

Daily Report 46/2021

26 February 2021¹


Summary

- In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded ten ceasefire violations. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 23 ceasefire violations in the region.
- In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded 20 ceasefire violations. In the previous reporting period, it recorded two ceasefire violations in the region.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and again saw containers inside and near the southern edge of the area near Zolote and people inside the latter area during daytime.
- The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at three entry-exit checkpoints and three corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The SMM observed gatherings in Lviv.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³

Number of recorded explosions⁴



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 25 February 2021. All times are in Eastern European Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational.

³ Including explosions.


⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations



Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 25 February 2021



Ceasefire violation concentration

- High
-
- Low
- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 26/02/2021

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded ten ceasefire violations, all explosions (nine undetermined and one impact), most of which occurred in areas north of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk) and north-west of Panteleimonivka (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Donetsk). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded 23 ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded 20 ceasefire violations, all shots of small-arms fire which occurred on the south-eastern edge of Luhansk city (non-government-controlled). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded two ceasefire violations.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded at least 10,828 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 3,555 explosions, 1,233 projectiles in flight, 104 muzzle flashes, 62 illumination flares and at least 5,874 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

On 25 February, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) south of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

During the day on 24 February, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two people inside a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 200m west-south-west of the area’s north-eastern corner and a person near a former position of the armed formations near the area’s eastern edge, about 1.5km north of its south-eastern corner.

On 25 February, while positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the area, the SMM again saw five containers inside a fenced perimeter south of the area’s southern edge, on the southern edge of the road leading eastwards towards Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk). The Mission also saw for the first time two metal poles inside the perimeter, assessed as flagpoles. Outside the fenced perimeter, on its north-western edge, the Mission saw three to four workers removing parts of concrete tiles and a tractor parked nearby. The SMM again saw concrete blocks placed along the northern edge of the fenced perimeter.

On the northern edge of the road leading to Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, opposite the fenced perimeter, the Mission saw a [previously observed](#) metal post, reportedly for traffic regulation, with a barrier attached to it (positioned upwards to not block the road). Near the post, the Mission saw that the ground had been paved.

The SMM again saw another container, which was previously located about 30m north of the area’s southern edge, on the area’s southern edge.

Inside the area, the SMM again saw a container about 60–70m north of the other five and another about 350m north of the area’s southern edge, both on the western edge of road T-

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

1316. About 10–30m north of the former container, the Mission again saw six concrete blocks placed in three rows across both lanes of the same road.

While positioned near the abovementioned checkpoint of the armed formations, the Mission saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), two of whom walked inside the area to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned. The SMM also saw an ambulance driven by a man (in his fifties) carrying two women (in their forties) drive to the same location and then return.

On 22 February, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted a person inside a former position of the armed formations near the area’s south-eastern corner and, outside the area, about 100m north of its northern edge and about 300m west-north-west of its north-eastern corner, the UAV spotted a person walking southwards on a footpath.

On 25 February, while positioned about 2km east of Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), the Mission heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 5-7km north, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, the SMM observed four self-propelled howitzers at a railway station in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the Mission observed a surface-to-air missile system and 14 self-propelled howitzers in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region (for further information, see the tables below).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁶

The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier near residential houses in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region (for further information, see the table below).

Anti-tank mines and mine signs near Petrivske, Donetsk region

On 22 February, about 200m north of the northern edge of Petrivske, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time at least two probable anti-tank mines (probable TM-62P3) on the southern edge of a dirt road, assessed as not recently laid and belonging to the armed formations, as well as at least two mine hazard signs on both sides of the same road.

SMM facilitation of maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

It additionally facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable maintenance to sewage treatment infrastructure near a government-controlled area of Dolomitne (53km north-east of Donetsk) and demining near Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk).

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational, with people queueing to travel towards government-controlled areas and in the opposite direction at both. The Mission observed a golf cart operating between the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and the EECP.

The SMM also noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were open but did not observe any people passing through, and that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were closed.

SMM observed gatherings in Lviv

On 23 and 25 February in Lviv, the Mission observed peaceful gatherings in support of persons either accused or convicted in various court cases.

On 23 February, it saw about 300 people (mixed genders and ages) gathered in front of the Lviv City Council at 1 Rynok Square. On 25 February, the Mission saw about 100 people (mixed genders and ages) in front of the Halytskyi District Court at Cholovskoho Street 2, some of whom were carrying Ukrainian and *Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists*, *European Solidarity* and *Democratic Axe* flags. The SMM observed about 20 and 27 law enforcement officers, respectively, at the gatherings.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Ivano-Frankivsk, Odessa, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, [see SMM Daily Report of 23 February 2021](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:⁷

- On 25 February, three SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near non-government-controlled Mykhailivka (30km north-east of Donetsk), on two occasions, as well as over areas near Panteleimonivka (26km north-east of Donetsk), near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) and near Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk).

⁷ For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs' position.

Table of weapons

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
25/2/2021	4	Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm)	At a railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk)	Patrol

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
24/2/2021	1	Surface-to-air missile system (9K35 <i>Strela-10</i>)	In a compound near Manhush (111km south of Donetsk)	Mini-UAV
	13	Self-propelled howitzer (2S3 <i>Akatsyia</i> , 152mm)	Near Manhush	
25/2/2021	1	Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm)	At a railway station in Druzhkivka (72km north of Donetsk)	Patrol

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁸

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
24/2/2021	1	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB)	In a residential area of Hladosove (51km north-east of Donetsk)	Mid-range UAV


⁸ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 25 February 2021⁹

SMM position	Event location	Means	No	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera at Donetsk Filtration Station (15km N of Donetsk)	1-3km SE	Recorded	1	Illumination flare	In vertical flight	N/K	24-Feb, 20:40
SMM camera 1.5km NE of Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km S of Donetsk)	3-5km E	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	25-Feb, 03:54
SMM camera 1km SW of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km S of Donetsk)	3-5km N	Recorded	1	Explosion	Outgoing	N/K	24-Feb, 20:53
	5km N	Recorded	1	Projectile	E to W (subsequent to previous event)	N/K	24-Feb, 20:53
	5km N	Recorded	1	Explosion	Impact (subsequent to previous event)	N/K	24-Feb, 20:53
	3-6km N	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	25-Feb, 00:38
	3-6km N	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	25-Feb, 01:55
	3-6km N	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	25-Feb, 03:54
About 2km NW of Panteleimonivka (non-government-controlled, 26km NE of Donetsk)	2.5-5km W	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	25-Feb, 11:35-11:40
About 2km E of Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km SW of Donetsk)	5-7km N	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	25-Feb, 12:08
About 1km SW of Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km NE of Donetsk)	4-5km SSE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	25-Feb, 12:19
SE edge of Luhansk city (non-government-controlled)	1.5-2km W	Heard	20	Shot		Small arms	25-Feb, 09:22-09:25

⁹ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹⁰



¹⁰ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).