


# Daily Report 131/2021

8 June 2021<sup>1</sup>

## Summary

- In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 53 ceasefire violations, including 14 explosions. In the previous 24 hours, it recorded 62 ceasefire violations in the region.
- In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded 23 ceasefire violations. In the previous 24 hours, it recorded 76 ceasefire violations in the region.
- Small-arms fire was assessed as directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near non-government-controlled Obozne, Luhansk region.\*
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. It again spotted people inside the disengagement area near Zolote during daytime.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable the operation and maintenance of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at six entry-exit checkpoints and five corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM monitored a demonstration in Kyiv.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted. Its UAVs again experienced multiple instances of GPS signal interference.\*

## Ceasefire violations<sup>2</sup>



<sup>1</sup> Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 7 June 2021. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

<sup>2</sup> For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and in Stanytsia Luhanska were not operational and weather conditions limited the observational capabilities of some of the other cameras.

<sup>3</sup> Including explosions.


<sup>4</sup> Including from unidentified weapons.

### Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and  
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Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

## Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 7 June 2021



#### Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- ..... Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005), IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

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In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 53 ceasefire violations, including 14 undetermined explosions. The majority of ceasefire violations occurred in an area east-north-east of Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 6-7 June. In the [previous 24 hours](#), the Mission recorded 62 ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded 23 ceasefire violations (no explosions). All ceasefire violations occurred in an area north-north-west of Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) (see below). In the [previous 24 hours](#), the Mission recorded 76 ceasefire violations.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) on 22 July 2020 regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has recorded at least 33,696 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 10,627 explosions, 5,713 projectiles in flight, 230 muzzle flashes, 109 illumination flares and at least 17,017 bursts and shots).

#### **Small-arms fire assessed as directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Obozne, Luhansk region**

While positioned on the north-western edge of Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) to conduct an announced mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight, the Mission heard 23 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km north-north-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying over positions of the armed formations approximately 2.5km north of the SMM's position. The Mission landed the UAV and left the area.\*

#### **Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske<sup>5</sup>**

While positioned inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) south of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

During the day of 5 June, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted four people near former positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces: two about 550m and two about 2km west-south-west of the area's north-eastern corner, respectively. It also spotted two people near former positions of the armed formations near the area's eastern edge, about 1.4km north of its south-eastern corner.

During the day of 6 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a person inside the disengagement area, near a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 550m west-south-west of the area's north-eastern corner.

On 7 June, while positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote, the Mission saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them). The SMM again saw the seven previously

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<sup>5</sup> Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

observed containers located south of the disengagement area's southern edge and inside the area.

While positioned at three locations near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

### **Withdrawal of weapons**

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, the Mission observed a surface-to-air missile system in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region, as well as a surface-to-air missile system and two howitzers in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including in a training area near Ternove (non-government-controlled, 57km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage areas, the SMM saw 39 tanks in the same training area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region. (For further information, see the table below.)

### **Presence of anti-tank mines near Sentianivka in Luhansk region**

On 26 May, about 2.5km north-north-east of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time 19 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid across road T-1317. About 20m north-west of the abovementioned mines, in a field west of the same road, it spotted for the first time five anti-tank mines.

On the same day, about 2.7km east-north-east of Sentianivka, the same UAV spotted for the first time at least 21 anti-tank mines in a field south of road T-1303.

About 2.3km north-east of Sentianivka, the same UAV spotted 45 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62), eight of which were seen for the first time, laid across the same road. (For previous observations from the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 6 March 2020](#).)

All these mines were assessed as belonging to the armed formations and the ones spotted for the first time were assessed as not recently laid.

### **SMM facilitation of maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure**

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk). The SMM also monitored the security situation near the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable maintenance and repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and the water infrastructure in Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk).

## **Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints**

In Donetsk region, the SMM observed that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were open, with traffic passing through in both directions. While positioned at the EECP near Novotroitske, the Mission heard seven undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-4km east-north-east.

The Mission observed that the EECP near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) was open, but did not observe any traffic passing through. It noted that the corresponding checkpoint near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) was closed.

The Mission also observed that EECP near Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km south of Donetsk) was open, but did not observe any traffic passing through.

In Luhansk region, the SMM observed that the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were open, with people queueing to travel in both directions.

The SMM also noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were open, but that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were closed.

## **SMM monitored a demonstration in Kyiv**

On 5 June, the SMM monitored a demonstration in support of LGBTQI in front of the Office of the President of Ukraine. About 150 people (mixed genders, mostly in their twenties and thirties) advocated for the adoption of draft law “On Amendments to the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses and the Criminal Code of Ukraine on Combating Discrimination”. Participants held banners demanding investigations into reported recent attacks on members of the LGBTQI community. The Mission also observed a small counter-protest of about 15 people (13 men and two women, in their twenties) near the northern entrance to the premises of the Office of the President. It saw at least 170 law enforcement officers.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

## **\*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

*The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed*

formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report of 2 June 2021](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

*Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:*

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:<sup>6</sup>

- On 5 June, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during take-off from its base near Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) and while flying over areas between Stepanivka and Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk), between Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Myronivskiyi (government-controlled, 62km north-east of Donetsk) and between Pleshchiivka (government-controlled, 51km north of Donetsk) and Stepanivka, as well as dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying between Kostiantynivka and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and between Myronivskiyi and Pleshchiivka.
- On 6 June, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during take-off from its base near Stepanivka, while flying over areas between government-controlled Kodema (57km north-east of Donetsk) and Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) and between government-controlled Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk) and Stepanivka, as well as dual GPS interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying between government-controlled Stepanivka and Katerynivka (47km north of Donetsk) and between Svitlodarsk and Novooleksandrivka.
- On 7 June, while positioned in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) to conduct an announced mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard 23 shots of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at an SMM mini-UAV. The Mission landed the UAV and left the area. (See above.)
- On the same day, SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during two flights over government-controlled areas: near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk) and near Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk).
- On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during a flight over areas near Orikhove.

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<sup>6</sup> For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interferences could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

## Table of weapons

### Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
<b>Government-controlled areas</b>				
7/6/2021	1	Surface-to-air missile system (9K33 <i>Osa</i> )	Near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk)	Patrol
<b>Non-government-controlled areas</b>				
5/6/2021	1	Surface-to-air missile system (9K33 <i>Osa</i> )	Near Zemliane (11km north-west of Luhansk)	Mini-UAV
	2	Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm)	In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk), where imagery also revealed the presence of 32 armoured combat vehicles. <sup>7</sup>	Mid-range UAV

### Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
<b>Non-government-controlled areas</b>				
5/6/2021	39	Tank (18 T-72, one T-64 and 20 type undetermined)	In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)	Mid-range UAV

<sup>7</sup> The armoured combat vehicles mentioned here are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.


**Table of ceasefire violations as of 7 June 2021<sup>8</sup>**

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera at entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km NE of Donetsk)	2-4km ENE	Recorded	16	Projectile	NW to SE	N/K	7-Jun, 00:01
	2-4km ENE	Recorded	23	Projectile	NW to SE	N/K	7-Jun, 00:02
SMM camera 1km SW of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km S of Donetsk)	3-5km N	Recorded	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	6-Jun, 22:22
	3-5km N	Recorded	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	7-Jun, 01:35
	3-5km N	Recorded	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	7-Jun, 01:37
EECP in Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km SW of Donetsk)	3-4km ENE	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	7-Jun, 10:40-10:51
	3-4km ENE	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	7-Jun, 11:25-11:35
	3-4km ENE	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	7-Jun, 11:39
NW edge of Obozne (non-government-controlled, 19km N of Luhansk)	2-3km NNW	Heard	23	Shot		Small arms	7-Jun, 11:29

<sup>8</sup> The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.



### Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions<sup>9</sup>



<sup>9</sup> The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).