


Daily Report 52/2021

5 March 2021¹

Summary

- In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 11 ceasefire violations. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 102 ceasefire violations in the region.
- In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded 36 ceasefire violations. In the previous reporting period, it recorded no ceasefire violations.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at three entry-exit checkpoints and three corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

Ceasefire violations²



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 4 March 2021. All times are in Eastern European Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational.

³ Including explosions.


⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations



Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 4 March 2021



Ceasefire violation concentration

- High
-
- Low
- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 05/03/2021

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 11 ceasefire violations, including four undetermined explosions, the majority of which occurred in an area south of Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas north of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded 102 ceasefire violations, the majority of which occurred near Shyrokyne.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded 36 ceasefire violations, including seven undetermined explosions. All these ceasefire violations occurred at northerly directions of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below). In the [previous reporting period](#), the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded at least 11,227 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 3,836 explosions, 1,310 projectiles in flight, 110 muzzle flashes, 62 illumination flares and at least 5,909 bursts and shots).

Reports of damage to civilian properties

The Mission is following up on reports of damage on 4 March 2021 to residential buildings on Pryvokzalna Street in Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

On 4 March, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) south of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On 4 March, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded seven undetermined explosions, two muzzle flashes and 27 projectiles in flight, all assessed as outside the **disengagement area near Zolote** but within 5km of its periphery.

On 3 March, while positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the area, the SMM again saw five containers inside a fenced perimeter south of its southern edge, on the southern edge of the road leading eastwards towards Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk). The Mission also again saw another container on the area’s southern edge.

Inside the area, the SMM again saw a container about 60–70m north of the other five and another about 350m north of the area’s southern edge, both on the western edge of road T-1316. About 10–30m north of the former container, the Mission again saw six concrete blocks placed in three rows across both lanes of the same road. The SMM also saw for the first time a round white object, assessed as a satellite dish, placed on one of the electricity poles about 100m north of the area’s southern edge and 60m east of road T-1316.

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

While positioned near the abovementioned checkpoint, the Mission saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), two of whom walked inside the area to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned.

On 4 March, while positioned at two locations near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the Mission observed eight tanks in two training areas in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region. (For further information, see the table below.)

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

4 March

The SMM noted that 33 tanks (27 T-64 and six T-72), two anti-tank guns (D-48, 85mm) and 18 mortars (12 2B9 *Vasilek*, 82mm, three 2B14 *Podnos*, 82mm, two BM-37, 82mm and one 2B10, 82mm) were again missing.

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

4 March

The SMM noted that one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 *Gvozdika*, 122mm) was again missing.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn⁶

At a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

4 March

The SMM noted that six anti-tank guns (MT-12 *Rapira*, 100mm) and five self-propelled howitzers (2S3 *Akatsiya*, 152 mm) were present. It also noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S3) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12) were again missing, and that three self-propelled howitzers (2S3) were missing for the first time.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁷

The SMM saw three infantry fighting vehicles near residential houses in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region and an armoured combat vehicle in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region (for further information, see the table below).

⁶ The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

⁷ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Demining activities near Orikhove, Luhansk region

On 4 March, about 3km west of Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km north-west of Luhansk, the SMM observed 17 de-miners (13 men and four women, mixed ages) of an international organisation in grey clothing conducting de-mining activities on road T-1316, and four mini-buses parked nearby.

SMM facilitation of maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk). On the morning of 4 March, while positioned near the DFS, the Mission recorded an undetermined explosion, assessed as within a 5km radius of the station.

It also monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable railway inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); maintenance of telecommunication infrastructure near Lobacheve (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk); maintenance of sewage treatment infrastructure near a government-controlled area of Dolomitne (53km north-east of Donetsk); as well as repairs to water pipes near a non-government-controlled area of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) and power lines near non-government-controlled Stepanivka (62km west of Luhansk), Almazna (55km west of Luhansk) and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were open, with people queueing to travel in both directions. The SMM observed a golf cart operating between the new section of the bridge and the EECP.

The SMM also noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were open but did not observe any people passing through, and that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were closed.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination

(JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report of 2 March 2021](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Table of weapons

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
4/3/2021	5	Tank (types undetermined)	In a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk)	Patrol
	3		In a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk)	

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁸

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
3/3/2021	3	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)	In a residential area of Sukha Balka (36km north of Donetsk)	Mini-UAV
Non-government-controlled areas				
3/3/2021	1	Armoured combat vehicle (MT-LB variant)	Near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk)	Mini-UAV

⁸ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.


Table of ceasefire violations as of 4 March 2021⁹

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	2-4km E	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	4-Mar, 09:32
SMM camera 1.5km NE of Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km S of Donetsk)	3-5km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	4-Mar, 18:28
SMM camera 1km SW of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km S of Donetsk)	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Mar, 22:12
	2-4km N	Recorded	2	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	4-Mar, 00:58
SE part of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	2-3km SE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	4-Mar, 09:51
About 1km SW of Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km NE of Donetsk)	2-3km S	Heard	5	Shot		Small arms	4-Mar, 13:20
SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km W of Luhansk)	1-3km ESE	Recorded	2	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	4-Mar, 18:42
	1-3km ESE	Recorded	12	Projectile	S to N (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	4-Mar, 18:48
	1-3km ESE	Recorded	5	Projectile	S to N (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	4-Mar, 18:49
	1-3km E	Recorded	1	Muzzle flash	Assessed as outside the disengagement area	N/K	4-Mar, 18:52

⁹ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
	1-3km E	Recorded	1	Projectile	NNW to SSE (subsequent to previous event, assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	4-Mar, 18:52
	1-3km E	Recorded	1	Muzzle flash	Assessed as outside the disengagement area	N/K	4-Mar, 18:52
	1-3km E	Recorded	1	Projectile	NNW to SSE (subsequent to previous event, assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	4-Mar, 18:52
	1-3km E	Recorded	2	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	4-Mar, 18:52
	1-3km E	Recorded	2	Projectile	NNW to SSE (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	4-Mar, 18:52
	1-3km ENE	Recorded	2	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	4-Mar, 18:58
	1-3km E	Recorded	8	Projectile	NNW to SSE (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	4-Mar, 19:00
	1-3km E	Recorded	1	Projectile	NNW to SSE (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	4-Mar, 19:00
	1-3km E	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined (subsequent to previous event, assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	4-Mar, 19:00

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹⁰



¹⁰ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).