


# Daily Report 85/2021

14 April 2021<sup>1</sup>

## Summary

- In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 54 ceasefire violations. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 40 ceasefire violations in the region.
- In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations. In the previous reporting period, it recorded two ceasefire violations in the region.
- Small-arms fire was assessed as directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), once near Olenivka and twice near Oleksandrivka, Donetsk region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure and recorded four undetermined explosions close to the Donetsk Filtration Station.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at three entry-exit checkpoints and four corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted. Its mini-UAVs experienced multiple instances of GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, and its long-range UAV flight was again cancelled due to dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming.\*

## Ceasefire violations<sup>2</sup>



<sup>1</sup> Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 13 April 2021. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

<sup>2</sup> For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational.

<sup>3</sup> Including explosions.


<sup>4</sup> Including from unidentified weapons.

### Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and  
Co-operation in Europe  
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

## Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 13 April 2021



#### Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- ..... Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 14/04/2021

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 54 ceasefire violations, including 13 undetermined explosions. The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, occurred at southerly directions of Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), in an area west of Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) (see below), and at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (see below). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded 40 ceasefire violations, some of which at southerly directions of the DFS.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations. In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded two ceasefire violations.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded at least 18,147 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 6,135 explosions, 1,885 projectiles in flight, 182 muzzle flashes, 74 illumination flares and at least 9,871 bursts and shots).

#### **Small-arms fire assessed as directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicles near Olenivka and Oleksandrivka, Donetsk region**

On 13 April, while positioned on the south-western edge of Olenivka to conduct an announced mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight, the SMM heard five shots and seven bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of about 1.8km north-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying over positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 1.8km west-north-west of the SMM's position. The Mission landed the UAV and left the area. It also experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during that and a previous flight over the same area.

On the same day, while positioned on the southern edge of Oleksandrivka to conduct an announced mini-UAV flight, at 15:10, the Mission heard four bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of about 1.4km south-south-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 1.4km west-south-west of the SMM's position. The Mission landed the UAV and moved to another location near the settlement to conduct another UAV flight in the area.

At 15:45, while positioned about 500m north of the northern edge of Oleksandrivka to conduct an announced mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard eight shots of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of about 1.4km south-south-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 1.4km west-south-west of the SMM's position. The Mission landed the UAV and left the area.

The mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during both flights.\*

#### **Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske<sup>5</sup>**

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<sup>5</sup> Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

On 13 April, while positioned inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) south of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On 12 April, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV again spotted at least 300 anti-tank mines (TM-62) about 1.6km west-north-west of the area’s south-eastern corner, on the eastern edge of road T-1316. (For previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 17 March 2021](#).) The UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during two separate flights over the railway bridge in the disengagement area.\*

On 13 April, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during two separate flights over the south-eastern part of the disengagement area.\*

On the same day, while positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the area, the Mission saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), two of whom walked inside the area to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned.

The Mission again saw the eight previously observed containers located south of the disengagement area’s southern edge, on its edge and inside the area. The SMM also saw one member of the armed formations (wearing an armband with “JCCC” written on it) and a man in civilian clothing enter the disengagement area and walk north in the direction of the abovementioned containers and then exit the area shortly thereafter.

While positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard a shot of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south, assessed as outside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** but within 5km of its periphery.

### Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system near a residential area and two towed mortars. (For further information, see the table below.)

### Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>6</sup>

The SMM saw eleven armoured combat vehicles, three anti-aircraft guns, and two self-propelled anti-aircraft systems in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and two armoured personnel carriers in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, including

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<sup>6</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

near residential areas, as well as six infantry fighting vehicles in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region. (For further information, see the table below.)

### **Anti-tank mines near Popasna, Luhansk region, and Zaichenko, Donetsk region**

On 12 April, near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time six anti-tank mines attached to a board (not seen in imagery from 20 February 2021) on the southern edge of road T-0504, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted about 58 anti-tank mines, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, in a field about 800 north-west-north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 93km south of Donetsk). (For previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 20 November 2020](#).)

### **SMM facilitation of maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure**

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. While positioned at two locations near the station, the Mission heard four undetermined explosions, assessed as within a 5km radius of the DFS.

The Mission also monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable regular railway track inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance in Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk) and maintenance of power lines in Opytne (government-controlled, 12km north-west of Donetsk) and near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk).

### **Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints**

In Donetsk region, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km south of Donetsk) was open but saw no traffic passing in either direction. It also noted that the checkpoint of the armed formations near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) was closed.

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were open, with people queueing to travel in both directions.

The SMM also noted that the EECPs near Zolote was open. It also saw that the checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were closed.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

### **\*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

*The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government. (For example, see [SMM Daily Report of 13 April 2021](#).) The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.*

*Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:*

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:<sup>7</sup>

- On 12 April, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during two separate flights over the railway bridge in the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).
- On the evening of 13 April, an SMM long-range UAV flight was cancelled due to dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, near its base in Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk).
- On the same day, while positioned in Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) to conduct an announced mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard 12 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The UAV experienced GPS signal interference during that and a previous flight, assessed as caused by probable jamming. (See above.)
- On the same day, while positioned in and near Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) to conduct announced mini-UAV flights, the SMM heard four bursts and eight shots of small-arms fire, respectively, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The mini-UAV also experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during both flights. (See above.)
- On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV was unable to take off on three occasions due to GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, near Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk).
- On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Yasne (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk).

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<sup>7</sup> For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interferences could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

- On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas Syhnalne (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk).
- On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during two separate flights over areas near Orlivka (government-controlled, 22km north-west of Donetsk).
- On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Nevelske (government-controlled, 18km north-west of Donetsk).
- On the same day, two SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during two separate flights over the south-eastern part of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).
- On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).
- On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near the eastern outskirts of non-government-controlled Luhansk city.

## Table of weapons

### Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
<b>Government-controlled areas</b>				
12/4/2021	1	Surface-to-air missile system (9K35 <i>Strela-10</i> )	Near a residential area of Chernenko (86km south of Donetsk)	Mini-UAV
13/4/2021	2	Towed mortar (type undetermined)	On the south-eastern edge of Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk) moving north	Patrol

### **Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>8</sup>**

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
<b>Government-controlled areas</b>				
12/4/2021	1	Anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm)	Near Lomakyne (93km south of Donetsk)	Mini-UAV
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB S)		
	3	Infantry fighting vehicle (one BMP-1 and two BMP-2)		
	2	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR -70)	Near a residential area of Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk)	
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80)	Near Hnutove (90km south of Donetsk)	
	2	Self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4 <i>Shilka</i> , 23mm)	Near a residential area of Chernenko (86km south of Donetsk)	
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-4 <i>Bucephalus</i> )	Near Zolote (60km west of Luhansk)	
13/4/2021	1	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB)	Near Lebedynske (99km south of Donetsk)	Patrol
	2	Anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm)		
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BTR-3)	Near Sopyne (101km south of Donetsk)	
	3	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80)	Near Orlivka (22km north-west of Donetsk)	
<b>Non-government-controlled areas</b>				
12/4/2021	6	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)	Near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk)	Mini-UAV

<sup>8</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.




**Table of ceasefire violations as of 13 April 2021<sup>9</sup>**

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
About 7km NNW of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km NE of Donetsk)	7-9km E	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	13-Apr, 12:15
About 2km N of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km S of Donetsk)	2-3km S	Heard	1	Shot	Assessed as outside the disengagement area	Small arms	13-Apr, 12:26
SW edge of Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km SW of Donetsk)	1.8km NW	Heard	5	Shot		Small arms	13-Apr, 13:20
	1.8km NW	Heard	7	Burst		Small arms	13-Apr, 13:20
About 1km NW of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk)	3-4km WSW	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	13-Apr, 13:34-13:35
About 2km SSE of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km N of Donetsk)	3-4km SW	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	13-Apr, 13:34
S edge of Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km SW of Donetsk)	1-4km S	Heard	8	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	13-Apr, 14:56-14:57
	1-4km S	Heard	4	Burst		Small arms	13-Apr, 14:56-14:57
	1-4km S	Heard	4	Shot		Small arms	13-Apr, 14:56-14:57
	1.4km SSW	Heard	4	Burst		Small arms	13-Apr, 15:10
About 500m N of Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km SW of Donetsk)	1.4km SSW	Heard	8	Shot		Small arms	13-Apr, 15:45
	1-1.5km SW	Heard	8	Shot		Small arms	13-Apr, 15:49

<sup>9</sup> The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

### Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions<sup>10</sup>



<sup>10</sup> The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).