
# Daily Report 35/2021

13 February 2021<sup>1</sup>

#### **Summary**

- The SMM recorded 20 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 894 ceasefire violations in the region, most of which were assessed as live-fire exercises in non-government-controlled areas.
- The Mission recorded four ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded two ceasefire violations in the region.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and again saw containers inside and near the southern edge of the area near Zolote.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable repairs and operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at four entry-exit checkpoints and four corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.\*

#### Ceasefire violations<sup>2</sup>




<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 12 February 2021. All times are in Eastern European Time.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational, and weather conditions limited the observational capabilities of some of the other SMM cameras.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Including explosions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Including from unidentified weapons.

#### Map of recorded ceasefire violations



In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 20 ceasefire violations, including 11 undetermined explosions. The majority of ceasefire violations occurred at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (see below) and on the north-western edge of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk). In the <u>previous reporting period</u>, the Mission recorded 894 ceasefire violations, most of which were assessed as live-fire exercises in non-government-controlled areas in the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded four ceasefire violations, all undetermined explosions which occurred in areas south-east of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) and south-west of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below). In the <u>previous reporting period</u>, the SMM recorded two ceasefire violations in the region.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded at least 9,531 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 3,246 explosions, 1,082 projectiles in flight, 101 muzzle flashes, 60 illumination flares and at least 5,042 bursts and shots).

#### Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske<sup>5</sup>

On 12 February, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) on the southern edge of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On 12 February, while positioned about 50m north of the northern edge of the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 5-7km south-west, assessed as outside the area but within 5km of its periphery.

On the same day, while positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the SMM saw that a container which was previously located about 30m north of the area's southern edge had been placed on the area's southern edge.

While at the same checkpoint, the SMM again saw five containers inside a fenced perimeter south of the area's southern edge, on the southern edge of the road leading eastward towards Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). The Mission saw seven workers inside the fenced perimeter placing concrete tiles, as well as stationary heavy equipment nearby.

Inside the area, it again saw a container about 60–70m north of the other containers and another one about 350m north of the area's southern edge, both on the western edge of road T-1316. About 10-30m north of the former container, the Mission saw for the first time six concrete

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

blocks in three rows placed across both lanes of road T-1316. Also, near the same container, on 11 February, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a man holding some tools and standing next to it.

About 40m west of the junction of road T-1316 and the road leading westward towards Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw for the first time a metal barrier composed of two metal parts fixed on each side of the road, assessed to be used to regulate traffic, as well as six concrete blocks 10m west of it. About 70m east of the junction of road T-1316 and the road leading eastward towards Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the Mission saw for the first time a similar metal barrier.

On the same day, while positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the area, the Mission also saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them), two of whom walked inside the area to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned.

While positioned at two locations near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

#### Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the SMM spotted six surface-to-air missile systems: five in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region and one in a compound in non-government-controlled Luhansk city (for further information, see the table below).

#### Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>6</sup>

The SMM spotted armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun in different compounds in non-government-controlled Luhansk city (for further information, see the table below).

## SMM facilitation of repairs and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. While positioned at three locations near the station, the SMM heard 12 ceasefire violations, including three undetermined explosions, all assessed as within a 5km radius of the station.

The SMM continued to monitor the security situation near the pumping station close to Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

It also facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and to enable demining activities in agricultural fields near government-controlled Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Myrna Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk).

# Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

In Donetsk region, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were open and saw civilian traffic passing through in both directions.

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations were open, with people passing through in both directions. The SMM observed a golf cart operating between the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and the EECP. The Mission also saw four men and one woman transferring a coffin from non-government- to government-controlled areas.

The SMM also noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were open but did not observe any people passing through, and that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were closed. About 50m east of the latter checkpoint, the Mission observed an excavator digging the soil.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

# \*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 9 February 2021). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

## Other impediments:<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV's position.

- On 12 February, SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near government-controlled Hnutove (90km south of Donetsk) (twice), Lomakyne (93km south of Donetsk) and Chermalyk (77km south of Donetsk), as well as while flying over areas near non-government-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) (thrice), Styla (34km south of Donetsk) and Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk) (on four occasions).

# **Table of weapons**

# Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
		Government-co	ntrolled areas	
11/2/2021	5	Surface-to-air missile system (9K35 <i>Strela</i> -10)	Near residential houses in Berdychi (government-controlled, 24km north-west of Donetsk)	Mini-UAV
		Non-government-	controlled areas	
11/2/2021	1	Surface-to-air missile system (9K35 <i>Strela</i> -10)	In a compound in Luhansk city	Mini-UAV

# Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>8</sup>

Date	No.	Туре	Location	Source of observation
		Non-government-c	ontrolled areas	
	2	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80)		
	1	Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2 Rkh)		
11/02/2021	1	Anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm)		Mini-UAV
	1	Combat engineering vehicle (BAT-2)	In different compounds in Luhansk city	
	2	Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (one BRDM-2 and one BRDM-2U)		
	2	Armoured personnel carrier (one BTR-80 and one MT-LB)		


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

# Table of ceasefire violations as of 12 February 20219

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
About 1.5km	2-3km WSW	Heard	2	Burst		Small arms	12-Feb, 08:52
WNW of Yasynuvata (non- government- controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk)	2-3km WSW	Heard	4	Shot		Small arms	12-Feb, 08:52-08:54
About 1km NW	2km WSW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	12-Feb, 11:49
of the railway	1-2km S	Heard	2	Shot		Small arms	12-Feb, 11:50
station in	2-3km WSW	Heard	1	Shot		Small arms	12-Feb, 12:00
Yasynuvata (non- government- controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk)	2-3km SW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	12-Feb, 12:16
SE edge of Avdiivka (government- controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	3-4km SE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	12-Feb, 11:00
About 6km NW of Horlivka (non- government- controlled, 39km NE of Donetsk)	3-4km W	Heard	5	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	12-Feb, 10:49-10:54
About 600m NE	2-3km E	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	12-Feb, 11:04
of Lebedynske (government- controlled, 99km S of Donetsk)	1-2km NE	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	12-Feb, 11:13
Holubivske (non- government- controlled, 51km W of Luhansk)	5-7km SE	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	12-Feb, 09:35-09:50
About 50m north of the disengagement area near Zolote (government- controlled, 60km W of Luhansk)	5-7km SW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	12-Feb, 11:38

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an "N/K"), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

#### Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions<sup>10</sup>



<sup>10</sup> The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).