

# Daily Report 221/2021

21 September 2021<sup>1</sup>


## Summary

- In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded 117 ceasefire violations, including seven explosions. In the previous 24 hours, it recorded 29 ceasefire violations in the region.
- In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded five ceasefire violations, all explosions. In the previous 24 hours, it recorded 62 ceasefire violations in the region.
- The Mission followed up on reports of damage to and near civilian properties in government-controlled Taramchuk, Donetsk region.
- Small-arms fire was assessed as directed at the SMM's mini-unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) near non-government-controlled Panteleimonivka, Horlivka, and Oleksandrivka, Donetsk region; the SMM lost spatial control over one of its mini-UAV near the disengagement area near Zolote.\*
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at four entry-exit checkpoints and three corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at checkpoints of the armed formations near Zaichenko, Khreshchatytske, Ozerianivka, and Olenivka, Donetsk region. Its mini-, mid- and long-range UAVs experienced multiple instances of jamming.\*

## Ceasefire violations<sup>2</sup>

Number of recorded ceasefire violations<sup>3</sup>

Number of recorded explosions<sup>4</sup>




<sup>1</sup> Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 20 September 2021. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

<sup>2</sup> For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. Weather conditions limited observational capabilities of some of the SMM's cameras.


<sup>3</sup> Including explosions.

<sup>4</sup> Including from unidentified weapons.


### Map of recorded ceasefire violations



## Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 20 September 2021



#### Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- ..... Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 21/09/2021

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 117 ceasefire violations, including seven undetermined explosions. The majority of ceasefire violations occurred in areas west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) (see below), and in areas north-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk). In the [previous 24 hours](#), the Mission recorded 29 ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded five ceasefire violations, all undetermined explosions occurred in areas south-west of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk). In the [previous 24 hours](#), the Mission recorded 62 ceasefire violations.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the Mission has recorded at least 58,171 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 16,312 explosions, 11,340 projectiles in flight, 270 muzzle flashes, 237 illumination flares and at least 30,012 bursts and shots).

### **Damage to and near civilian property in government-controlled Taramchuk, Donetsk region**

The SMM followed up on reports of damage to a residential property in Taramchuk (government-controlled, 29km south-west of Donetsk).

On 18 September, about 3m south-west of an inhabited single-storey house at 23 Klenova Street in Taramchuk, on the south-east-facing wall of a summer kitchen, the Mission saw a shattered window. The SMM assessed the damage as recent. A woman (in her seventies), who introduced herself as the owner of the house, told the SMM that on the morning of 16 September shelling had occurred nearby.

About 250m south-south-east of the house, in the southern corner of an agricultural field and about 30m north of another house on Klenova Street, an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three recent craters: two assessed as caused by probable 122mm artillery rounds fired from an easterly direction and one assessed as caused by a probable 120mm mortar round.

About 35m north-north-east of the aforementioned house, the SMM saw one crater next to a northern wall of a damaged uninhabited building, assessed as recent and caused by a probable 122mm artillery round fired from an easterly direction.

(For previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 18 September 2021](#).)

### **Four instances of gunfire, assessed as directed at SMM mini-UAVs in Donetsk region; the SMM lost spatial control of one of its mini-UAVs in Luhansk region**

While positioned on the northern edge of Panteleimonivka (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Donetsk) to conduct an announced mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard a burst of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 600m north-east, assessed as targeting the UAV. The UAV also experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during that and a subsequent flight over the area.

While positioned on the north-western edge of Horlivka to conduct an announced mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard 65 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of about 1-2km north-north-east, assessed as targeting the UAV. The UAV also experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during the same flight.

While positioned on the north-western edge of Oleksandrivka to conduct an announced mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard ten shots of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 1km west-north-west, assessed as targeting the UAV, which was flying about 1km west of the SMM's position.

While positioned in the south-eastern part of Oleksandrivka to conduct an announced mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard 16 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 1.1-1.4km west, assessed as targeting the UAV, which was flying about 1.3km south-west of the SMM's position.

On all four occasions, the Mission landed the UAVs and left the areas.

The SMM was positioned on the eastern outskirts of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) to conduct an announced mini-UAV flight near the area's northern edge. From 16:35 to 16:43, the UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, after which the SMM lost spatial control over it, as it was flying over an area about 100m north of the SMM's position. The SMM was not able to retrieve the UAV and subsequently left the area. Another SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying near the southern edge of the disengagement area.\*

#### Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske<sup>5</sup>

Inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) south of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

Near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the **disengagement area near Zolote**, the SMM saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them). The SMM again saw the seven previously observed containers located south of the disengagement area's southern edge and inside the area, as well as a previously reported underground structure inside the area.

Two SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near the northern and southern edges of the disengagement area, respectively. (See above.)\*

While positioned at three locations near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

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<sup>5</sup> Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

## **Withdrawal of weapons**

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, the Mission saw a howitzer in a training area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the Mission saw one tank in the same training area. (For further information, see the tables below.)

## **Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn<sup>6</sup>**

*At a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region*  
19 September

The SMM observed no change in the number of weapons present and missing compared with the previous visit on 14 May 2021.

## **Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone**

The Mission saw two armoured combat vehicles in a residential area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region. (For further information, see the table below.)

## **Mine hazard signs near government-controlled Popasna, Luhansk region**

On the south-eastern outskirts of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed two previously unreported mine hazard signs (red squares with white skulls and crossbones, and text in Cyrillic), attached on both sides of road T-0504.

## **SMM facilitation - the operation and repair of critical civilian infrastructure**

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. While positioned near the north-eastern edge of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion, assessed as within a 5km radius of the station.

## **Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints**

In Donetsk region, the SMM observed that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were open, with traffic passing through in both directions.

In Luhansk region, the Mission observed that the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska was open, with people queueing to travel in both directions. At the EECP, near a previously reported metal structure, the SMM observed 14 newly placed support poles and two workers building

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<sup>6</sup> The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

the foundation of another metal structure. (For previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 20 September 2021](#).)

The Mission noted that the EECs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were open, but that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were closed.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

### **\*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

*The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report of 20 September 2021](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.*

#### Denials:

- At a checkpoint near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 93km south of Donetsk), three armed members of the armed formations denied the Mission passage west towards Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 92km south of Donetsk), citing “demining activities in the area” and referring to security concerns. While at the checkpoint, the SMM saw civilian traffic passing through.
- At a checkpoint near Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 86km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage west towards Kulykove (non-government-controlled, 87km south of Donetsk), citing “demining activities in the area”.
- At a checkpoint near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), a member of armed formations denied the Mission passage south-west towards Ozerianivka (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Donetsk), referring to a lack of prior notification. While at the checkpoint, the SMM saw civilian traffic passing through.

#### *Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:*

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Delay:

- At a checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations allowed a Mission member to proceed on foot towards government-controlled areas only after about 90 minutes of waiting, alleging a lack of prior notification about the crossing.

Other impediments:<sup>7</sup>

- An SMM mini-UAV was assessed as targeted by small-arms fire while flying over areas near Panteleimonivka (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Donetsk). The same UAV also experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during that and a subsequent flight over the area. (See above.)
- An SMM mini-UAV was assessed as targeted by small-arms fire while flying over areas near Horlivka. During the same flight, the UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming. (See above.)
- Two SMM mini-UAVs were assessed as targeted by small-arms- and heavy-machine-gun fire on two occasions in Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk).
- An SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over an area near the northern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), after which the Mission lost spatial control of the aircraft and was unable to retrieve it.
- Another SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote. (See above.)
- An SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Rohanske (government-controlled, 79km north-west of Donetsk) and Novohryhorivka (government-controlled, 70km north-west of Donetsk), and dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Oleksandro-Kalynove (government-controlled, 47km north of Donetsk).
- Two SMM mid-range UAV flights were cancelled due to GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, near Donetsk city's Petrovskyi District (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk).
- SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during seven flights: on three occasions near Donetsk city's Petrovskyi District, and twice near Shyroka Balka (non-government-controlled, 34km north-east of Donetsk) and near Horlivka, respectively.

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<sup>7</sup> For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of tens of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

## Tables of weapons

### Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
<b>Non-government-controlled areas</b>				
17/9/2021	1	Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm)	In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)	Mid-range UAV

### Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
<b>Non-government-controlled areas</b>				
15/9/2021	1	Tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)	Aerial imagery

### **Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>8</sup>**

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
<b>Government-controlled areas</b>				
15/9/2021	2	Armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined)	In a residential area in Kodema (57km north-east of Donetsk)	Mini-UAV

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<sup>8</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.




**Table of ceasefire violations as of 20 September 2021<sup>9</sup>**

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	3-5km NE	Recorded	18	Projectile	WNW to ESE	N/K	19-Sep, 19:37
W edge of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km NE of Donetsk)	2-3km WSW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	20-Sep, 11:00
NW edge of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km NE of Donetsk)	1-2km NNE	Heard	65	Shot			20-Sep, 12:07-12:08
NW edge of Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km SW of Donetsk)	1km WNW	Heard	10	Shot		Small arms	20-Sep, 12:31
SE edge of Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km SW of Donetsk)	1.1-1.4km W	Heard	16	Burst		HMG	20-Sep, 12:56-12:57
N edge of Panteleimonivka (non-government-controlled, 26km NE of Donetsk)	3-5km SW	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	20-Sep, 10:23
	600m NE	Heard	1	Burst		Small arms	20-Sep, 10:34
About 500m NE of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km N of Donetsk)	3-5km SE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	20-Sep, 10:58
N edge of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km NE of Donetsk)	3-5km SSW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	20-Sep, 11:00
About 2km WSW of Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km NE of Donetsk)	3-4km S	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	20-Sep, 10:59
About 2km NE of Panteleimonivka (non-government-controlled, 26km NE of Donetsk)	3-5km W	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	20-Sep, 11:01
About 2km S of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km NW of Luhansk)	5-10km SSW	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	19-Sep, 09:54-09:59
	5-10km SSW	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	19-Sep, 10:05

<sup>9</sup> The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

### Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions<sup>10</sup>



<sup>10</sup> The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).