


Daily Report 223/2019

20 September 2019¹

Summary

- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
- Inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the Mission saw workers from government-controlled areas working on the foundations of a bypass bridge east of the broken section of the bridge.
- The Mission observed demining activities inside the disengagement area near Zolote and was, as a result, able to cross through.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs and the operations of critical civilian infrastructure, including repairs to water pipelines and power lines.
- Restrictions of the Mission's access continued, including at checkpoints in and near Petrivske and Verkhnoшыrokiyske, both in non-government-controlled areas.*

Ceasefire violations¹




¹ For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Chermalyk was not operational.

² Including explosions.

³ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations



In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (11), compared with the [previous reporting period](#) (about 280 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south of Pyshevyk (government-controlled, 84km south of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded 23 ceasefire violations, including 11 explosions compared with the [previous reporting period](#) (no ceasefire violations). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west-south-west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk) and east and west-south-west of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On the morning of 19 September the SMM observed 16 members of the State Emergency Service (SES) of Ukraine preparing to conduct demining activities, about 500m north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk). It also saw seven workers from government-controlled areas with a crane working on the foundation of a bypass bridge, about 7-10m east of the broken section of the bridge. Five other workers with two vehicles, an excavator and a tractor, were cutting iron barrier ropes at the eastern side of the road about 30m north of the broken section of the bridge.

In the afternoon of the same day, the SMM observed six workers from government-controlled areas with three tractors, a bulldozer and a crane unloading eight concrete slabs from a truck about 15m east of the broken section of the bridge.

On the same day, the SMM saw members of an international organization providing support for pedestrians crossing the wooden ramps on the broken section of the bridge and installing a tent with a metal construction for volunteers, about 15m north of the northern edge of the broken section of the bridge.

On the same day, while positioned south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion about 1-1.2km west-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area. While positioned north of the disengagement area, the SMM heard seven shots of small- arms fire and an undetermined explosion about 2-4km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On the morning of 19 September, the SMM observed two deminers from non-government-controlled areas talking to two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) at the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska.⁴

⁴ The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

Other disengagement areas⁵

While positioned near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the northern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw five deminers from government-controlled areas conducting demining activities inside the disengagement area, in areas between the aforementioned checkpoint and the railway bridge. The SMM also saw that [a previously reported](#) 120mm mortar tailfin embedded on the ground on the eastern edge of road T-1316 inside the disengagement area had been removed.

While positioned at the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM saw five deminers from non-government-controlled areas conducting demining activities in a field about 350m north-west of the checkpoint. At the same location, the SMM heard three explosions about 1-2km north-north-west, assessed as controlled detonation of unexploded ordnance (UXO) inside the disengagement area. The SMM also saw that [a previously reported](#) “Barely Visible Obstacle” (MZO) placed on road T-1316 was not present. As a result, the Mission was able to cross through the road inside the disengagement area, for the first time since July 2019. About 1.6km east, the SMM saw repair works to a former checkpoint of the armed formations.

The SMM’s access to its camera near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) was restricted (see below).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

On 19 September, the Mission observed no weapon in violation of withdrawal lines.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁶

Government-controlled areas

19 September

The SMM saw:

- two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (a BMP-2 and one undetermined) in the eastern outskirts of Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) and
- an IFV (BTR-4E) near Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk).

About 2km north of Kapitanove (49km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw three Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel with two mid-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) on the ground.

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the [Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware](#) of 21 September 2016.

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Non-government-controlled areas

19 September

The SMM saw six people in military-style clothing fortifying a position and a crane placing concrete slabs on the road between Petrivske and Styla (34km south of Donetsk), north-east of the Petrivske disengagement area.

SMM facilitation of repairs to and the operation of civilian infrastructure

The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to the sewage system near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk). It also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk) and to enable assessments of a water conduit in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

SMM monitored the security situation the Black and Azov Sea coasts

On 18 September, the Mission observed a calm situation along the Sea of Azov coast in Kherson region and at a Ukrainian State Border Guard Service security post in Valok (188km south-east of Kherson) and at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report 14 September 2019](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Denial of access:

- At a checkpoint in Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations [again](#) denied the SMM passage, citing “demining in the area” and “sniper activity”, thereby restricting the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske.
- At a checkpoint west of Verkhnohyrokiivske (formerly, Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations [again](#) denied the SMM passage, citing “ongoing engineering works in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.


Table of ceasefire violations as of 19 September 2019⁷

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera at Donetsk Filtration Station (15km N of Donetsk)	0.8-1.2km SSW	Recorded	1	Muzzle flash		N/K	18-Sep, 21:11
	0.8-1.2km SSW	Recorded	1	Projectile	WNW to ESE (subsequent to previous event)	N/K	18-Sep, 21:11
	0.8-1.2km SSW	Recorded	2	Projectile	WNW to ESE	N/K	18-Sep, 21:11
	0.8-1.2km SSW	Recorded	1	Projectile	N to S	N/K	18-Sep, 21:11
	0.8-1.2km SSW	Recorded	1	Projectile	NW to SE	N/K	18-Sep, 21:11
	300m-500m SSW	Recorded	1	Explosion	Outgoing	N/K	18-Sep, 22:03
	0.8-1.2km SSE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Airburst	N/K	18-Sep, 22:03
	300m-600m S	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	18-Sep, 21:35
SMM camera at entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km NE of	2-4km ENE	Recorded	3	Projectile	N to S	N/K	19-Sep, 02:35

⁷ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Donetsk)							
SMM camera at entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshechyk (government-controlled, 84km S of Donetsk)	3-4km S	Recorded	1	Projectile	E to W	N/K	18-Sep, 20:33
	3-4km S	Recorded	1	Projectile	E to W	N/K	18-Sep, 20:48
	3-4km S	Recorded	2	Projectile	W to E	N/K	18-Sep, 21:16
	3-4km S	Recorded	2	Projectile	W to E	N/K	18-Sep, 21:48
	3-4km S	Recorded	10	Projectile	W to E	N/K	19-Sep, 00:01
	3-4km S	Recorded	10	Projectile	W to E	N/K	19-Sep, 00:19
	4-5km S	Recorded	1	Projectile	In vertical flight	N/K	19-Sep, 03:07
SW edge of Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km NE of Donetsk)	1-2km WSW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	19-Sep, 09:17
	1-2km WSW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	19-Sep, 09:54
	1-2km W	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	19-Sep, 10:04
	2-3km SW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	19-Sep, 10:06
	1-2km WSW	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	19-Sep, 11:28
	1-3km W	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	19-Sep, 12:30
Holmivskiyi (non-government-controlled, 49km NE of Donetsk)	2-3km NE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	19-Sep, 12:31
Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km W of Luhansk)	10-13km WSW	Heard	6	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	18-Sep, 22:25-22:27
	10-13km WSW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	18-Sep, 22:38
	10-13km WSW	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	18-Sep, 23:15
N edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km W of Luhansk)	4-5km SSE	Heard	5	Shot		Small arms	19-Sep, 16:29-16:30
Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km NE of Luhansk)	2-3km E	Heard	7	Shot		Small arms	19-Sep, 17:40-17:48
	3-4km E	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	19-Sep, 17:40-17:48
	1-1.2km WSW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	19-Sep, 17:44

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions⁸



⁸ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well).