


Daily Report 229/2021

30 September 2021¹

Summary

- In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded 15 ceasefire violations, including three explosions. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 257 ceasefire violations in the region.
- In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded 28 ceasefire violations, including 12 explosions. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 159 ceasefire violations in the region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable the operation, maintenance and repairs of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at three entry-exit checkpoints and two corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted. Its unmanned aerial vehicles again experienced instances of jamming.*

Ceasefire violations²



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 29 September 2021. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras at the Oktiabr mine were not operational.

³ Including explosions.


⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 29 September 2021



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 30/09/2021

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 15 ceasefire violations, including three undetermined explosions. The majority of ceasefire violations occurred at easterly directions of Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk). In the [previous reporting period](#), the SMM recorded 257 ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded 28 ceasefire violations, including 12 undetermined explosions. The majority of ceasefire violations occurred in areas south-east and north-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), including some at north-westerly directions of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below). In the [previous reporting period](#), the SMM recorded 159 ceasefire violations, some of which also occurred in areas close to the disengagement area near Zolote.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding Measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the Mission has recorded at least 61,152 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 16,903 explosions, 11,843 projectiles in flight, 272 muzzle flashes, 245 illumination flares and at least 31,889 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

While positioned inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

During the night of 28-29 September, while on the northern edge of Popasna, the Mission heard four undetermined explosions and three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 4-8km north-east. During the day on 29 September, while positioned about 2km south-west of Berezhivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 3-5km north-west. All these ceasefire violations were assessed as outside the **disengagement area near Zolote**, but within 5km of its periphery.

On 29 September, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the area, the SMM saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them). The SMM again saw the seven previously observed containers located south of the disengagement area’s southern edge and inside the area, as well as a previously reported underground structure inside the area.

On the same day, while positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the area, the Mission saw that both entrances of a previously reported underground shelter located outside the disengagement area about 5m west and 10m south-west of the checkpoint, had been reinforced with wooden walls and roofs. (For previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 20 September 2021](#).)

On the night of 28-29 September, the SMM camera 2km east of Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) recorded one projectile in flight and two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km east-south-east, assessed as inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske**.

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

Outside the disengagement area, on the western edge of Petrivske, the SMM observed three members of the armed formations, wearing protective gear and carrying metal detectors, conducting de-mining activities in a field.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, the Mission observed a surface-to-air missile system, two multiple launch rocket systems, and four howitzers, including in a residential area, at a railway station, and at a compound near a residential area in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the SMM observed a surface-to-air missile system, six tanks, and 19 howitzers in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, including near a residential area and at a compound near a residential area. (For further information, see the tables below.)

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn⁶

At two heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region
29 September

The SMM noted that 14 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 *Gvozdika*, 122mm) were present, and that 15 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 *Gvozdika*, 122mm) were missing compared with the previous visit on 21 April 2021.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁷

The Mission saw two infantry fighting vehicles and one probable electronic warfare system in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, as well as one armoured combat vehicle in a compound near a residential area in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region. (For further information, see the table below.)

Presence of anti-tank mines and mine hazard signs near Shyroka Balka, Betmanove, and Donetsk and Luhansk regions

On 28 September, in a field near the southern edge of Shyroka Balka (non-government-controlled, 34km north-east of Donetsk), an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted four previously reported anti-tank mines, assessed as belonging to the armed formations. (For previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 10 June 2021](#).)

On the same day, on the eastern edge of Popasna, the Mission observed red-and-white stripes of plastic tape assessed as mine hazard warnings and at least 18 mine warning signs (red squares with skulls and crossbones with and “Danger! Mines”, written on them in Ukrainian) not

⁶ The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

previously reported, on both sides of road T-0504 for about 2km, some of which on the southern edge of the road, extended further along a local road and into a field. On the north-eastern edge of Popasna, the Mission also observed red-and-white stripes of plastic tape assessed as mine hazard warnings and at least ten mine warning signs (red squares with skulls and crossbones and “Danger! Mines” written on them in Ukrainian), not previously reported, leading further west for about 1.5km. For previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 20 September 2021](#).)

SMM facilitation of the operation, maintenance and repair of critical civilian infrastructure

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

The Mission also continued to monitor adherence to localized ceasefires to enable repairs to power lines in non-government-controlled Donetsk city’s Petrovskiy District.

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Stanytsia Luhanska was open, with people queueing to travel in both directions. On 27 September at the EECP, the SMM observed that all passport control booths had been removed from the EECP. It also saw that at the same area, passports of people travelling towards non-government-controlled areas were being checked at three minivans and one mini-container, and that a new building was operational 150m to the south-west where control of baggage and documents of people travelling towards government-controlled areas was being conducted.

On 29 September, near the EECP, the SMM saw that previously observed construction works of a metal structure had been completed and that toilet cabins, recently under construction, were now open. (For previous observations the area, see SMM Daily Reports of [27 September](#) and [29 September 2021](#).)

The SMM noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were open, but that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were closed.

While positioned at the EECP near Shchastia, the Mission saw a stationary convoy consisting of 20 trailer trucks, accompanied by two vehicles bearing the logo of a humanitarian organisation.

On the same day, while positioned at the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations, the SMM saw a convoy consisting of 20 trailer trucks, accompanied by two vehicles bearing the logo of a humanitarian organisation, driving towards non-government-controlled areas.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report of 28 September 2021](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:⁸

- SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during six flights: three times over areas near Bashtevych (non-government-controlled, 40km south-west of Luhansk), twice over areas near Pivdenne (formerly Leninske, government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), and once over areas Hrechyshkyne (government-controlled, 45km north-west of Luhansk).

⁸ For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of tens of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

Tables of weapons

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
28/9/2021	4	Towed howitzer (2A36 <i>Giatsint-B</i> , 152mm)	At a railway station in Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk)	Mini-UAV
	1	Multiple-launch rocket system (BM-21 <i>Grad</i> , 122mm)	In a compound near a residential area in Chabanivka (66km north-west of Luhansk)	
29/9/2021	1	Surface-to-air missile system (9K33 <i>Osa</i>)	In a residential area of Vidrozhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk)	Patrol
	1	Multiple-launch rocket system (BM-21 <i>Grad</i> , 122mm)	Near Krasnopillia (83km north of Donetsk)	

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
28/9/2021	6	Tank (type undetermined)	Near a residential area in Zatyshne (64km south-west of Donetsk)	Mini-UAV
	1	Surface-to-air missile system (9K33 <i>Osa</i>)	Near Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk)	
	6	Towed howitzer (2A36 <i>Giatsint-B</i> , 152mm)	In a compound near a residential area of Khibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk)	
	9	Self-propelled howitzer (2S3 <i>Akatsiya</i> , 152mm)	Near Khibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk)	
	4	Towed howitzer (2A36 <i>Giatsint-B</i> , 152mm)		

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁹

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
29/9/2021	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP -2)	Near Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk)	Patrol
	1		Near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk)	
	1	Probable electronic warfare system (<i>Nota</i> -type)	Near Lebedynske (99km south of Donetsk)	
Non-government-controlled areas				
29/9/2021	1	Armoured combat vehicle (BTR-variant)	In a compound near a residential area in Luhansk city	Patrol


⁹ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 29 September 2021¹⁰

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera 2km E of Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km SW of Donetsk)	2-3km ESE	Recorded	2	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as inside the disengagement area near Petrivske)	N/K	29-Sep, 00:35
	2-3km ESE	Recorded	1	Projectile	N to S (assessed as inside the disengagement area near Petrivske)	N/K	29-Sep, 01:46
SMM camera at entry exit check-point in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km NE of Donetsk)	2-4km ESE	Recorded	1	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	28-Sep, 23:56
	1-3km E	Recorded	3	Projectile	NNW to SSE	N/K	29-Sep, 01:47
	1-3km E	Recorded	2	Projectile	NNW to SSE	N/K	29-Sep, 01:48
	1-3km ENE	Recorded	4	Projectile	In vertical flight	N/K	29-Sep, 01:48
SMM camera at entry exit check-point in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km SW of Donetsk)	2-4km NNE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	29-Sep, 05:11
SMM camera in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km NE of Donetsk)	2-4km WSW	Recorded	1	Projectile	ESE to WNW	N/K	29-Sep, 02:22
N edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km W of Luhansk)	4-8km NE	Heard	4	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote)	N/K	28-Sep, 23:50-00:00
	4-8km NE	Heard	3	Burst	Assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote	HMG	28-Sep, 23:50-00:00
	4-7km SE	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	29-Sep, 00:21-00:30
	4-7km SE	Heard	2	Burst		HMG	29-Sep, 00:21-00:30
	4-7km SE	Heard	5	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	29-Sep, 18:10-18:35
	4-7km SE	Heard	11	Burst		HMG	29-Sep, 18:10-18:35
About 2km SSW of Bereziwske (non-government-controlled, 53km NW of Luhansk)	3-5km NW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote)	N/K	29-Sep, 12:10

¹⁰ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹¹



¹¹ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).