated for them, but in some cases there is evidence of greater levels of segregation than in the past, leading some researchers to refer to this as "hypersegregation" (Massey and Denton, 1993). Inner-city Turks in such neighbourhoods attend segregated schools, worship in their own mosques, and shop in segregated stores, generate their niche economies, and so forth. The exodus of the Turkish middle-class from inner cities for new neighbourhoods has left behind only the poorest of the poor in communities increasingly disconnected to the larger urban economy and bereft of the institutional support that once helped ghetto dwellers to survive in a hostile world. These are communities hard hit by deindustrialization, where residents are forced to cope with the consequences of what happens to neighbourhoods when work disappears (Kivisto, 2002). The most appropriate term for describing the worldview of those "hypersegregated people" is *nihilism*.

Unemployed Euro-Turks (22 % in Germany, and 11 % in France) tend to express their distrust in both Turkish and German/French states as they are both not capable of providing them with better opportunities to survive. Their damaged solidarity with the homeland and hostland was previously replaced by orientation to alternative formations such as community associations, religious organizations (predominantly *Milli Görüş*, Alevi *Cemevis*), fellowship organizations, culture, ethnicity and mosques. However, the crisis and corruption faced by the religious organizations and the failure of the other ethnic or religious based associations to meet their demands have resulted in the decline of such formations. The outcome of this process now is that those people have happened to come to the belief that there is nothing else but themselves to believe in. This is what we call the proleterianisation process resulting with the rise of nihilist tendencies in a way that belittles the value of politics.

The lives of the Euro-Turks (especially of the German-Turks) of lower social status have been complicated by deindustrialization and by the arrival of new immigrants (*Aussiedlers* and *Übersiedler*)[17] since the early 1990s. The decline of the manufacturing has prevented many Euro-Turks from upward mobility available to unskilled workers in the past.

Monthly income of the household?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Less than 1000 Euro	221	**20,8**	89	**14,8**
Between 1001-1500 Euro	306	28,7	178	29,7
Between 1501-2000 Euro	296	27,8	160	26,7
Between 2001-3000 Euro	173	**16,2**	122	**20,3**
More than 3001 Euro	67	6,3	49	8,2
No response	2	,2	2	,3

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[16] The common denominator of these districts that we observed in our own qualitative field research is that they are all ethnically Turkish enclaves. These districts are just some of the examples of such ethnic enclaves.
[17] *Übersiedler* refers to the East Germans who migrated to the Federal Republic of Germany during the Cold War; and *Aussiedler* means ethnic Germans who repatriated from Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the Cold War period.

	Count			
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

The table above indicates that French-Turks are generally speaking better off than the German-Turks. While 21 % of the German-Turks earn less than 1000 Euro/month, this ratio is around 15 % for the French-Turks.

Present job status?

	Germany		France	
	Count	%	Count	%
Regular Salaried worker	**349**	**32,8**	**218**	**36,3**
Temporarily waged worker	21	2,0	**49**	**8,2**
Self-employed	45	4,2	**67**	**11,2**
Presently unemployed taking unemployment benefit	**114**	**10,7**	28	4,7
Presently unemployed not taking unemployment benefit	**123**	**11,5**	15	2,5
Political asylum, getting state benefit	2	,2		
Retired, not working	**96**	**9,0**	27	4,5
Student	69	6,5	45	7,5
Housewife	246	23,1	151	25,2
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

Majority of the interviewees are regularly paid workers. This ratio is bigger in France (36 %) compared to Germany (32 %). The second largest group is the housewives (25 % F-T; 23 % G-T). On the other hand unemployment rate among the German-Turks is around 22 %. The unemployment rate among the French-Turks is around 7 %. The high unemployment rate among the German-Turks dos not necessarily mean that Germany has a much bigger unemployment problem compared to France. It may also because of the fact that Germany has a better welfare state system in a way that provides the unemployed people with better unemployment benefit. The qualitative research has also indicated that German-Turks are inclined to benefit from the existing welfare system, sometimes even to the extent that misusing it. The number of the self-employed and temporarily working people among the French-Turks (11 % and 8 %) is higher than the German-Turks (4 % and 2 %).

How do you find your economic and social conditions compared to that of your parents?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Much worse	34	3,2	10	1,7
Worse	182	**17,1**	62	10,3
the same	211	19,8	100	16,7
better	494	46,4	330	**55,0**
much better	144	13,5	98	16,3
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

How do you find your recent economic and social conditions compared to the last decade?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Much worse	58	5,4	18	3,0

Worse	338	**31,7**	94	15,7
the same	201	18,9	92	15,3
better	373	35,0	278	**46,3**
much better	95	8,9	117	19,5
No response			1	,2
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

The tables above indicate that German-Turks are more inclined to express their relative demise of prosperity. While the French-Turks are generally happy with their recent economic and social conditions, the German-Turks complain more about their recent status. Although both groups state their relative prosperity compared to their parents, the ratio of the interviewees addressing their rising status in the last ten years is 44 % among the German-Turks, and 66 % among the French-Turks. This may be due to the impact of the common European currency, EURO, which was put into effect in 2002.

Social Economic Status: Occupational Status I

	Germany	France	Total
Housewife, student, asylum seeker	29,8%	33,3%	30,1%
Retired	9,0%	4,5%	8,6%
Unemployed	22,3%	7,5%	20,9%
Self-employed artisan	3,5%	6,2%	3,7%
Self-employed (lawyer, doctor etc.)	,4%	,7%	,4%
Employer	,4%	3,5%	,7%
Blue collar	22,1%	39,3%	23,7%
White collar (employee)	10,1%	4,5%	9,6%
White collar (employer)	2,5%	,5%	2,3%
Total	**100,0%**	**100,0%**	**100,0%**

The striking numbers are the unemployment rates in both countries: 22 % in Germany, and 8 % in France. Unemployment rate among the German-Turks almost doubles the rate among the German-Germans (11 %). French-Turks are predominantly blue collar worker, while the German-Turks are rather more diversified. The data indicate that German-Turks are economically more integrated than the French-Turks.

Social Economic Status: Educational Status II

	Germany, %	France, %	*Total, %*
Illiterate	1,7	2,5	1,8
Drop-out	2,3	3,0	2,3
Primary school	19,5	27,5	20,3
Secondary school	34,9	18,3	33,4
High school (Licé)	15,6	14,0	15,4
Occupational School	17,5	22,3	17,9
University	8,3	9,5	8,4
Postgraduate	,3	2,8	,5
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

The striking figure in the table above is the difference between the secondary school graduates in both countries (35 % in Germany and 18 % in France). This actually refers to the problematic nature of the German educational

system which does not easily mobilize the students upward. German educational system, which has been labelled by the latest Piza research (the Programme for International Student Assessment)[18] as the most inefficient one among the European countries, does actually reproduces the status quo in terms of the existing class structure. The figures in Turkey are quite different than the ones in Germany and France. The rate of illiteracy among the Turks in Turkey was around 13 % in 1996.

However, the common denominator of the two countries' education system is that both do not really provide the migrants and their children with a platform whereby they could turn their cultural capital into an economic capital after they graduate. Thus, both countries are discriminating towards the migrant families in the labour market. It is also claimed by Tribalat (2002) that the rate of illiteracy is much higher among the Moroccan and Algerian communities. The fact that Muslims cannot socially mobilize themselves in public life leads to the emergence of strong mental constructs in the country which identify social, economic and educational problems with 'backward cultures'. Such mental constructs make an inclusive education for citizenship extremely difficult to achieve. The sociologist François Dubet observes that:

"Relationships in schools, like relationships in society as a whole, are increasingly racialized. Individuals are perceived as having an 'ethnic' identity and stigmatized. To put it simply, whereas previously schools would have described children as working class, now they describe them as immigrant children. Whereas children were before diagnosed as having problems because their fathers were poor, now they diagnose children as having problems because their fathers are 'immigrants', even if the child is of the third generation. Whereas they identify the behaviour of boys as 'aggressive', now the behaviour is described as 'ethnic'" (Cited in Starkey, 2003: 120).

Racialization of discourse on social immobility and educational failure goes parallel with the fact that there are any ethnic minority councillors in France today. A combination of stigmatization and lack of role models may make it more difficult for ethnic minority pupils in France to identify with a republican discourse which cannot provide them with any material capital (Starkey, 2003: 120). France is lately facing a significant challenge in raising citizens loyal to the republican values of *Liberté, Egalité,* and *Fraternité.* Citizenship education through national education system has always been intended to help integrate a diverse population into a single national culture defined as republican. Universal and liberal values have always been prior to cultural, ethnic and religious dispositions. This presents a static and assimilationist view of French society into which pupils have to fit. A dynamic view would also suggest opportunities to help shape society, in which individuals could be more reflexive and active social agents.

Socio-Economic Status Distribution

	Germany, %	France, %	Total, %
Highest	2,4	2,5	2,4
Upper	5,1	11,0	5,6
Upper Middle	11,4	13,7	11,6
Middle	28,8	31,3	29,1
Lower Middle	27,5	21,7	27,0
Lower	16,3	14,8	16,2
Lowest	8,5	5,0	8,1
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

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[18] Co-ordinated by the OECD, PISA (the Programme for International Student Assessment, 2002) is a collaborative effort among the governments of 28 OECD and four non-member countries. The first results, published in December 2001, provide an indicator of the outcome of initial education that is officially recognised across the developed world. Crucially, the survey will be repeated every three years, allowing countries to monitor progress regularly. In 2003, all 30 OECD countries will take part, while at least 13 more non-members, from China to Chile, are joining the survey. What do the PISA results show? Finnish students did particularly well in reading, and Japanese and Koreans excelled in mathematics and science. Australia, Austria, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom were significantly above average for all three types of literacy. Those consistently below average included two relatively affluent economies, Germany and Italy, as well as others with below-average national income like Greece, Mexico, Poland and Portugal. The United States performed bang in the middle. These averages mask important variations in performance within each country. Since most education systems have been trying particularly to improve the performance of the lowest achievers, the amount of variation in achievement is important. Germany was one of the countries with the greatest inequalities in reading literacy, with poor performing students dragging down the average.

The data above indicate that French-Turks are more prosperous in comparison to the German-Turks. 52 % of the German-Turks and 41 % of the French-Turks have reported to be in the lower middle class and below.

The data below indicate that Euro-Turks pose quite a different picture from the ways in which they are perceived by both Turks in Turkey and receiving societies. Euro-Turks no longer essentialize their homeland as a final destination of return; and they no longer fit into the stereotypical image developed by the receiving societies. They integrate into the political, cultural and economic spheres of life in both countries, especially in Germany. Hence, both Turks in Turkey and German/French societies should reconsider their perspectives about the Euro-Turks.

Perceptions on Turkey

Euro-Turks' orientation to Turkey in various spheres of life is shaped by several factors such as religiosity, ethnicity, gender, social status, length of stay abroad, and social capital. It is stereotypically believed both in Turkey and Germany/France that Euro-Turks are tremendously concerned with political, social, economic and cultural affairs of their homeland, and that they are not engaged in domestic life of their countries of settlement. The data below indicate that such assumptions are actually stereotypes, and that Euro-Turks have quite realistic and rational perceptions about Turkey, far from being sightless and romantic.

To which extent are you interested in politics in Turkey?

	Germany		France	
	Count	%	Count	%
Not at all	280	26,3	215	**35,8**
Not really	166	15,6	87	14,5
So so	215	20,2	102	17,0
As much as I can	272	25,5	140	23,3
Very much so	132	12,4	56	9,3
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

The number of the Euro-Turks who are not interested in politics in Turkey is surprisingly high (42 % G-T; and 50 % F-T). This number actually contradicts with the stereotype that German-Turks are still oriented to the homeland politics, and they are not interested at all in the domestic politics of Germany. Contrary to this, there are plenty of German-Turks and French-Turks who reported to be interested in German politics, French politics, EU politics and world politics.

Which political party in Turkey do you affiliate with?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
AKP (Justice and Development Party)	339	**31,8**	209	**34,8**
ANAP (Motherland Party)	46	4,3	18	3,0
CHP (Republican People's Party)	76	7,1	53	**8,8**
DEHAP (People's Democratic Party)	26	2,4	33	5,5
DYP (True Path Party)	36	3,4	9	1,5
GP (Young Party)	18	1,7	9	1,5
MHP (Nationalist Action party Partisi)	87	8,2	47	7,8
SP (Saadet Partisi)	111	**10,4**	4	,7
ÖDP(Freedom and Solidarity Party)			8	1,3
DSP (Democratic Left Party)	6	,6		
LDP (Liberal Democrat Party)	1	,1		
BBP (Grand Unity Party)	2	,2	2	,3
None of those above	317	**29,8**	200	**33,3**

	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
No response			5	,8
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

Most of the Euro-Turks affiliate themselves with the AKP (32 % in Germany; and 35 % in France). 10 % support for the Saadet Party (SP) in Germany seems to be an indication of the power of the communal tendencies among the German-Turks. Support for the CHP remains to be relatively law in both countries. However, support for the MHP is also remarkable in both countries (8 %). On the other hand, what is also remarkable is the high percentage of people who do not affiliate with any political party in Turkey (30 % in Germany; and 33 % in France).

Have you voted in general elections in Turkey at all after settling in Germany/France?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Yes	266	**25,0**	48	**8,0**
No	799	75,0	552	92,0
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

The high percentage of German-Turks (25 %) who voted in Turkish general elections after settling in Germany partly results from the fact that political mobilization among the German-Turks is higher than the French-Turks (8 %). As known, especially Milli Görüş (National View Association) mobilized many Turkish electorates to vote in several elections in Turkey. *Milli Görüş* in France is not as organized as in Germany.

Did you vote in November 2002 elections in Turkey?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Yes	114	10,7	20	3,3
No	951	89,3	580	96,7
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

Decreasing percentage of those German-Turks voting in the latest elections in Turkey may have resulted from the fact that affiliation with radical religious formations such as Milli Görüş and Islamic capital have lately dropped. The other reason may be that orientation towards the Turkish politics is gradually dissolving.

What is the most important problem of Turkey? (multi-response)

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Democracy, human rights	249	**23,4**	87	14,5
Corruption, nepotism, bribery	211	**19,8**	129	**21,5**
Pressure on religiosity in the name of Laicism	127	11,9	41	6,8
Inflation, poverty	122	11,5	117	**19,5**
Separatism, terror	59	5,5	19	3,2
Unemployment	111	10,4	71	11,8
Kurdish question	18	1,7	25	4,2
Threatening Laicism, religious fundamentalism	7	,7	9	1,5
Administrative problems	18	1,7	11	1,8
Loosening of ethical values	32	3,0	6	1,0
Uneducation	50	4,7	28	4,7
Violence	4	,4	3	,5

Traffic	14	1,3	7	1,2
Health and social security problems	38	3,6	46	7,7
No response	4	,4	1	,2
None of those above	1	,1		
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

For the German-Turks, primarily democracy and human rights pose the greatest challenge for Turkey (23 %). It is corruption, nepotism and bribery for the French-Turks (22 %). What is also very remarkable is the difference between the German-Turks and French-Turks with respect to their views on the "pressure on religiosity in the name of laicism": 12 % of the German-Turks placed such problem in the third position, while only 7 % of the French-Turks pointed at it in the fifth position.

Which institution in Turkey do you trust most? (multi-response)

	Germany		France	
	Count	%	Count	%
Government	351	**33,0**	166	**27,7**
Religious institutions	210	19,7	61	10,2
Fellowship associations	26	2,4	8	1,3
Presidency	66	6,2	50	8,3
Labour unions	15	1,4	15	2,5
Courts	17	1,6	10	1,7
Parliament (TBMM)	42	3,9	22	3,7
Police	39	3,7	16	2,7
Political Parties	14	1,3	6	1,0
Educational institutions	37	3,5	30	5,0
Army	151	**14,2**	145	**24,2**
Health and social security institutions	7	,7	3	,5
Media	3	,3	9	1,5
No response	62	5,8		
I don't know	5	,5		
None of those above	20	1,9	59	9,8
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

The first institution Euro-Turks trust most in Turkey is the government (AKP, 33 % by G-T; and 28 % by F-T). Besides the AKP government with an Islamic democratic vision, religious institutions in Turkey attract 20 % of the German-Turks; and 10 % of the French-Turks. And the Army takes the third place among the German-Turks with 14 %, and the second place among the French-Turks with 24 %. AKP's success may have many reasons. Our qualitative research indicates that it is the priorities of the party which makes it popular among the Euro-Turks: emphasis on employment, progress, values, justice, and the European Union. On the other hand, the first institution disliked most is the media (29 % in Germany; and 22 % in France). And the second one is the health and social security institutions (11 % in Germany, and 23 % in France). Army takes the third place in Germany (9 %), while it is the police in France (10 %).

Which institution in Turkey do you trust least? (multi-response)

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent

Government	94	8,8	48	8,0
Religious institutions	33	3,1	44	7,3
Fellowship associations	19	1,8	8	1,3
Presidency	78	7,3	21	3,5
Labour unions	25	2,3	16	2,7
Courts	68	6,4	38	6,3
Parliament (TBMM)	30	2,8	11	1,8
Police	75	7,0	57	9,5
Political Parties	75	7,0	51	8,5
Educational institutions	15	1,4	3	,5
Army	97	9,1	18	3,0
Health and social security institutions	121	11,4	138	**23,0**
Media	308	**28,9**	134	**22,3**
No response	19	1,8		
I don't know	3	,3		
None of those above	5	,5	13	2,2
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

Do you think Turkey has become better or worse compared to the previous years?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Much worse	41	3,8	32	5,3
Worse	164	15,4	94	15,7
The same	197	18,5	85	14,2
Better	567	**53,2**	309	**51,5**
Much better	96	9,0	80	**13,3**
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

Are you optimistic or pessimistic about Turkey's future?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Very Pessimistic	26	2,4	22	3,7
Pessimistic	110	10,3	67	11,2
Neither pessimistic nor optimistic	303	28,5	144	24,0
Optimistic	516	**48,5**	301	**50,2**
Very optimistic	110	**10,3**	65	**10,8**
No reply			1	,2
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

Around the same number of people believe that Turkey has recently become better compared to the previous years (62 % G-T; and 65 % F-T). And both German-Turks and French-Turks are predominantly optimistic about Turkey's future. A similar trend is also visible in the public polls held in Turkey. Although the Euro-Turks are

not so optimistic about their future in their countries of settlement, they have a firm belief that Turkey has better future prospects. This is a remarkable point to keep in mind.

Perceptions on Germany/France

Turkish migrants and their children in the West are officially defined in Turkey as either *'gurbetçi'*, or *'Yurtdışındaki vatandaslarimiz'* (our citizens abroad). Euro-Turks are stereotypically defined by the Turkish people in Turkey as either *'Almanyalı* or *'Almanci'* (German-like). Both terms carry rather negative connotations in Turkey. The major Turkish stereotypes about the Euro-Turks are those of their being rich, eating pork, having a very comfortable life in Germany/France, losing their Turkishness, and becoming more and more German/French.[19] Recently, Euro-Turks raise their voices to complain about the paternalist approach of the Turkish state towards themselves. They no longer want to be perceived as being passive, obedient, subject to support, and cash machines making foreign currency for the homeland. Constituting around 4 million inhabitants in the West, they rather want to be more active in the Turkish – EU relations and to be supportive for Turkey in adapting herself with the new EU regimes.

Do you have German / French citizenship?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Yes, I do.	279	26,2	213	35,5
I have already applied, and waiting for it.	74	6,9	44	7,3
I am planning to apply.	277	26,0	187	31,2
I am not planning to apply.	435	40,8	155	25,8
No response			1	,2
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

The number of German-Turks who either have EU citizenship or are planning to apply is around 59 % in Germany and 74 % in France. These high numbers indicate that Euro-Turks are prone to integration and political participation. The latest statistics indicate that the number of German-Turks naturalized increased almost double since the year 2000, when the new citizenship law was put into force. The number of the German-Turkish population having German citizenship was around 350 thousand, and now this figured increased up to more than 700 thousand people. The latest statistics we acquired in our research then corresponds to 59 % who either have German citizenship or plan to have it soon. And this percentage equals around 1.5 million people among the total 2.5 million German-Turks. The new German citizenship law actually signifies that migrants can be quite receptive and incorporatist vis-à-vis democratic and inclusive political and legal changes.

On the other hand the fact that there are 1 million people (41 %) who are not willing to acquire German citizenship does not necessarily mean that they are not integrationist, nationalist, Islamist or whatever it may be. This percentage is around 26 % in France, corresponding to almost 100 thousand French-Turks. It may be that some of the both German-Turks and French-Turks are already pleased with the *denizenship*[20] status, which gives them civil, social, and cultural rights but political rights. Another reason in the German context may be that German-Turks had expected a more democratic citizenship law to be put into effect without any limitation for dual citizenship. But perhaps their expectations diminished, and they did not see any further benefit in acquiring German citizenship. A third possible reason in the German context may be that Turks, who are mostly residents in the urban space, preferred to ignore the new nationality law, which relatively required more bureaucratic workload in city-states such as Berlin. This may have had a discouraging impact on the German-Turks in the process of naturalisation. A fourth justification in both German and French context may be that there is already a decline in the voting habits of Euro-Turks, who have not been given the right to vote in the Turkish general elections. The right to vote in their own residential areas is a great issue for Turkish citizens living abroad.

To which extent are you interested in politics in Germany/France?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent

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[19] For a detailed analysis of these labelings see Kaya (2001).

[20] *Denizen* literally refers to those who reside in a certain geography. The term is introduced by Thomas Hammar (1990) in the migrancy context.

Not at all	395	37,1	281	46,8
Not really	236	22,2	79	13,2
So so	187	17,6	115	19,2
As much as I can	187	17,6	106	17,7
Very much so	60	5,6	19	3,2
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

Around 60 % of the Euro-Turks are not interested in domestic politics of their countries of settlement. 20 % to 25 % are reported to be interested in it.
Which political party in Germany/France are you affiliated with more?

	Germany		France	
Liberal parties	35	3,3	9	1,5
Conservative parties	28	2,6	4	,7
Social democratic parties	**288**	**27,0**	169	**28,2**
Greens and environmentalist parties	91	8,5	31	5,2
Radical right and nationalist	9	,8	10	1,7
Radical left and communist parties	13	1,2	23	3,8
In equal distance to all	44	4,1	32	5,3
None of those above	**557**	**52,3**	322	53,7
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

The table above indicates that German-Turks have recently become more affiliated with the left wing political parties such as the Social Democrats (27 %) and the Greens (8.5 %). The same trend is also visible among the French-Turks (28 % for the Social Democrats and 5 % for the Greens). It should be mentioned here that previously in the early stages of the migratory process Euro-Turks were more oriented towards the conservative parties due to their scepticism towards the left wing parties back in the homeland. The recent shift also implies that Euro-Turks are becoming more involved and reflexive in daily politics of their countries of settlement in a way that displays that they are actually very well integrated. However there is still a great amount of people who are not really engaged in domestic politics. The qualitative research also shows that the German-Turks, for instance are very reflexive to the latest manoeuvres of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which tries to use Turkey's candidature as an election campaign instrument to attract the nationalist votes. Furthermore, the CDU is not considered to be a European entity as it reduces the Europeanness to cultural and religious homogeneity in an essentialist way. What is also quite striking for both countries is that almost the same percentage of Euro-Turks is not affiliated with any German or French political party (around 53 % in each country). However, crosstabulations clearly point out that there is a growing tendency among the younger generations towards political integration, and also that the indifference to domestic politics is highly a common phenomenon among those of lower social status.
Crosstabulation 1. Which political party in Germany/France are you affiliated with more? and Birthplace?

%	Birthplace			
	Turkey	**Germany**	**France**	**Total**
Liberal parties	**2,8**	**4,1**	**,9**	**3,1**
Conservative parties	**2,3**	**3,1**	**,0**	**2,5**
Social democratic parties	**25,1**	**32,9**	**26,6**	**27,1**
Greens and environmentalist parties	**8,0**	**9,0**	**3,7**	**8,2**
Radical right and nationalist	**1,1**	**,3**	**,9**	**,9**
Radical left and communist parties	**1,7**	**,7**	**,9**	**1,5**

In equal distance to all	**1,1**	**,3**	**,9**	**,9**
None of those above	54,6	46,4	63,3	52,5
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

Crosstabulation 1 indicates that second and third generation Euro-Turks overwhelmingly tend to support Social Democratic political parties. Green parties are also attracting the young generations. However, it seems that young generations of German-Turks are more interested in domestic politics of their country of settlement than the French-Turks. This shows again the fact that German-Turks are more politically integrated than the French-Turks.

Crosstabulation 2: Which political party in Germany/France are you affiliated with more? and Social Status?

%	SOCIAL STATUS							Total
	Highest	**Upper**	**Upper Middle**	**Middle**	**Lower Middle**	**Low**	**Lowest**	
Liberal parties	14,2	7,0	5,6	3,0	2,2	1,1	1,0	3,1
Conservative parties	3,2	4,5	3,0	3,6	1,6	1,3	1,0	2,4
Social democratic parties	**36,1**	**35,0**	**29,4**	**29,2**	**27,1**	**20,9**	**20,4**	**27,1**
Greens and environmentalist parties	**17,4**	**17,4**	**9,9**	**8,8**	**6,8**	**5,9**	**3,3**	**8,2**
Radical right and nationalist parties	,0	2,0	1,8	1,3	,5	,5	,0	,9
Radical left and communist parties	,6	2,8	2,8	1,2	1,6	,0	2,3	1,5
In equal distance to all	3,2	3,1	7,5	4,9	3,2	3,6	3,1	4,2
None of those above	25,2	28,3	40,0	48,0	56,9	66,7	68,9	52,5
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

Crosstabulation 2 indicates that Euro-Turks of middle and higher classes are inclined to support left-wing political parties. However, those of lower social status have reported to be less interested in the German/French domestic politics.

Which institution is the first you trust most in Germany/France?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Turkish Official Institutions (Embassies, Consulates),	102	9,6	122	**20,3**
Turkish associations	44	4,1	24	4,0
Mosques	**198**	**18,6**	42	7,0
Fellowship organisations	12	1,1	5	,8
German Government	99	9,3	76	12,7
Labour unions and Chambers	25	2,3	24	4,0
Courts	179	**16,8**	33	5,5
Parliament	16	1,5	7	1,2
Police	73	6,9	19	3,2
Political Parties	**5**	**,5**		
Education institutions	62	5,8	37	6,2
Social security and health institutions	**217**	**20,4**	178	**29,7**

	20	1,9	18	3,0
European Parliament	20	1,9	18	3,0
Media	6	,6	5	,8
No response	6	,6		
None of those above	1	,1	10	1,7
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

A majority of the German-Turks are not affiliated with any ethnic or religious association (61 %). This may of course have several reasons. One of the reasons is likely that such organizations could not cure their already existing problems in the last decade. Corruption incidences in the religious organizations and *tariqats* revealed lately have also a great impact on the decreasing proportion of membership to such organizations. Instead, Euro-Turks are rather a) becoming more affiliated with political parties (41 %, which is a relatively high figure); b) becoming more self-centred; c) becoming more involved in their own extended family networks. The latter is always the missing layer in evaluating the individualization processes in Turkish communities.

Both groups appreciate the social security and health institutions (20 % G-T; and 30 % F-T). What is also striking is the sharp difference between the German-Turk and the French-Turks in terms of their appreciation with the Turkish official institutions like the embassies and consulates (10 % G-T; and 20 % F-T). Below it could also be seen how the German-Turks dislike such institutions (26 %). Again appreciation with the mosques among the German-Turks indicates their religiosity and communitarianism.

Which institution is the first you trust least in Germany/France?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Turkish Official Institutions (Embassies, Consulates)	**274**	**25,7**	45	7,5
Turkish associations	77	7,2	48	8,0
Mosques	53	5,0	45	7,5
Fellowship organisations	41	3,8	32	5,3
German Government	73	6,9	50	8,3
Labour unions and Chambers	45	4,2	23	3,8
Courts	18	1,7	23	3,8
Parliament	20	1,9	15	2,5
Police	56	5,3	64	10,7
Political Parties	130	12,2	90	**15,0**
Education institutions	13	1,2	10	1,7
Social security and health institutions	5	,5	3	,5
European Parliament	40	3,8	14	2,3
Media	**198**	**18,6**	110	**18,3**
No response	19	1,8		
I don't know	2	,2		
None of those above	1	,1	28	4,7
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

German-Turks do primarily dislike the Turkish official institutions such as the embassies and consulates. On the other hand, the French-Turks dislike the media most (18 %).

What is the primary problem you are facing most in Germany/France?

	Germany, %	France, %	Total, %
Contradictory moral values	25,8	17,5	25,0
Unemployment	15,0	10,5	14,6
Discrimination	22,6	16,8	22,1

Religious intolerance	5,1	2,2	4,8
Intolerance to our Turkishness	3,6	4,0	3,6
Loneliness and discommunication	3,4	6,8	3,7
Drug use	4,1	3,3	4,1
Exploitation of our labour	1,8	3,0	1,9
Racism	4,8	6,3	4,9
Poverty	0,5	0,3	0,5
Cultural and linguistic assimilation	5,3	6,2	5,3
Lack of German/French language	7,2	18,3	8,3
No reply	0,6	--	0,5
None of those above	0,3	4,7	0,7
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

The most important problem faced by German-Turks is reported to be contradiction of moral values (26 %), whereas French-Turks report that their incompetence in French language is their primary concern (% 18). The lack of French language among a group of French-Turks actually seems to contradict with the myth of assimilationist republican model in France.

What is the secondary problem you are facing most in Germany/France?

	Germany, %	France, %	Total, %
Contradictory moral values	8,8	9,8	8,9
Unemployment	8,7	6,8	8,6
Discrimination	17,7	12,2	17,2
Religious intolerance	5,4	4,2	5,3
Intolerance to our Turkishness	7,0	3,7	6,7
Loneliness and discommunication	6,7	10,0	7,0
Drug use	6,8	6,8	6,8
Exploitation of our labour	4,0	5,0	4,1
Racism	10,0	10,5	10,1
Poverty	2,4	1,8	2,4
Cultural and linguistic assimilation	11,2	8,0	10,9
Lack of German/French language	9,5	12,2	9,7
No reply	1,3	4,3	1,6
None of those above	0,3	4,7	0,7
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

Discrimination and racism seem to be the second most important problem faced by the Euro-Turks in both countries.

Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future of Germany/France?

	Germany, %	**France, %**
Very Pessimistic	7,4	1,3
Pessimistic	43,9	22,2
Neither pessimistic nor optimistic	33,6	32,7
Optimistic	14,1	39,5
Very optimistic	,9	4,0
No reply	0	,3
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**

While there is a great deal of pessimism common among the German-Turks on the future of Germany, there is optimism among the French-Turks on the future of France. This is directly related to the economic limitations, deindustrialisation, unemployment and inflation in Germany.

Expectations for the year 2004: Country's employment situation (Source Eurobarometer 2003)

%	Worse	Same	Better
France	53	23	18
Germany	62	22	10

Expectations for the year 2004: Country's economic situation (Source Eurobarometer 2003)

%	Worse	Same	Better
France	52	26	*17*
Germany	*57*	25	13

Expectations for the year 2004: Household financial situation (Source Eurobarometer 2003)

%	Worse	Same	Better
France	22	46	*28*
Germany	*34*	*50*	*11*

Expectations for the year 2004: Personal job situation (Source Eurobarometer 2003)

%	Worse	Same	Better
France	10	55	*25*
Germany	*14*	*63*	*12*

On the other hand, Eurobarometer Autumn 2003 Public Opinion Surveys results held in 15 EU countries also indicate that the judgements of the Euro-Turks on the future of their countries of settlement are in parallel with their majority societies. As the Eurobarometer results above indicate German society is more pessimistic than the French society about the future performance of their countries in terms of economic, financial and employment indicators.

Is there any organization you are a member of, or you are involved with?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
No	**652**	**61,2**	427	**71,2**
Yes	413	38,8	173	28,8
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

Around 39 % of the German-Turks and 29 % of the French-Turks are involved with various associations. The types of the organization they are involved in are as follows:

What kind of organization you are involved in or you are a member of?

	Germany		France	
	Count	%	Count	%
Labour Union	48	**11,6**	20	**11,6**
Chamber of Occupation	11	2,7	8	4,6
Political Party	39	9,0	5	2,9
Ethnic association	23	5,5	9	5,2
Turkish-German/French Friendship Association	31	7,5	55	**31,8**

Cultural Centre	86	**20,8**	54	**31,2**
Fellowship Solidarity Association	13	3,1	7	4,0
Alumni Organisation	10	2,4	7	4,0
Sport Club	87	**21,1**	29	**16,8**
Religious Association	186	**45,0**	27	**15,6**
Charity Association	9	2,2	1	,6
Student associations	3	,7	2	1,2
No response	8	1,9	1	,6
Total	**413**	**100,0**	**173**	**100,0**

While in Germany the religious associations are preferred most (45 %, which is the 17 % of all), it is only 16 % among the French-Turks who are involved in religious organizations. Cultural centres are preferred most in France (31 %). Membership to the labour union is also remarkably high in both countries (12 %). On the other hand, political party membership among the German-Turks (9 %) is much higher than the French-Turks.
Crosstabulation: What kind of organization you are involved in or you are a member of?
And Place of Birth?

Membership	Place of Birth?			Total , %
	Turkey,%	Germany,%	France,%	
No	62,2	61,3	73,4	62,2
Yes	37,8	38,7	26,6	37,8
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

The Crosstabulation above displays that those born in France (27 %) have less tendency to be engaged in any kind of association. Conversely, 39 % of those born in Germany are more engaged in associations and civil society organisations.
Images in Comparison: Homeland and "Host"land
The data below expose that Euro-Turks no longer essentialized their homelands as a place for eventual return. Instead, both Turkey and Germany/France have various advantages and disadvantages for them. When asked they are quite objective in stating which place is better in terms of various aspects such as human rights, democracy, education, tolerance, values and job opportunities.
Do you feel yourself affiliated closer with Germany/France or Turkey?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Turkey	516	**48,5**	214	35,7
Germany/France	234	22,0	152	**25,3**
Equally close with both	287	26,9	215	**35,8**
equally far with both	28	2,6	19	3,2
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

Approximately 49 % of the German Turks affiliate more with Turkey, 22 % with Germany, and 27 % with both countries. On the other hand, 36 % of the French-Turks affiliate more with Turkey, 25 % with France and 36 % with both countries. The reasons behind German-Turks' low affiliation with Germany maybe manifold, but economic crisis seems to be one of the main reasons. Affiliation with the homeland, on the other hand, may result from either structural outsiderism as in the German case or assimilationist integration as in the French case. Both outsiderism and assimilation may lead to the construction of communal networks having defensive, nationalist, religious, laicist, Kemalist, and even Kurdish undertones.

The percentage of those who equally affiliate with both countries is remarkably high: 27 % in Germany and 36 % in France. These groups seem to be constituting the bridge between Turkey and the European Union as

they have construct more reflexive, active, transnational, postnational, universalist and cosmopolitan identities. These groups generally come from within those born in Germany/France. On the other hand, those assimilated amount to 22 % in Germany and 25 % in France. The data indicate that Turks no longer essentialize their homeland, and they actually challenge the '*gurbetçi*' discourse common among the Turks in Turkey. They are no longer '*gurbetçi*'; they have already become active social agents of their new countries. They have actually accommodated themselves in the transnational space bridging the two countries, homeland and 'host'land.

Crosstabulation: Do you feel yourself affiliated closer with Germany/France or Turkey? and Birthplace?

%	Birthplace			Total
	Turkey	Germany	France	
Turkey	55,5	25,0	22,9	47,2
Germany/France	17,7	**35,2**	**30,3**	22,3
Equal affiliation to both	24,2	**37,0**	**43,1**	27,8
Equal detachment from both	2,5	2,7	3,7	2,7
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

Crosstabulation 1 indicates that Euro-Turks of second and third generations are either equally affiliated with both countries at the same time, or more affiliated with their country of settlement. Hence, young generations are more integrated into Germany/France than the elder generations. The fact that young generations are equally affiliated with both homeland and receiving country points to the premise of this research. Younger generations construct a bridge between Turkey and the EU. It is striking to see that less than 25 % of young generations in both countries have reported to be more affiliated with Turkey.

Crosstabulation 2: Do you feel yourself affiliated closer with Germany/France or Turkey? and Social Status?

%	SOCIAL STATUS							Total
	Highest	Upper	Upper Middle	Middle	Lower Middle	Low	Lowest	
Turkey	34,0	34,2	45,3	42,6	47,2	54,1	65,7	47,2
Germany/France	**29,5**	**21,8**	**19,5**	**22,9**	**25,6**	21,0	14,3	22,3
Equal affiliation to both	**35,9**	**39,5**	**32,8**	**32,1**	**24,2**	22,8	16,7	27,8
Equal detachment from both	,6	4,5	2,4	2,4	3,0	2,0	3,3	2,7
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

Crosstabulation 2 shows that middle and higher class Euro-Turks are either more affiliated with Germany/France, or equally affiliated with homeland and the country of settlement; whereas lower classes have reported to be more affiliated with Turkey.

Which country is better?

	Germany		France	
	Turkey	**Germany**	Turkey	**France**
Health and social security systems	1,3	**96,0**	,5	**96,3**
Respecting rules	3,5	**88,2**	10,3	**70,0**
Seeking rights	1,8	**87,1**	3,2	**80,5**
Democracy and human rights	2,6	**86,4**	4,0	78,5
Job opportunities	3,3	77,4	2,5	**85,0**
Educational system	7,4	77,3	9,2	72,2
Efficiency of judiciary system	2,5	77,3	4,8	61,5
Valuing human capital	7,4	74,8	6,7	77,8
Equal treatment for all	3,6	71,8	7,0	61,3

Attitudes of police	6,0	66,3	10,2	51,0
Comfortable and easy life	28,3	51,6	24,7	49,0
Respecting cultures and religions	25,6	48,5	34,0	34,3
Mutual tolerance	**42,9**	37,2	41,5	33,5
Moral social values	**56,0**	19,9	43,0	33,5

The interviewees were asked to compare the homeland and the hostland in terms of 14 different topics (the order of the answers are in line with the highest scores addressing Germany). The findings indicate that Euro-Turks generally favour their hostlands as far as the health and social security system, respecting rules, seeking rights, democracy and human rights, job opportunities, judiciary system, valuing human capital, equal treatment, attitudes of the police, and a comfortable life are concerned. Turkey is reported to have great defects in those respects. However, in terms of respecting cultures and religions, Germany's liberal multicultural structure is more appreciated than the republican and laicist structure of both Turkey and France. Thus, the liberal and democratic structure of Germany is more appreciated than the republican and laicist structure of Turkey and France.

There are only two aspects remaining where Turkey has an advantage compared to the other two countries: Mutual tolerance and moral social values. These two aspects address cultural differences among which sexual freedom, gender relations, warmth, hospitality, frankness, and respect to the elderly people come to the fore. The point to emphasize here is the big difference between Germany and France with regard to the moral social values. Germany is reported to be more problematic in terms of moral concerns compared to France. The emphasis on cultural differences seems to be one of the factors giving rise to the emergence of the community support networks in both Germany and France. This doesn't mean of course that cultural differences are the only reason of the closed community formations. Exclusionary formal state practices in Germany until the late 1980s and assimilationist republican policies in France have brought about similar consequences in terms of the creation of ethnic enclaves and closed diasporic groups. Recent policy changes in Germany with respect to more democratic and inclusionary citizenship laws seem to make a shift for the German-Turks towards integration and interaction with the majority society. However, integrationist republican policies are lately being reported by the French-Turks to be leading to assimilation and loss of differences. Another explanation for the remarkable difference between German-Turks and French-Turks with regard to the ways in which they problematize the depreciation of moral values in their countries of settlement is the high level of poverty and unemployment at the expense of German-Turks, which prompts people to invest more in culture, religion, ethnicity, past, norms and values.

Policies of Citizenship: Integration / Assimilation

German and French forms of statecraft have significant differences when compared. French form of statecraft springs from the Enlightenment tradition, which was based on the *material civilizational idea* seeking to impose the western universalist ideals on the remote lands. This tradition was colonial in the sense that it was determined to constitute a homogenous and monolitical world political culture based on the western values namely fraternity, liberty and equality. However, German form of statecraft comes from the anti-Enlightenment idea of *Aufklärung*, which was rather emphasizing romantic culture idea to perceive all cultures equal to each other. Thus, two alternative models of statecraft are at stake: on the one hand, French *civilizationist project* traced back to the Enlightenment philosophers such as Rousseau and Montesquieu; on the other hand, German *culturalist project* traced back to Herder. This differentiation is quite explanatory in understanding the nationhood, citizenship, immigration, integration and assimilation regimes of both countries in comparison. Rogers Brubaker's work titled Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (1992) is very much based on such a differentiation:

> If the French understanding of nationhood has been *state-centred* and *assimilationist*, the German understanding has been *Volk-centred* and *differentialist*. Since national feeling, developed before the nation-state, the German idea of the nation was not originally political, nor was it linked to the abstract idea of citizenship. This prepolitical German nation, this nation in search of a state, was conceived not as the bearer of universal political values, but as an organic cultural, linguistic, or racial community – as an irreducibly particular *Volksgemeinschaft*. On this understanding, nationhood is an ethnocultural, not a political fact (Brubaker, 1992: 1).

Comparisons between the two countries' understandings of nationhood go back to the early 19th century. They were first formulated by German intellectuals who sought to distance themselves from the allegedly shallow rationalism and cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment and the French revolution through a historicist celebration of cultural pluralism (ibid.). Brubaker also states that French and German traditions of citizenship and nationhood can be stigmatized by such conceptual dualities: universalism and particularism,

cosmopolitanism and ethnocentrism, Enlightenment rationalism and Romantic irrationalism, assimilationist and differentialist, civilizational and cultural, political and ethnocultural. When it comes to migrants, Brubaker praises the French politics of citizenship due to its universalist and inclusive nature easily turning the migrants into citizens. Whereas he implicitly condemns the German politics of citizenship as it has a particularist and exclusive nature only turning the migrants into settlers, but not to citizens.

However, things have dramatically changed since Brubaker wrote his path-breaking piece. Those countries which used to be known as having inclusive, democratic and universalist incorporation regimes vis-à-vis migrants have turned out to be more restrictive and exclusive. France, England, USA, Ireland and Holland are some examples in this respect, adopting a restrictive citizenship regime and giving up the jus soli principle in granting citizenship to the migrants. On the other hand, Germany which was known as differentialist, particularist, culturalist, ethnonationalist and exclusive in terms of citizenship policies, has become more democratic and inclusive since the year 2000. The data gathered in this research indicates that Brubaker's statements concerning the citizenship regimes of the two countries no longer comply with reality.

Dominant discourses of multiculturalism, cultural diversity and pluralism in Germany have recently led the German-Turks to represent themselves with their own cultural identities in the public space. Such popular discourses reinforced by the Social Democratic and Green policies have also resulted in political, economic, and cultural integration of the German-Turks in all spheres of life. The number of the Turkish origin parliamentarians in the local, national and European Parliaments indicates that German-Turks politically integrate; the visibility of German-Turks in the cultural spheres also indicates that Turks culturally integrate; and the rising amount of investment in domestic economy by the German-Turks displays that Turks economically integrate. These facts actually contradict with the stereotypical belief in Germany that Turks do not integrate. On the contrary, Turks integrate in the German political, economic and cultural ways of life. This may result from the culturally differentialist futures of incorporation policies in Germany, or from the existence of the large Turkish population in the country. However, it is likely that it is the Social Democrat – Green coalition government in power since 1998 has made the greatest impact in democratizing the immigration and integration policies in a way that has turned Germany from being a *segregationist country* into an *integrationist country*.

French form of republican ideal of integration is reported to resemble assimilation: a citizenship model to assimilate those into French civilizational project through language, Laicité, modernism, state-centrism, western-centric universalism, and rationalism. While cultural diversity is usually undermined, citizenship is underlined. Thus, politically defined citizenship has always been prior to culture-specific nationality. The dominance of citizenship over nationality, of political over ethnocultural conceptions of nationhood, is perhaps best expressed in Tallien's remark of the spring of 1975: "the only foreigners in France are the bad citizens" (Cited in Azimi, 1988: 702). However, civilizational discourse has always been implicitly embedded in the French republican model. Integration refers to acculturation of foreigners. Acculturation in this respect means Franco-conformity. According to Tribalat (2002) the major weakness of the "French Melting Pot" resides in its difficulty in producing professional and social mobility, a phenomenon that involves whole society, but which is more difficult for the foreign origin populations. One should not forget that around 80 % 0f the young persons stemming from immigration who are between 20 and 29 years old are children of workers, i.e. almost twice that of young native French.

Gordon (1964: 71) identifies seven types of assimilation/integration: (1) cultural or behavioural assimilation (acculturation); (2) structural assimilation, which involves the entrance into the organizations and institutions of the host society at the primary group level; (3) marital assimilation (amalgamation); (4) identificational assimilation (creation of a sense of peoplehood at the societal level; (5) attitude receptional assimilation (absence of prejudice); (6) behavioural receptional assimilation (absence of discrimination); (7) civic assimilation (generating a shared identity of citizenship). According to Gordon, structural assimilation is the most essential of all. Once it occurs, all of the others will inevitably follow. The table below displays the form of assimilation/integration in France and Germany as far as the Euro-Turks are concerned.

Table. Form of Assimilation/Integration in both countries

	Germany	France
cultural or behavioural assimilation		X
structural assimilation	X	
marital assimilation		
identificational assimilation	X	X
attitude receptional assimilation		
behavioural receptional assimilation		X
civic assimilation	X	X

"Unity-in-diversity" or "Unity-over-diversity"?

There are recently several political philosophers who have tried to provide some conceptual and philosophical tools in order to lay out a framework around the discussions on diversity. Will Kymlicka (1995), a liberal-communitarian, attempts to combine ideas of liberal democratic principles as a basis for a cohesive societal structure (*unity*) with recognition of communitarian rights for cultural minorities (*diversity*) within the multinational state (*Unity-in-diversity*). Kymlicka claims that collective rights for minority groups do not contradict a liberal notion of politics, they are pivotal for enabling individual freedoms for the members of the minority group in question (Kymlicka 1995: 46). On the other hand Brian Barry, a republican, warns the reader about the cleavages springing from a multiculturalist approach, since respect for diversity threatens the unity necessary for promoting equal distribution among the citizens. This is not wholly an economic issue, but also one of distributing equal rights. Barry points to the negative consequences of Kymlicka's emphasis on 'group rights' when it comes to sectarian religious groups. He argues (Barry 2001: 165) that these could never be granted group specific rights, if the (liberal) state is to remain true to its ideal of impartiality and neutrality. His priorities lie at the rule of the majority with respect for individual rights over the principles of group-centred multiculturalism, a kind of *Unity-over-diversity*.

The positions stated above (liberal-communitarian, and republican) are the mostly debated political postures with regard to the management of cultural diversities in the context of nation-states. However, there is not sufficient discussion concerning the management of cultural, ethnic, national, religious and civilizational diversity within the European Union. There are recently some attempts within the European Union Commission aiming at possible scenarios for the future. These scenarios have lately become visible with the circulation of such notions in public as 'unity-in-diversity', 'Europe of regions', 'cultural diversity', 'diversity', and 'European citizenship'. It should also be stated here that the EU Commission seems to favour a Kymlickan "unity-in-diversity" position in order to manage all sorts of diversities. On he other hand, the data actually indicate that the contemporary German model of integration formulated by the Red-Green coalition government complies with the discourse of "unity-in-diversity", and that the French model is more in line with the homogenizing discourse of "unity-over-diversity".

Habitats of Meaning of the Euro-Turks

It is a common belief that Euro-Turks are not interested enough in the media of their countries of settlement, that they are rather involved in the Turkish media. However, the picture depicted by our research presents the other way around. Euro-Turks, generally speaking, are also quite attentive to the media of their new destinations. German/French TV channels and newspapers are widely followed by the Euro-Turks. It has been reported that 45 % of the German-Turks watch German TV channels every day while 55,5 % of the French-Turks do the same. Around 28 % of the German-Turks either never, or rarely, watch the German TV channels, while this amount goes down to 17 % for the French-Turks. It is also remarkable to point out that approximately 54 % of the German-Turks and 35 % of the French-Turks have been frequently using the internet.

The development of telecommunication technology has made the reception of almost all the Turkish TV channels and newspapers in the EU countries possible. Turkish media in Berlin have achieved a remarkable cultural hegemony throughout the Turkish diaspora. To understand this one has to examine the rising interest of the Turkish media industry in the Turkish population living in both countries as well as in several others. The major Turkish TV channels have had their own European units making special programmes for Turks living in Europe. TRT International (state channel) is the first of these channels. The other channels are Euro Show, Euro Star, Euro D, Euro ATV, TGRT, Kanal 7 and Lig TV. All these TV channels apart from the TRT Int. can be received via satellite antennas. TRT Int. is already available on cable.

The programme spectrum of all these channels may differ greatly from each other. TRT Int tends mainly to give equal weight to entertainment, education, magazine, movies and news. Since it is a state owned channel, it tries to promote the 'indispensable unity of the Turkish nation' by arranging, for instance, money campaigns for the Turkish armed forces fighting in the South Eastern part of Turkey. There are also a lot of programmes concentrating on the problems of the Euro-Turks. This channel can also be widely received in Turkey. Thus, in a way, it also informs the Turkish audience about the happenings of the Euro-Turks, mainly that of the German-Turks, whilst connecting the modern diasporic Turkish communities to the homeland.

Euro Show, Euro D and Euro Star are private channels making secular based programmes. The majority of the programmes are composed of old Turkish movies, American movies, comedy programmes, dramas, Turkish and European pop charts, sport programmes, reality-shows and news. On the other hand TGRT and Kanal 7 are the religious based TV channels. Besides the actual programmes, these channels give priority to the dramas and movies with religious motives. Traditional Turkish folk music programmes are also a part of the policy of these two channels. Satel is another channel giving the Turkish and European pop charts. It is the favourite channel of the Turkish youngsters who have satellite antennae. Lig TV is, on the other hand, a pay TV broadcasting the Turkish Premierre League football matches.

Most of the major Turkish newspapers are also circulated in Germany and France. *Hürriyet, Milliyet, Sabah, Cumhuriyet* and *Evrensel* are some of the Turkish papers printed in Germany. There are also many other

sport and magazine papers from Turkey. Although the content of the papers is extremely limited in terms of the news about the homeland, they offer a wide range of news about Turkish diasporic communities in Europe.

Turkish media partly shape the 'habitats of meaning' of the Euro-Turks.[21] Turkish media mostly attempt to provide a stream of programmes which is considered to suit the 'habitats of meaning' of the diasporic subject. For instance, the German-Turks are perceived by the Turkish media industry as a group of people who resist cultural change. This perception, for instance, is the main rationale behind the selection of the movies and dramas. A high number of the films on each channel are the old Turkish films which were produced in the late sixties and seventies.[22] The performance of the old Turkish movies, which touch upon some traditional issues such as Anatolian feudalism, bloodfeuds, migration (*gurbet*), desperate romance and poverty, reinforces the reification of culture within the Turkish diaspora. As Foucault noted such films attempt to 're-programme popular memory' to recover 'lost, unheard memories' which had been denied, or buried, by the dominant representations of the past experienced in the diaspora (Quoted in Morley and Robins, 1993: 10). Hence, identity is also a question of memory, and memories of home in particular (Morley and Robins, 1993: 10). Before the private TV channels were opened, it was the VCR industry which used to provide those kinds of movies to the Turkish diaspora.[23]

Turkish media seems to contribute to the reproduction of traditions, values, discourses brought from the homeland in the beginning of the migration process, because the programmes have been produced mostly by those who do not have an insight about the conditions of Euro-Turks. However, recently there are some new initiatives held by the local Euro-Turks to run private TV channels and radio stations. Aypa TV, TD1 and Radio Metropol in Berlin are some of those initiatives run by the local Euro-Turks who are better equipped in understanding the social, political, and economic context of their communities.[24]

How often do you watch German/French television channels?

	Germany, %	France, %	Total, %
Almost every day	45,3	55,5	46,2
3-5 days in a week	14,6	11,7	14,3
1-2 days in a week	11,8	15,5	12,2
Rarely	15,9	10,3	15,3
Never	12,5	7,0	12,0
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

How often do you watch Turkish television channels?

	Germany, %	France, %	Total, %
Almost every day	69,7	71,7	69,9
3-5 days in a week	14,4	7,3	13,7
1-2 days in a week	5,3	7,7	5,5
Rarely	4,9	4,5	4,8
Never	5,8	8,8	6,1
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

How often do you listen to German/French Radio channels?

	Germany, %	France, %	Total, %
Almost every day	14,3	26,8	15,5
3-5 days in a week	6,3	8,7	6,5

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[21] The notion of 'habitats of meaning' belongs to Ulf Hannerz (1996). Hannerz has developed the notion in relation to the co-existence of local and global at once. TVs and print media have an important impact on the formation of our habitats of meaning. As some people may share much the same habitats of meaning in the global ecumene, some other people may have rather distinct and localised habitats of meaning.

[22] Before the hegemony of the American film industry prevailed over the world market, the Turkish film industry produced a vast amount of film until the early eighties.

[23] J. Knight (1986) states that 80 percent of the German-Turks used to watch Turkish videos daily.

[24] For a detailed account of the local TV channels run by the German-Turks, see Kosnick (2004).

	Germany, %	France, %	Total, %
1-2 days in a week	9,2	11,3	9,4
Rarely	18,9	12,8	18,3
Never	51,4	40,3	50,3
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

How often do you listen to Turkish Radio channels?

	Germany, %	France, %	Total, %
Almost every day	9,2	10,7	9,3
3-5 days in a week	5,7	6,3	5,8
1-2 days in a week	9,5	13,2	9,8
Rarely	21,2	21,3	21,2
Never	54,4	48,5	53,8
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

How often do you read German/French newspapers?

	Germany, %	France, %	Total, %
Almost every day	17,2	13,2	16,8
3-5 days in a week	12,5	11,2	12,4
1-2 days in a week	16,6	15,3	16,5
Rarely	21,5	20,5	21,4
Never	32,2	39,8	32,9
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

How often do you read Turkish newspapers?

	Germany, %	France, %	Total, %
Almost every day	32,8	21,0	31,7
3-5 days in a week	14,0	12,0	13,8
1-2 days in a week	16,9	15,8	16,8
Rarely	17,7	24,5	18,3
Never	18,7	26,7	19,4
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

How often do you use Internet?

	Germany, %	France, %	Total, %
Almost every day	24,3	13,8	23,3
3-5 days in a week	8,5	4,3	8,1
1-2 days in a week	8,1	7,0	8,0
Rarely	12,7	9,7	12,4
Never	46,4	65,2	48,2

Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

More than half of the German-Turks seem to be engaged in internet while less than 1/3 of the French-Turks are. It should also be indicated that almost 25 % of the German-Turks report that they use Internet almost everyday, and only 14 % of the French-Turks are reported to have access to internet everyday.

Chapter 5
Europe and the European Union

Alternative Projects of Europe: A holistic Europe, or a syncretic Europe?

There are at least two definitions of Europe and European Union. The first is the one proposed by the Conservatives in a way that defines Europeanness as a static, retrospective, holistic[25], essentialist, and culturally prescribed entity. The second is the one proposed by the Social Democrats, Liberals, Socialists and Greens underlining the understanding that 'Europe' refers to a fluid, ongoing, dynamic, prospective, syncretic and nonessentialist process of becoming. While the first definition highlights a *cultural project*, the latter definition welcomes a *political project* embracing cultural and religious differences including Islam. This should be one of the reasons to explicate why the inclusive and responsible acts of the Social Democrats and Greens in Germany and France are very well received by the German-Turks.

Syncretic Europe	Holistic Europe
dynamic	static
secular	religious
societal	communal
Postnational	Multinational
economic	economic
Political	cultural
Syncretic culture	Holistic culture
Post-civilizational	Civilizational
prospective	retrospective
Non-essentialist	Essentialist
Heterophilia	Heterophobia
Political geography	Physical geography

Table. Alternate Projects of Europe

Accordingly, the conservative *holistic idea* aims to build a culturally prescribed Europe based on the Christian mythology, shared meanings and values, historical myths and memories, Ancient Greek and/or Roman legacy, homogeneity and heterophobia. Holistic Europe does not intend to include any other culture or religion devoid of European/Christian legacy. Hence, neither Turkey nor Islam has a place in this project. This is why Angela Merkel (CDU leader in Germany) and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (President of the EU Convention) and several other leaders in the wider Union (Poland, Slovakia) both implicitly and explicitly advocate including an article in the EU Constitution regarding the Christian roots of the Union. On the other hand, progressive *syncretic idea* proposes a politically dynamic Europe based on cultural diversity, dialogue, heterogeneity, and heterophilia. The advocates of syncretic Europe promote coexistence with Turkey and Islam, underlining the understanding that the EU is by origin is a peace project. Joscka Fischer, Michel Rocard, and Gerhard Schröder are some of the leaders emphasizing the secular character of the EU. Surprisingly enough, the cultural Europe project complies with the latest Republican idea of 'unity-over-diversity' in a way that declines heterogeneity and opposes the potential of the European Project as a peace project. However, the political Europe project goes along with the idea of 'unity-in-diversity' aiming to construct a meta-European identity embracing cultural and religious differences. Hence, the perspectives of the Europe-Turks on the EU should be assessed in line with these two antithetical paradigms on Europe. The data gathered indicate that the Euro-Turks' perspectives foster the progressive ideal of political Europe embracing diversity.

Euro-Turks' Perspectives on the European Union

Focus group discussions, in-depth interviews and structured interviews display that they are in favour of Turkey participation in the European Union although there is also a remarkable amount of people who are against it.

What Does European Union mean to you?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
An Economic integration	**513**	**48,2**	382	**63,7**

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[25] Anthropologically speaking, there are two principal notions of culture. The first one is the *holistic notion of culture*, and the second is the *syncretic notion of culture*. The former considers culture a highly integrated and grasped static 'whole'. This is the dominant paradigm of the classical modernity, of which territoriality and totality were the main characteristics. The latter notion is the one which is most obviously affected by increasing interconnectedness in space. This syncretic notion of culture has been proposed by the contemporary scholars to demonstrate the fact that cultures emerge in mixing beyond the political and geographical territories (Kaya, 2001: 33).

A common cultural policy	61	5,7	34	5,7
A democracy project	69	6,5	38	6,3
A Christian Club	**227**	**21,3**	67	**11,2**
Exploitation, Imperialism	74	6,9	24	4,0
A Political and military super power	51	4,8	44	7,3
A bureaucratic community detached from public	70	6,6	11	1,8
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

While around 48 % of the German-Turks and 64 of the French-Turks regard the EU as an Economic Integration, 21 % of the German-Turks and 11 % of the French-Turks regard it as a Christian Club. What is underlined by the Euro-Turks is the economic integration aspect of the EU.

Classification of the three most common replies to what the EU means personally to EU citizens (Source Eurobarometer 2003)

Germany, %		France, %	
The euro	56	The euro	57
Freedom of movement	51	Freedom of movement	52
Peace	46	Cultural Diversity	39

The results held by the 2003 Eurobarometer Public Public Opinion Surveys also indicate that both Germans and French give the priority to the economic and financial aspects in defining the meaning of the EU. It is apparent that the Euro has the greatest impact on both communities in one way or another. And the second most influential character of the Union is the freedom of movement.

To which extent you are either positive or negative about the EU?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Very negative	59	5,5	25	4,2
Negative	237	22,3	74	12,3
Both positive and negative	312	29,3	137	22,8
Positive	**313**	**29,4**	285	**47,5**
Very positive	**29**	**2,7**	39	**6,5**
No idea	115	10,8	40	6,7
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

Generally speaking the Euro-Turks are positive about the European Union. Approximately 32 % of the German-Turks and 54 % of the French-Turks are in favour of the EU idea; around 28 % of the German-Turks and 17 % of the French-Turks are not in favour. 29 % of the German-Turks and 23 % of the French-Turks have mixed thoughts about it. Those German-Turks who are negative about the EU are likely to think that the EU has gained a lot from Germany's prosperity, in other words from their prosperity. On the other hand, those French-Turks who are positive about the EU are likely to think that the EU has given them more prosperity. This observation is also confirmed by the fact that 6 % of the German-Turks are supportive of the EURO, while 25 % of the French-Turks support it.

Image of the European Union (Source Eurobarometer 2003)

%	Fairly, Very Negative	Neutral	Fairly, Very Positive
France	21	31	45
Germany	16	38	39

The results of the Eurobarometer 2003 also comply with our results on the Euro-Turks. Both communities have rather a positive image of the European Union. However, French-Turks (16 %) are less negative about the EU than the French (21 %), and German-Turks (28 %) are more negative than the (Germans 16 %).

To which extent do you support Turkey's membership to the European Union?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
She'd better	313	**29,4**	222	**37,0**
She definitely should	110	**10,3**	122	**20,3**
It doesn't matter	251	23,6	115	19,2
She'd better not	165	15,5	76	12,7
She definitely shouldn't	157	14,7	49	8,2
No idea	69	6,5	16	2,7
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

General tendency is that the Euro-Turks are in favour of Turkey's entry to the Union. However, this tendency is clearer in **France** (57 %) than in **Germany** (31 %).
Enlargement: for or against? (Source Eurobarometer 2003)

Enlargement	For, %	Against, %
Germany	38	42
France	34	55

Eurobarometer results indicate that both Germans and French are two of the least favouring nations in terms of enlagement in general. However, Germans are more in favour of enlargement compared to the French.
What does the EU membership of Turkey mean to you?

	Germany	France
Massive migration from Turkey to the EU	71,2	68,7
More human rights	69,3	78,8
More democracy	62,7	66,7
More job opportunities	61,4	83,0
Moral breakdown	52,0	36,3
Exploitation	37,2	34,2
End of independence	23,9	24,0
Division of the country	23,8	22,5

The interwievees were asked what the EU meant to them, and they were given various items to comment on. Both German-Turks and French-Turks gave similar answers to the following questions: Turkey's entrance into the EU does not really result with division of the country (53 % G-T, 58 % F-T); it won't result with the end of independence (52 % G-T; and 58 % F-T); membership will bring more democracy to Turkey (63 % G-T; and 67 % F-T); membership will improve the implementation of human rights (70 % G-T; and 79 % F-T); and membership will result with migration from Turkey into the EU countries (71 % G-T; and 69 % F-T). On the other hand, there is a big discrepancy between the German-Turks and the French-Turks in answering the following questions: membership will cause moral breakdown in Turkey (52 % G-T; and 36 % F-T); membership will bring about exploitation in the expense of Turkey (52 % G-T; and 34 % F-T); and membership will enlarge job opportunities (61 % G-T; and 83 % F-T). These figures expose that French-Turks seem to be more in favour of Turkey's membership to the Union, and that they have less cultural, moral and communal concerns than the German-Turks.

EU causing division of Turkey?	Germany	France	Total
Yes	23,8	22,8	23,8
No	53,3	57,0	53,7

No response	22,8	20,2	22,6
Total	**100,0**	**100,0**	**100,0**

Will full membership to the Union cause division of Turkey? (Source Euroscepticism in Turkey, 2004)

EU causing division of Turkey?	Turkey, %
Yes	19
No	28
Neutral	39
No response	14
Total	100,0

The two tables above compare the views of the Euro-Turks and Turks on the assumption that full membership to the Union may result in the division of Turkey. 54 % of the Euro-Turks clearly indicate that they don't agree with such an assumption, while 28 % of the Turks do not agree with it.

To which extent you are positive or negative about the EURO?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Very negative	537	**50,4**	166	27,7
Negative	371	**34,8**	175	29,2
Both positive and negative	71	6,7	97	16,2
Positive	46	4,3	127	**21,2**
Very positive	17	1,6	25	4,2
No idea	23	2,2	10	1,7
Total	1065	100,0	600	100,0

The tables below also indicate the perceptions of the interlocutors about the positive and negative impacts of the Euro-Turks on the hostland. While a great proportion of the people in Germany think that Turks stand for cultural richness and labour force, a relatively lower proportion believe that Turks have negative impact with their incapability of obeying rules, closed community formations and distinct values. The interviewees commonly believe that the Euro-Turks primarily provide the European countries with labour force. "Cultural richness", "job opportunities", and "familial and moral values" are the following items they contribute to the western countries. What is remarkably different between the German-Turks and the French-Turks is that the G-T put emphasis on symbolic contributions like cultural (53 %) and moral (32 %), and the F-T give priority to the material contributions like labour force (73 %) and job opportunities (42 %). Those who do believe that Turks bring no contribution are relatively low (4-5 %).

The euro: for or against? (Source Eurobarometer 2003)

Euro?	For, %	Against, %
Germany	60	33
France	68	28

The results held by the Eurobarometer Surveys also comply with the results held in our research. German-Turks' attitude is identical to that of the Germans, and French-Turks' attitude is also identical to that of the French. Hence, the Euro-Turks' orientation to the Euro are parallel with their country fellows.

What kind of positive impacts do the Turks have on the host society? (multi-response)

	Germany		France	
	Count	%	Count	%
Cultural diversity and richness	568	**53,3**	252	42,0
Labour force	688	64,6	440	**73,3**

Creating new job opportunities	405	38,0	242	**40,3**
Bringing new familial and ethnical values	341	**32,0**	121	20,2
Bringing humanitarian quality	286	**26,9**	111	18,5
Others	8	,8	4	,4
No response	3	,3		
I Don't think that they have a positive impact	41	3,8	29	4,8
Total	1065	100,0	600	100,0

What kind of negative impacts do the Turks have on the host society? (multi-response)

	Germany		France	
	Count	%	Count	%
Abusing the social security system	268	**25,2**	109	18,2
Not adapting with local values	287	26,9	198	**33,0**
Constructing their own closed communities	282	26,5	195	**32,5**
Being lazy	252	**23,7**	92	15,3
Not obeying rules	387	**36,3**	141	23,5
Misunderstanding	4	,4		
Selfishness and jealousy			2	,3
Turkish men running after French women			1	,2
No response	12	1,1	6	1,0
I Don't think that they have a negative impact	262	24,6	191	**31,8**
None of the above	1	,1		
Total	1065	100,0	600	100,0

Combining the two tables above, the Euro-Turks believe that their positive impact is bigger than their negative impact. Approximately 32 % of the French-Turks and 25 % of the German-Turks believe that Turks have no negative impact on the host societies. 36 % of the German-Turks state that Turks generally do not obey the rules, and 25 % believe that Turks misuse the social security system. The misuse of the social security system was one of the mostly debated issues by the young generation German-Turks in the in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. In parallel with the misuse of the social security system, 24 % of the German-Turks report that Turks are inclined to be lazy. On the other hand, the disability of adopting with the local values (33 %), the tendency of constructing ethnic enclaves (33 %) are the mostly raised issues by the French-Turks in explicating the negative impacts of the Turks. The ways in which different issues have been phrased by both German-Turks and French-Turks are also subject to the separate incorporation regimes applied by Germany and France vis-à-vis the migrants. The issue of constructing ethnic enclaves and communities raised by the French-Turks seems to be highly linked with the fact that the Republican state tradition is very sensitive about homogeneity and difference-blindness. However, the liberal democratic regime in contemporary Germany does recognize the differences in a way that doesn't problematize ethnic and cultural enclaves as much as the French state does.

Apparently, Euro-Turks have gained strong merits in terms of developing a democratic political culture highlighting human rights, democratization, participation, and reflexivity, rule of law, rights, equality and trust. What is different in this picture compared to the picture in Turkey is that they have generated a rights-specific-political culture rather than a duty-specific-one. The answers given to the questions comparing the rights, educational system, police, democracy, human rights, social security system, job opportunities, legal system, the respect for rules and regulations, value human capital, equality, freedom of faith, and cultural dialogue indicate that Germany and France are considered to be much more democratic than Turkey. All these answers depicting the drastic difference between Germany/France and Turkey clearly indicate the deep-rooted democratic institutions and the high level of democracy in Germany/France. Turkey comes to the fore when the interviewees were asked questions about mutual tolerance, and moral values.
EU Membership and Migration Prospects for Turks

One of the commonly expressed concerns regarding Turkey's membership to the Union is the possibility of immense immigration from Turkey into the EU countries. However, our qualitative and quantitative research exhibits the contrary. In the first place, those interlocutors we interviewed in the in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and structured interviews expressed that they would not recommend the Turks in Turkey to migrate to the EU countries if Turkey gets into the Union (79 %). The reason for them to raise such a recommendation is the difficulties they face in the EU: rising unemployment, longing, law wages, disciplined working conditions, lack of tolerance, and depreciation of moral values. However, they generally have a strong belief that there would be an immense migration to the EU countries. This belief is in parallel with the common belief in the EU countries. Hence, the experiences of the Euro-Turks should be clearly transmitted to the Turks in Turkey. On the other hand, the previous experiences in the integration of Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece to the Union did not result in immense migration. In these cases even reverse migration was experienced. It seems that the same could apply to the Turkish case. The proportion of those people who would consider going back to the homeland in the case of Turkey's membership to the Union is more than 30 % in both countries.

Q. Would you recommend those from Turkey to immigrate to Germany/France?

	Germany		France	
	Count	%	Count	%
I would recommend	220	20,7	227	37,8
I wouldn't recommend	845	79,3	364	60,7
It depends			9	1,5
Total	1065	100,0	600	100,0

Q. Do you expect an immense migration to the EU countries if Turkey joins the Union?

	Germany		France	
	Count	%	Count	%
Yes	**758**	**71,2**	**412**	**68,7**
No	180	16,9	125	20,8
No idea	127	11,9	63	10,5
Total	1065	100,0	600	100,0

Q. Would you consider returning back to Turkey if Turkey joins the EU?

	Germany		France	
	Count	%	Count	%
Yes, I would certainly return.	91	8,5	58	9,7
Yes, I would.	204	19,2	126	21,0
I don't know.	405	38,0	173	28,8
No, I wouldn't.	253	23,8	166	27,7
No, I wouldn't certainly return.	112	10,5	77	12,8
Total	1065	100,0	600	100,0

Euro-Turks commonly share the dominant stereotypical though in the west envisaging massive immigrant flow to the EU countries if Turkey joins the union (around 70 % in both countries). Around 30 % of the Euro-Turks reported that they would consider returning to Turkey if Turkey joins the Union. This is an important indication challenging the stereotypical judgment dominant in the west envisioning a massive migration flux. Furthermore, the Euro-Turks do not recommend the Turks to migrate to the west (80 % G-T; and 61 % F-T).

Crosstabulation 1. Would you recommend people living in Turkey to immigrate to Germany/France? and Birthplace?

%	Birthplace			Total
	Turkey	Germany	France	
I would recommend	21,7	21,8	55,0	22,3
I wouldn't recommend	78,2	78,2	43,1	77,6
It depends	,2	,0	1,8	,2
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Crosstabulation 1 indicates that German-Turks born in Germany do not recommend the people living in Turkey to immigrate to Germany when Turkey joins the union. However, French-Turks born in France recommend the other way around. It seems that young generations of French-Turks are rather more satisfied with the present situation in France unlike the German-Turks in Germany.

Crosstabulation 2: Would you recommend people living in Turkey to immigrate to Germany/France? and Social status?

%	SOCIAL STATUS							Total
	Highest	Upper	Upper Middle	Middle	Lower Middle	Low	Lowest	
I would recommend	31,6	30,7	22,0	22,3	20,4	22,7	19,2	22,3
I wouldn't recommend	67,1	69,0	77,7	77,6	79,5	77,1	80,8	77,6
It depends	1,3	,3	,3	,1	,1	,2	,0	,2
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Crosstabulation 2 implies that Euro-Turks of every social status do not really recommend those in Turkey to immigrate into the EU countries when Turkey joins the Union.

Chapter 6

Building New Identities

While on the one hand, Euro-Turks are officially defined in Turkey as either *'gurbetçi'*, or *'Yurtdışındaki vatandaslarimiz'* (our citizens abroad), on the other hand, they are stereotypically defined by the Turkish people in Turkey as either *'Almanyalı* or *'Almanci'* (German-like). Both terms (*Almanyalı* and *Almancı*) carry rather negative connotations in Turkey. The major Turkish stereotypes about the Euro-Turks are those of their being rich, eating pork, having a very comfortable life in Germany/France, losing their Turkishness, and becoming more and more German/French.[26] In recent years, Euro-Turks began to raise their voices to complain about the paternalist approach of the Turkish state towards themselves. They no longer want to be perceived as passive and obedient persons in need for support, and cash machines making foreign currency for the homeland. Constituting around 4 million inhabitants in the West, they rather want to be more active in the Turkish – EU relations and to be supportive for Turkey in adapting herself with the new EU regimes. The rise in their willingness to acquire German/French citizenship is a sign in this respect, addressing their potential and reflexivity in *generative politics*.[27]

Europeanness: A Constant Process of Being and Becoming

Both the qualitative and quantitative data gathered in our research, point out that concrete understanding of Europeanness does not exist among the Euro-Turks. However, the same observation corresponds to the receiving societies. There is actually no doubt that a deep-rooted sense of Europeanness does not also exist among the majority of the public; and actually an identity is ideologically being constructed by the political elite of the European Union gradually through education, European citizenship, and common history and future. European Union has evidently displayed a stronger political unity since the Tindemans Report (Leo Tindemans was then the Belgian Prime Minister) submitted to the European Council at the end of December 1975, which prompted the member states to form a unified political entity with her own flag, anthem, myths, memories, peoples, regions, and rights and duties granted to the EU citizens.[28]

The definition of Europeanness also depends on the class differences among the Euro-Turks. When the members of the working class are asked about the term, their definitions usually have parallels with the dominant discourse in Turkey. These definitions mostly include the notions like values, democracy, equality, human rights and modernization in drawing the main framework of Europeanness. Thus, 'Europeanness' addresses a teleological project emphasizing constant progress and a target to be reached at. On the other hand, some of the members of the middle class usually state that they do not have such a concern to be defined as 'European', and that they are already experiencing such an identity without the need to reach at any prospective target. Those who have such a discourse are the third and/or fourth generation youngsters who were mostly born in the country of settlement. Actually, the first and second generation middle class people reproduce the dominant discourse in Turkey. But, the third/fourth generation youngsters have developed a cosmopolitan identity underlining differences, diversity and citizenship. A separate note is needed here to briefly summarize various discourses developed by the Euro-Turks in a retrospective way. Those first generation migrants in the 1960s and 1970s developed a discourse revolving around the economic issues; the second generation in the 1980s generated an ideological and political discourse which was actually originating from the homeland-related issues; and eventually the third generation since the 1990s have developed a culture specific discourse stressing intercultural dialogue, symbolic capital, cultural capital, difference, diversity, tolerance and multiculturalism.

A final comparison between the middle class and working class with regard to the definition of Europeanness is that the middle class in general equate Europeanness with science, scientific thought, reason, trust, rules and rights, and the working class associates it with justice, law and equality.

Which identifications suit you most?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
I am Turkish	390	36,6	145	24,2
First Turkish and then European	531	**49,9**	351	**58,5**
First European and then Turkish	98	9,2	68	11,3

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[26] For a detailed analysis of these labelings see Kaya (2001).

[27] The term '*generative politics'* was first coined by Anthony Giddens (1994) to underline one of the essential elements of *radical politics* addressing the centrality of reflexive individual agency.

[28] For a detailed account of the Tindemans Report see, Tindemans (1975); see also Maas (2004).

Only European	40	3,8	21	3,5
Others	6	,6	15	2,6
Total	1065	100,0	600	100,0

The table shows that Euro-Turks themselves confirm their hyphenated identities (Euro-Turks): 60 % in Germany and 70 % in France. Around 60 % of the German-Turks define themselves as either Turkish/European or (50 %) European/Turkish (10 %). This ratio is 59 % (Turkish-European) and 10 % (European-Turkish) in France. On the other hand, 37 % of the German-Turks and 24 % of the French-Turks define themselves as "Turkish". These figures differ from the findings of Hakan Yılmaz (Bosphorus University) that he displays in his work on "Euroscepticism in Turkey". In his research 54 % of the Turks define themselves as "Turkish", 30,5 % as Turkish-European and 4,7 % as European-Turkish.

Crosstabulation 1: Which identification suits you most? and Birthplace?

%	Birthplace			Total
	Turkey	Germany	France	
Only Turkish	39,9	24,3	13,8	35,5
First Turkish and then European	48,2	57,5	60,6	50,7
First European and then Turkish	7,7	13,5	22,9	9,4
Only European	3,5	4,5	,9	3,7
No reply	,4	,3	,9	,4
None of the above	,1	,0	,9	,1
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Crosstabulation 1 indicates that young generations of Euro-Turks are primarily identifying themselves with hyphenated identities as in European-Turkish, or Turkish-European (75 % in Germany and 85 % in France).

Crosstabulation 2: Which identification suits you most? and Social status?

%	SOCIAL STATUS							Total
	Highest	Upper	Upper Middle	Middle	Lower Middle	Low	Lowest	
Only Turkish	17,9	17,3	25,5	32,1	36,0	42,6	63,6	35,5
First Turkish and then European	59,6	63,1	58,0	52,8	51,9	42,8	32,9	50,7
First European and then Turkish	14,7	17,3	10,9	9,6	10,1	7,9	1,4	9,5
Only European	7,1	1,7	4,9	4,6	1,9	6,1	2,1	3,8
No reply	,0	,0	,1	,9	,1	,6	,0	,4
None of the above	,6	,3	,5	,0	,0	,0	,0	,1
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Crosstabulation 2 shows that Euro-Turks of higher social status rather stick to the hyphenated identities underlining the European element. On the other hand, those of lower social status underline their Turkishness.
European and national identity (Source Eurobarometer 2003+; Euroscepticism in Turkey 2004; and our research*)**

Identity	Nationality	First Nationality and then European	First European and then Nationality	Only European
Germans+	38	45	10	4

German-Turks*	37	50	9	4
Turks**	54	30	5	4
France+	35	50	9	3
French-Turks*	24	59	11	4

The table above is comprised of the results of three different researches held in 2003 and 2004. The research on Euroscepticism in Turkey held by Hakan Yılmaz indicates that 54 % of the Turks in Turkey identify themselves as only Turkish, 30 % as first Turkish-European, and 5 % as European-Turkish, and 4 % as European. Eurobarometer Surveys imply that 38 % of the Germans and 35 % of the French identify themselves with their nationality, while around 60 % of both Germans and French identify themselves with hyphenated identities such as German, or French/European, or European/German, or French. On the other hand, Euro-Turks do not differ from their country fellows in terms of their hyphenated identities underlining the European element.

Which one of those below defines you most? (multiresponse)

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Turkish citizen	256	24,0	213	35,5
Turkish	240	22,5	145	24,2
Kurdish	45	4,2	23	3,8
Muslim	348	32,7	96	16,0
Muslim-Turkish	424	39,8	244	40,7
Alevi	35	3,3	22	3,7
German (French) citizen	**74**	**6,9**	**54**	**9,0**
German (French)-Turk	**77**	**7,2**	**106**	**17,7**
Euro-Turk	**60**	**5,6**	**36**	**6,0**
World citizen	**56**	**5,3**	**64**	**10,7**
EU Citizen	**22**	**2,1**	**25**	**4,2**
Muslim-Kurdish	2	,2		
Human being	3	,3	1	,2
Euro-Muslim	1	,1		
No answer	3	,3		
None of those above	1	,1		
Total	1065	100,0	600	100,0

The sum of those defining themselves as German citizen, German-Turk, world citizen and EU citizen is actually quite high (27 %). This goes up to 47 % among the French-Turks. The difference between those defining themselves as either German-Turks or French-Turks is worth mentioning here. 7 % define themselves as German-Turk, and 18 % define themselves as French-Turks. This is probably because of the definition of Germanhood and Frenchood. While Germanhood is considered to be an ethnic nomination, Frenchood is defined as a civic nomination letting those outsiders be included in. Among the French-Turks civic identities are more phrased as in their defining themselves Turkish citizen (36 %). This is around 24 % for the German-Turks. This table shows us again that such definitions are subject to the dominant regimes of definitions by the majority constraints.

Euro-Islam: Symbolic religiosity

Islamic diasporic groups in the west who are alienated by the system and swept up in a destiny dominated by the capitalist West, no longer invent local futures; what is different about them is that they remain tied to their traditional pasts, religions and ethnicities. Remaking, or recovering, the past serves at least a dual purpose for the diasporic communities. Firstly, it is a way of coping with the conditions of the present without being very critical about the status quo. Secondly, it also helps to recuperate a sense of self not dependent on criteria handed down by others -the past is what the diasporic subjects can claim as their own. Hence, their rising affiliation with Islam, culture, authenticity, ethnicity, nationalism and traditions provides Euro-Turks or Euro-Muslims with the opportunity to establish solidarity networks against the major clusters of modernity such as capitalism,

industrialism, racism, surveillance, egoism, loneliness, insecurity, structural outsiderism and militarism. Accordingly, Islamic revival turns out to be a symptom, which is the outcome of certain processes of structural outsiderism.

Islam is, by and large, considered and represented to be posing a threat to the European way of life in the West. It is frequently believed that Islamic fundamentalism is the source of the xenophobic, racist and violent attitudes present. On the contrary, one of the main premises of this research is that religious resurgence is a symptom brought about by various structural constraints such as unemployment, racism, xenophobia, exclusion, and sometimes assimilation. Then, in order to tackle such challenges, discourse on culture, identity, religion, ethnicity, traditions and past becomes essential for minorities in general, and migrant groups in particular. As Clifford rightly states, those migrant and/or minority groups who are alienated by the system, and swept up in a destiny dominated by the capitalist West, no longer invent local futures. What is different about them remains tied to traditional pasts (Clifford, 1988: 5). Remaking the past and investing in culture, ethnicity and religion serves at least a dual purpose for migrant communities. Firstly, it is a way of coming to terms with the present without being seen to criticize the existing status quo. The 'glorious' past is, here, handled by, for instance, the diasporic subject as a strategic tool absorbing the destructiveness of the present which is defined by exclusion, structural outsiderism, poverty, racism and institutional discrimination. Secondly, it also helps to recover a sense of the self not dependent on criteria handed down by others. Because, the past is what the diasporic subjects can claim as their own (Ganguly, 1992: 40). This is actually a form of politics generated by outsider groups. According to Alistair MacIntyre (1971) there are two forms of politics: *politics of those within* and *politics of those excluded*. Those *within* tend to employ legitimate political institutions (parliament, political parties, media) in pursuing their goals, and those *excluded* use culture, ethnicity, religion and tradition to pursue their aims. It should be noted here that MacIntyre does not place culture in the private space; culture is rather inherently located in the public space. Thus, the quest for identity, authenticity and religiosity should not be reduced to an attempt to essentialize the so-called purity. It is rather a form of politics generated by subordinated subjects.

Herbert Gans' intervention on the rise of symbolic ethnicity and religiosity is quite explanatory in this regard. According to Gans (1979), symbolic ethnicity and religiosity is available to those who want to sporadically feel ethnic and religious, without being forced to act ethnically and religiously. The stress on ethnicity and religion is usually something adopted from parental culture as part of negotiation with the majority society. The way the Euro-Turks employ ethnicity and religion as a source of identity is quite distant from being essentialist. This is a form of what Herbert J.Gans (1979: 6) calls 'symbolic ethnicity', or *symbolic religiosity*:

> [A]s the functions of ethnic cultures and groups diminish and identity becomes the primary way of being ethnic [and religious], ethnicity [and religiosity] take on an expressive rather than instrumental function in people's lives, becoming more of a leisure-time activity and losing its relevance, say, to earning a living or regulating family life. Expressive behaviour can take many forms, but often involves the use of symbols -the symbols as signs rather than myths. Ethnic symbols are frequently individual cultural practices that are taken from the older ethnic culture; they are abstracted from that culture and pulled out of its original mooring, so to speak to become stand-ins for it.

There are recently some Islamic oriented movements such as the Cojepiennes based in Strasbourg, who are determined to adapt themselves into the western way of life with their own identities. Such form of modern interpretation of Islam proves that Islam does not actually pose a threat to the western values; its main concern is actually is to incorporate itself into the mainstream.

Furthermore, Euro-Turks raised the issue that so many elderly people passed away last summer due to the extraordinary heat prevailed in both countries. Their common argument about the incidences is that contemporary western societies lack some essential values such as solidarity, respect for elderly people, family, and warmth. They make it clear that Euro-Turks still keep such values in a way that attributes them a difference vis-à-vis the majority societies.

Which one of those below identifies you most in terms of your religious affiliation?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Sunni Muslim	**531**	**49,9**	276	**46,0**
Alevi Muslim	41	3,8	31	5,2
Muslim	**465**	**43,7**	242	**40,3**
Atheist	5	,5	34	**5,8**
Turkish	4	,4	1	,1

Agnostic	1	,1	1	,1
Others	7	,7	12	2,1
No answer	7	,7	2	,3
None of those above	4	,4	1	,1
Total	1065	100,0	600	100,0

Both German-Turks and French-Turks define themselves with the similar religious affiliations? However, the fact that almost 6 % of the French-Turks define themselves as atheist is quite remarkable compared to the German-Turks (less than 1 %). Thus it seems that German-Turks have stronger religious affiliation.

How do you define yourself with regard to the identifications below? (multiresponse)

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Nationalist	188	17,7	160	**26,7**
Leftist	37	3,5	35	5,8
Democrat	183	17,2	98	16,3
Religious	**349**	**32,8**	127	**21,2**
Conservative	180	16,9	27	4,5
Rightist	36	3,4	12	2,0
Atatürkist	93	8,7	127	**21,2**
Laicist	39	3,7	112	**18,7**
Social democrat	84	7,9	40	6,7
Ülkücü (ultra nationalist)	42	3,9	48	8,0
Revolutionary	10	,9	18	3,0
Patriot	**238**	**22,3**	115	19,2
Islamic	146	13,7	50	8,3
No response	3	,3	3	,5
I don't know	1	,1		
None of those above	2	,2	4	,7
Total	1065	100,0	600	100,0

German-Turks generally define themselves as 'religious' (33 %), 'patriot' (22 %), 'nationalist' (17 %), 'democrat' (17 %) and 'conservative' (17 %). On the other hand, the French-Turks use the following identifications to define themselves 'nationalist' (27 %), 'Atatürkist' (21 %), 'religious' (21 %), 'laicist' (19 %) and 'patriot' (19 %). This shows that the French-Turks are rather republican and unitarist, while the German-Turks are communitarian.

How do you define yourself with the following statements regarding your faith?

	Germany		France	
	Count	%	Count	%
Quite a religious person fulfilling all the requirements of my faith	80	7,5	58	9,7
Someone trying to fulfil religious requirements	571	53,6	279	46,5
Faithful, but not fulfilling the religious requirements	377	35,4	197	32,8
Someone who doesn't really believe in faith	26	2,4	28	4,7
Someone who does not have faith	11	1,0	35	5,8
No response			3	,5
Total	1065	100,0	600	100,0

It has been reported that 7,5 % of the German-Turks and 10 % of the French-Turks define themselves as quite religious, a similar pattern with the Turks in Turkey. 89 % of the German-Turks and 80 % of the French-Turks are reported to be relatively faithful. On the other hand, 2, 4 % of the German-Turks and 10 % of the French-Turks seem to be either atheist or faithless.

Crosstabulation 1: How do you define yourself with the following statements regarding your faith? and Birthplace?

Result: Religiosity is still dominant in Germany... But a symbolic religiosity...

%	Birthplace			Total
	Turkey	Germany	France	
Quite a religious person fulfilling all the requirements of my faith	9,3	2,8	5,5	7,7
Someone trying to fulfil religious requirements	53,5	51,9	57,8	53,0
Faithful, but not fulfilling the religious requirements	33,3	40,5	28,4	35,2
Someone who doesn't really believe in faith	2,1	4,1	3,8	2,6
Someone who does not have faith	1,8	,7	2,9	1,5
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

The crosstabulation displaying the correlation between the birthplace and faith indicates that religiosity is still dominant in among the German-Turks. Religious mobility is quite understandable in a country like Germany where religion is still a strong source of identification among the German people. Furthermore, German-Turks are primarily defined with their Islamic identity by the majority society. On the other hand, the secular and republican characteristics of the French-Turks are being are prioritized by the French. However, religiosity among the Euro-Turks is not an essentialized one, but a symbolic one Symbolic religiosity is available to those who want to sporadically feel religious, without being forced to act religiously. The stress on religion is usually something adopted from parental culture as part of negotiation with the majority society. The way the Euro-Turks, especially German-Turks, employ religion as a source of identity is quite distant from being essentialist.

Crosstabulation 2: How do you define yourself with the following statements regarding your faith? and Social Status?

Result: Religiosity increases among the Euro-Turks of lower social status...

%	SOCIAL STATUS							Total
	Highest	Upper	Upper Middle	Middle	Lower Middle	Low	Lowest	
Quite a religious person fulfilling all the requirements of my faith	7,1	5,9	6,9	7,0	6,5	9,2	13,8	7,7
Someone trying to fulfil religious requirements	51,9	42,0	45,4	55,3	54,9	55,2	53,1	53,0
Faithful, but not fulfilling the religious requirements	28,2	45,7	38,5	33,6	35,5	33,8	32,6	35,2
Someone who doesn't really believe in faith	10,9	2,0	5,2	2,5	2,7	1,2	,2	2,6
Someone who does not have faith	1,9	4,2	3,8	1,6	,4	,7	,4	1,4
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

The crosstabulation displaying the correlation between social status and faith indicates that religiosity increases

among the Euro-Turks of lower social status.

Has your religious faith become stronger or weaker than before?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Become stronger	**516**	**48,5**	219	36,5
Become weaker	131	12,3	68	11,3
No difference	418	39,2	313	**52,2**
Total	1065	100,0	600	100,0

Around 49 % of the German-Turks and 37 % of the French-Turks reported that their faith in God has recently become stronger. On the other hand, around 12 % in both countries reported that their faith has become weaker. **Could you tell us if you agree or disagree with the following statements?**

Religious and world affairs should be separated from each other.

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Agree	462	43,4	430	**71,7**
Disagree	442	41,5	114	19,0
No idea	161	15,1	56	9,3
Total	1065	100,0	600	100,0

French-Turks (72 %) are much more secular than the German-Turks (43 %). However, *L'affaire du foulard* (translated as "the headscarf debate") vividly illustrated that the republican ideal does not necessarily support diversity. The administration maintained that insofar as state-sponsored education is 'secular', schools could not allow religious expressions that might be construed as acts of promoting a particular religious belief. In 1994, this policy became official governmental policy when the Minister of Education Francois Bayrou issued a blanket ban on headscarves. The clash of civilizations evident in this dispute made it apparent that the republican French civilizational project was not ready for multiculturalism, and was rather ontologically assimilationist (Kivisto, 2002; and Wieviorka, 1995). Multiculturalism is not generally regarded positively - citizenship means full membership in the Republic, and migrants are expected to become fully integrated – assimilated. Then, it makes no sense to speak of minorities, since all are equally French according to the official discourse (Schuster and Solomos, 2002: 47).

Religious and world affairs should be separated from each other? (Source Genral Public Survey in Turkey, February 2000, SAM)

Turkey	**Overall**	
	Count	**%**
Yes, they should be separated!	2302	73,3
No, they cannot be separated!	645	20,6
No response	191	6,1
Total	**3138**	**100,0**

The same was asked in Turkey in a general survey in February 2000. Around 73 % of the Turks reported their orientation to secularism, while 20 % acclaimed non-secular world view.

Religious and state affairs should be separated from each other.

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Agree	483	**45,4**	466	**77,7**

Disagree	424	39,8	96	16,0
No idea	158	14,8	38	6,3
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

French-Turks (78 %) are much more laicist than the German-Turks (45 %).

Religion vs. Secularism: A Safe Haven on Earth!

Secularism has been a great concern of many nation-states since the absolutist tradition of the state became dominant in Europe of the 16th Century. Secularism is predominantly believed to be a modern invention *vis-à-vis* the divine authority. However, there are claims opposing such a belief. John Gray, in his article, "The Myth of Secularism", asserts that liberal humanism, thus secularism, is 'very obviously a religion – a shoddy derivative of Christian faith notably more irrational than the original article, and in recent times more harmful' (Gray, 2002: 69). Gray goes on further and argues that 'the secular realm is a Christian invention. The biblical root of the secular state is the passage in the New Testament where Jesus his disciples to give to God what is God's and to Caesar what belongs to Caesar' (İbid.). As known coming from a Stoic tradition Saint Augustine refined this thought in his book On the City of God in the 5th Century, in which he clearly differentiated between the City of God and the City of Earth. This early Christian commandment is the ultimate origin of the liberal attempt to separate religion from politics. Hence, Gray believes that secularism is a neo-Christian cult.

Secular societies usually believe that they have left religion behind and that they have distanced politics from religion. This belief is again doubtful because what they have actually done is substitute one set of myths for another. The secular world view is simply the Christian view of the world with God left out and embroidered with science, liberalism, positivism, humanism, Darwinism and rationality.

Contemporary modern societies are constantly exposed to such myths. "All men are created equal" and "everyone possesses human rights" are just two of the proclamations of democratic liberalism. Such popular liberal declarations do not differ from verses in the Bible. With the same token, 'freedom,' 'democracy,' 'secularism,' 'liberalism,' 'multiculturalism' and 'diversity are the kinds of words which are constantly repeated like a verse. The process of endless repetition of such words in the ideoscape has a religious connotation. Secularism is one of those words. Hence, it does not have to contradict with religious faith; it rather overlaps with religion.

The term secularism was coined around 1852 to describe an ideology organised to counter religious loyalties. The secularist ideology of the 19th century should be analysed in line with other constitutive categories of the same age. These categories were defined in various terms by several social scientists such as Comte, Tönnies, Feurbach, Marx, Spencer, Durkheim, Mauss and Weber. In their combination, these intellectuals envisaged a form of modern society centred on secular, especially scientific, knowledge and human self-regulation, but on religion-centred-life-form. Thus, both secularism and religion suggest an alternative type of society. While the former implies 'turning towards this world' and underlines temporality, the latter implies 'extreme other-worldliness' where the supernatural was given too much priority. At first glance secularism and religion might seem to propose two radically distinct projections. However, using a Durkheimian paradigm may break up the Cartesian binarism exposed by the two. Durkheim once stated that 'what constitutes society is bound to be considered sacred.' Hence, secularism is, in a way, constrained by what it aims to challenge, i.e., religion. Thus, aiming at another form of society vis-à-vis the religious one, secularism also turns out to be sacred. With the same token, secular political practices replacing religious ones are not construed anew, but rather subject to temporal realities made up by the same public who were previously governed by religious ideology. This is why secular political practices often simulate religious ones.

The term Secularism designates the temporal world, or the temporal aspect of reality. Secularism, in a way, suggests invading the realm of the sacred, the mystical, and the religious. Thus, the secularist ideology aims at the construction of autonomous subject, who is self-ruled and liberated from the grip of obscurantism. As phrased above, secularism implies 'turning towards this world' but not 'the other world'. What if there is no world of justice, equality, respect, love and fraternity at sight? Then persons prefer 'turning towards other world' where they expect to find happiness. These two antithetical positions can also be expounded under the headings of 'autonomy' and 'heteronomy'.

Modern individual is subject to the major clusters of modernity such as capitalism, industrialism, racism, surveillance, egoism, loneliness, insecurity, structural outsiderism and militarism. It seems that these obstacles may be overcome through some solidarity networks. These solidarity networks may lead to two antithetical formations: *autonomy and heteronomy*. On the one hand, religious, ethnic and traditional community structures supply the migrants with the necessary equipment to struggle against the destabilising effects of these challenges, in other words, to have a safe haven on earth. Such solidarity networks serve a platform to the migrants whereby they could perform a politics of identity, which corresponds to what Ulrich Beck (1992) calls

'sub-politics', or what Anthony Giddens (1994: 14-15) calls 'life politics'. This provides the migrants with a kind of politics through which they could emancipate themselves from the arbitrary hold of capitalism, poverty and material deprivation. Such a politics of identity refers to a shield, which makes the migrants attempt to develop their *autonomy*. Whereas the solidarity network formation could also be conceived of posing a survival strategy for the migrants against the feeling of insecurity and loneliness. Thus, while the community formation, on the one hand, embodies autonomous self, it also gives rise to what Zigmunt Bauman calls *heteronomy* in a way that pleases individuals in the secure atmosphere of community.

Multiculturalism and Interculturalism

Multiculturalism has become one of the most popular discourses in the west in the last quarter of the 20th century. Ideology of multiculturalism aims to provide minority cultures with some platforms whereby they could express their identities through music, festivals, exhibitions, conferences etc. However, multiculturalism has lately been criticized by many scholars (Kaya, 2001; Russon, 1995; Radtke, 1994; and Rosaldo, 1995). In fact, the representation of a wide variety of non-western cultures in the form of music, plastic arts and seminars is nothing but the reconfirmation of the categorisation of 'the west and the rest'. The rationale behind the representation of the cultural forms of those 'others' in these multicultural initiatives inevitably contributes to the broadening of differences between the so-called 'distinct cultures'. The ideology of multiculturalism tends to compartmentalise the cultures. It also assumes that cultures are internally consistent, unified and structured wholes attached to ethnic groups. Essentialising the idea of culture as the property of an ethnic group, multiculturalism risks reifying cultures as separate entities by overemphasising their boundedness and mutual distinctness; it also risks overemphasising the internal homogeneity of cultures in terms that potentially legitimise repressive demands for communal conformity.

Constructed multiculturalism permits the supposedly 'distinct cultures' to express themselves in some public platforms. Multiculturalist metanarrative might, at first glance, seem to be a 'friend' as John Russon (1995: 524) stated. These multicultural platforms, in a way, sharpen the process of 'othering the other' in the imagery of self, or in other words, leads to a form of ethnic 'exotification'. Russon (1995: 524) explains that:

> Now, it is fairly common gesture, in the name of pluralism, to insist that we treat others as others, and accept their ways as, perhaps, 'interesting', 'private' to them, and especially not the same as ours. [T]his exotification which 'tolerates the other' is another product of the alienating gaze of the reflective ego, and it fails in two important ways. First, it makes the other a kind of lesser entity open to our patronising support, despite our complete rejection of its value as analysing other than the cute contingencies of someone else's culture; thus there is an inherent power relation here in which the other is made subordinate to our benevolence and superior reason. Second, it fails to acknowledge that, just as *our* program of tolerance has implications for the other-it contains that other in its view-so too does the ethnicity of the other contain us. Our so-called 'democratic' and pluralistic ideal is as much an ethnic expression as that of the other is an ethnicity...

Russon's remarks on 'tolerance' remind us of the way in which public and private spheres are highly differentiated by the ideology of multiculturalism. This ideology, as John Rex (1986, 1991) has described, involves nurturing commonality (shared laws, open economy and equal access to state provisions) in the former and ensuring freedom (maintain the traditions of ethnic minorities) in the latter. Russon, first, prompts us to think that multiculturalism tends to promote the confinement of cultures in their own private spheres with a limited interaction with other cultures. The differentiation between public and private has always contributed to the reinforcement of dominant class or group's hegemony over the subaltern groups. The cultures which hardly interact with other cultures are tempted to become a static heritage. Thus, Russon, here, draws our attention to the point that the official discourse of multiculturalism contributes to the reification of culture by the minority communities. Secondly, he underlines the issue of power relations between the dominant culture and the others. This is the clientalist side of the policy of multiculturalism -a point to which I shall return shortly. Clientalism tends to petrify the existing social conditions without making any change in the power relations between 'master' and 'disciple'.

What Russon attempts to criticise by the notion of 'tolerance' is also raised by Rosaldo in a slightly different way. Searching the correlation between culture and power, Rosaldo (1989: 198-204) rightly claims that power and culture have a negative correlation. In saying so, he refers to the examples of the Philippines and Mexico. In the Philippines and Mexico, for instance, full citizens are those who have power and lack culture, whereas those most culturally endowed minorities, such as Negritos and Indians, lack full citizenship and power respectively. Thus having power refers to being postcultural and vice versa: "the more power one has, the less culture one enjoys, and the more culture one has, the less power one yields. If *they* [minorities] have an explicit monopoly on authentic culture, *we* [majority] have an unspoken one on institutional power" (1989: 202). Rosaldo takes the discussion further, and concludes that making the 'other' culturally visible results with the invisibility of the 'self'. Thus, the policy of multiculturalism attempts to dissolve the 'self' within the minority. Dissolution of the 'self' is also related to the celebration of *difference* by minorities because the notion of difference makes culture particularly visible to outside observers. Thus, not only the multiculturalist policies, but

also minorities themselves contribute to the process of dissolution of the 'self' as well as of the institutional power within the minority.

Lately, the discourse of 'interculturalism' has replaced that of multiculturalism. Interculturalism acrually requires interaction and exchange between cultures, and it does not imprison cultures in their so-called 'distinct' spheres. Interculturalism aims to challenge racism, xenophobia, heterophobia, nationalism and ethnocentrism. Hence, we also tried to understand the ways in which the Euro-Turks are oriented to both discourses. And the result is that Euro-Turks are oriented to both. But, they affirm interculturalism (87 %) more than they do multiculturalism (66 %).

Nobody should adopt with the other; everybody should have his/her way.

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Agree	690	**64,8**	472	**78,7**
Disagree	283	26,6	104	17,3
No idea	92	8,6	24	4,0
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

Both groups should interact with each other to find the similarities.

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Agree	915	**85,9**	539	**89,8**
Disagree	85	8,0	29	4,8
No idea	65	6,1	32	5,3
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

Euro-Turks dominantly argue that they are mostly in favor of a multiculturalist setting (% 65 G-T; 79 % F-T). However, as may be known, recently multicultural policies have been severely criticised in the west. The ideology of multiculturalism tends to compartmentalise the cultures. It also assumes that cultures are internally consistent, unified and structured wholes attached to ethnic groups. Essentializing the idea of culture as the property of an ethnic group, multiculturalism risks reifying cultures as separate entities by overemphasising their boundedness and mutual distinctness; it also risks overemphasising the internal homogeneity of cultures in terms that potentially legitimise repressive demands for communal conformity. This is why interculturalism discourse seems to replace multiculturalism. The table below indicates that the Euro-Turks are inherently in favour of intercultural dialogue (% 86 G-T; and 90 % F-T). This predominant view is parallel to what the progressive political elite are trying to construct in the west. Thus, it is clear that Euro-Turks neither want to pose a challenge against the European societies, nor want to see the European societies as challenges. These two tables above indicate that Euro-Turks are ready to invest in their similarities with the majority societies more than in their differences.

Turks have no friends but Turks!

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Agree	345	32,4	256	42,7
Disagree	608	**57,1**	315	**52,5**
No idea	112	10,5	29	4,8
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

There is a common stereotypical belief in Turkey, saying that Turks have no friends but Turks! Yet, Euro-Turks do not share such a cynicism. This is the indication that the Euro-Turks are more in favour of interaction with the

outer worlds and cultures.
What is your second spoken foreign language?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
No	607	57,0	366	61,0
English	**380**	**35,7**	**144**	**24,0**
French/German	13	1,2	36	6,0
Spanish	2	,2	4	,7
Kurdish	28	2,6	23	3,8
Circassian	2	,2	1	,2
Russian	1	,1	2	,3
Greek	5	,5	4	,6
Arabic	22	2,1	10	1,7
Bosniac	2	,2		
Dutch	2	,2	1	,2
Persian	1	,1		
Italian			8	1,3
Zaza			1	,2
Total	**56,0**	**19,9**	**43,0**	**33,5**

The competence of the Euro-Turks on the foreign languages also differs in the two countries. A great number of German-Turks reported to speak English as foreign language (36 %). This number falls down to 24 % in **France**. Furthermore, this table seem to explicate that German-Turks are relatively more open to the outside world compared to the French-Turks despite their communitarian affiliations. This refers to the need to redefine the concept of communitarianism, which does not necessarily refer to the closure of communities.

'Imported Brides or Bridegrooms' from Turkey
One of the significant issues among the Euro-Turks is the increasing amount of marriages from Turkey. There is a growing tendency lately that some of the Euro-Turkish families are inclined to favour marrying their children with partners brought from Turkey. Partners brought from Turkey for such marriages are known as 'imported brides/bride grooms." These marriages are usually arranged marriages preferred by conservative families. Brides from Turkey are chosen as they are believed to be more culturally pure, and thus to be capable of raising better educated children. On the other hand, bride grooms are usually chosen from among those candidates who fit into the occupational prospects of the extended family in question. Marriage for such families seems to be associated with a traditional meaning: as a purely economic institution, or as a child bearing institution. The tables below indicate that German-Turks (21 %) are more against the arranged marriages from Turkey than the French-Turks (17 %). This may have several explanations. One of the explanations would be that German-Turks are more self-sufficient with their own community settings tracing back to almost 50 years. However, the French-Turks still prefer to be culturally inspired by Turkey.

Are you in favour, or not, of Turkish men bringing their wives from Turkey?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
I am in favour.	428	40,2	290	48,3
I neither object nor favour.	428	40,2	207	34,5
I object	**209**	**19,6**	**103**	**17,2**
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

Are you in favour, or not, of Turkish women bringing their husbands from Turkey?

	Germany		France	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
I am in favour.	409	38,4	288	48,0
I neither object nor favour.	428	40,2	206	34,3
I object	**228**	**21,4**	**106**	**17,7**
Total	**1065**	**100,0**	**600**	**100,0**

Marrying to someone from Turkey certainly refers to the willingness of migrant families to remain in touch with Turkey as well as to the protection of cultural values such as honour. Honour is not only an individual value, but also something social and communal. Cultural values such as honour become a source of distinction and difference in a remote land where the diasporic individual encounters the other. Honour and resistance to intermarriage could also refer to a counter attack to assimilation, especially in France. Marrying to someone from Turkey does not only function as a tool to keep the culture intact, but also a tool for sustaining immigration (Bozarslan, 1996). On the other hand, imported brides and grooms may also provide the migrants with the opportunity to generate strong families in which one of the spouses is likely to have a dependence on the other due to the lack of competence in language and culture of majority society. Claire Autant and Véronique Manry (1998: 73) claim that French-Turkish women remain reluctant when their parents decide to marry them to a man from Turkey. Marrying to a man from Turkey may even provide them with some advantages such as man becoming dependent on the bride due to the lack of competence in French; and loosening of parental authority from both sides. Gaby Strasburger (2004) has also claimed that the issue of parental suppression is relevant to a certain degree among the Euro-Turks; apart from exceptional cases of suppression youngsters decide mainly on their free will to marry someone from their country of origin.

Conclusion

This research in progress has several findings. Some of the findings are listed below: Euro-Turks have constructed **reflexive** identities in a way that contributes to the redefinition of Europeanness, Germanness, and Frenchness. It has been explicated in the report that the Euro-Turks have individually and collectively (through new form of communitarianism) constructed their identities in interaction with majority societies.

The research, in this stage, also reveals that there are three major groupings of Euro-Turks emerging in the migratory process.

1. Bridging Groups (more than 40 %):

    a. Those who are equally affiliated with both homeland and 'host'land. Young generations with cosmopolitan and syncretic cultural identities (multilingual) fall into this category;

    b. Those who are also affiliated with both homeland and 'host'land, and who construct a dynamic transnational space combining Turkey and Germany/France such as the Euro-Muslims (e.g. Cojepiennes in France, and MUSIAD in Germany).

    c. Those who have hyphenated and multiple identities without essentializing any particular political, religious, ethnic and racial identity.

2. Breaching Groups (around 40 %):

    Those who still have a strong orientation to the homeland, including extreme religious, nationalist, and laicist persons/groups (Less than 40 %);

3. Assimilated groups (around 20 %):

    Those who are assimilated to the majority societies are usually economically more prosperous.

Euro-Turks also display the fact that Europeanness is not a prescribed identity, but an ongoing process of being and becoming. Thus, the Euro-Turks contribute to the redefinition of the EU and Europeanness with their own social, political, cultural and economic identities. There is no need to say that these categorization made in the interim report are subject to change in the course of the research.

The research reveals that Euro-Turks do not pose a threat to the political and social system of their countries of settlement, but rather have the willingness to incorporate themselves into the system. It is commonly known that Western European states, generally speaking, have the tendency to regard Islam as a threat to their national *security*. Instead, the research uncovers that orientation to Islam among the Euro-Turks could also be regarded as a quest for *justice* and *fairness*. Accordingly, this work shall present some of the relevant qualitative and quantitative data gathered during the research. In the end it will be proposed that the EU states should give in the *security discourse*, and get engaged in *justice discourse* in their responds to minority claims.[29]

The data gathered by the structured interviews indicate that German-Turks, generally speaking, are more communitarian, religious and conservative than the French-Turks. Compared to the French-Turks, the German-Turks seem to be less in favour of integration as they are content with their ethnic enclaves, religious archipelagos and traditional solidarity networks. However, other findings in the research indicate the other way around. Although compared to the German-Turks, the French-Turks seem to get engaged more in modern way of life orientating themselves to integration, French language, secularism, laicism, and French media on the one hand, they are engaged less in French domestic politics, political parties, internet, theatres, and cinemas. However, German-Turks seem to generate more cosmopolitan, hybrid, global, and reflexive identities in a way that redefines Europeanness, which is actually subject to a constant change. Thus, the experiences of the German-Turks actually seem to indicate that Islam does not necessarily contradict with Europeanness, cosmopolitanism, modernity, and globalism.

Western democracies and citizenship regimes seem to fail in treating minority claims as a quest for justice. As Kymlicka and Norman stated "immigrant groups that feel alienated from the larger national and [religious] identity are likely to be alienated from the political arena as well" (2000: p. 39). Traditional citizenship rhetoric is inclined to aggravate the advance of the interests of the dominant national group at the expense of migrants. Hence, it is unlikely that the classical understanding of citizenship can resolve issues of co-existence of 'culturally discrete' entities. In order to avoid the potentiality of conflict and alienation, there is an essential task to be undertaken: citizenship laws should not be based on prescribed cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic qualities. Moderate and democratic citizenship laws that should be formulated in line with the task stated above can be anticipated to resolve the emphasis made on ethnicity, religiosity and nationality by migrants groups.

This research has also revealed that there are not only those Turkish origin migrants in the west who fit into the category of stereotypical 'Turk'. It has been displayed that the proportion of Euro-Turks in this category is around *40 percent*. However, it was also concluded that the majority of the Euro-Turks have become

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[29] This classification is made by Will Kymlicka (2002) to refer to the ways in which the demands of minority groups have been identified in western and eastern European countries. He claims that western European democracies usually define minority claims as a quest for justice and fairness, while eastern European states name such claims as a threat to their national security.

politically, socially, economically and culturally integrated active agents in their countries of settlement. Around *20 percent* of them have actually assimilated into the receiving society. On the other hand, *40 percent* have generated a form of life embracing both homeland and 'hostland' in a way that constructs a bridge in between.

CONCLUSIVE REMARKS

■ ISLAMIC/ETHNIC/NATIONAL REVIVAL AMONG EURO-TURKS:

- NOT A SECURITY CHALLENGE,

- A QUEST FOR JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS;

■ RELIGIOUS, ETHNIC AND CULTURAL RESURGENCE IS AN ALTERNATIVE FORM OF POLITICS GENERATED BY MIGRANTS WHEN THEY ARE NOT GIVEN THE STRUCTURAL AND LEGAL RIGHTS FOR POLITICAL INTEGRATION BY THEIR COUNTRIES OF SETTLEMENT;

■ DEFINITION OF INTEGRATION SHOULD CHANGE

- NOT LIMITED TO CULTURAL ASSIMILATION

- SHOULD INCLUDE POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL INTEGRATION

■ MIGRANTS ARE MORE RESPONSIVE TO DEMOCRATIC/INCLUSIVE CITIZENSHIP REGIMES.

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