
# Daily Report 32/2021

10 February 2021<sup>1</sup>

#### **Summary**

- The SMM recorded ten ceasefire violations in Donetsk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 42 ceasefire violations in the region.
- The Mission recorded 40 ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded five ceasefire violations in the region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and again saw containers inside and near the southern edge of the area near Zolote.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable operation and maintenance of critical civilian infrastructure and a transfer of funds.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at five entryexit checkpoints and two corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Bezimenne and on a road near non-government-controlled Korsun, Donetsk region.\*

#### Ceasefire violations<sup>2</sup>




<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 9 February 2021. All times are in Eastern European Time.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational, and weather conditions limited the observational capabilities of some of the other SMM cameras.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Including explosions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Including from unidentified weapons.

#### Map of recorded ceasefire violations



In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded ten ceasefire violations, including nine explosions (five undetermined and four outgoing, all of undetermined weapons), which occurred in areas on the north-western edge of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and near the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk). In the <u>previous reporting period</u>, the Mission recorded 42 ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded 40 ceasefire violations, including two undetermined explosions, all of which occurred in an area south-east of Myrne (non-government-controlled, 28km south-west of Luhansk) and were assessed as a live-fire exercise outside the security zone. In the <u>previous reporting period</u>, the SMM recorded five ceasefire violations in the region.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded at least 8,558 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 3,197 explosions, 1,079 projectiles in flight, 101 muzzle flashes, 60 illumination flares and at least 4,121 bursts and shots).

#### Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske<sup>5</sup>

On 9 February, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) on the southern edge of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On 9 February, while positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM again saw five containers inside a fenced perimeter south of the area's southern edge, on the southern edge of the road leading eastward towards Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk). Inside the area, on the western side of road T-1316, it again saw a container about 60–70m north of the other containers and another container about 350m north of the area's southern edge.

The same day, while positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the area, the Mission saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them), two of whom walked inside the area to about 350m north of its southern edge and returned. The SMM also saw stationary heavy equipment and 13 workers mixing cement, cementing blocks in place around the fenced perimeter and installing electrical cables nearby.

While positioned at three locations near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

#### Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

In violation of withdrawal lines, SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) spotted 34 multiple launch rocket systems in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, some of which in a training area. Also in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, it observed four surface-to-air missile systems, 40 howitzers and 16 tanks beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the majority of which in training areas (for further information, see the tables below).

#### Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region 9 February

The SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

#### Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>6</sup>

The Mission spotted armoured combat vehicles near a residential area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region and armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region (for further information, see the table below).

## SMM facilitation of operation and maintenance of critical civilian infrastructure and , and monitoring of transfer of funds

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable maintenance of water infrastructure in Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk) and demining activities in agricultural fields near government-controlled Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Myrna Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM also monitored adherence to a localized ceasefire in order to enable a transfer of funds from non-government- to government-controlled areas across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), reportedly related to water payments.

#### Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Donetsk region, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoints (EECP) near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were operational but did not observe any civilian traffic.

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska was operational, with people passing through in both directions.

The SMM also noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia were open but did not observe any people passing through, and that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were closed.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

## \*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments — which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 9 February 2021). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

#### Denials:

- On a road on the north-eastern edge of Korsun (non-government-controlled, 31km north-east of Donetsk), two members of the armed formations (blocking the road with a utility truck) denied the SMM passage towards Yenakiieve (non-government-controlled, 41km north-east of Donetsk), citing "ongoing training activities in the area".
- At a checkpoint near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk), two members of the armed formations denied the Mission passage towards Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 97km south of Donetsk), citing "demining activities in the area". While at the checkpoint, the patrol saw a civilian car passing through towards Sakhanka.

*Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:* 

The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

#### Delay:

- At a checkpoint in Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations allowed the Mission to proceed westward only after about 50 minutes, citing "the SMM's safety and orders from superiors". While at the checkpoint, the SMM saw civilian cars passing through in both directions.

## **Table of weapons**Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation	
Non-government-controlled areas					
7/2/2021	7	Multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 <i>Grad</i> , 122mm)	In a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk)	Mini-UAV	
	8	(BM-21 Graa, 122Hill)	In a compound near Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk)		
	Multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 <i>Grad</i> , 122mm)	1 3	Near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk)		

### Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation		
Non-government-controlled areas						
	10	Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm)		Mini-UAV		
	12	Towed howitzer (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm)	In a training area near Miusynsk (62km			
	2	Tank (T-64)	south-west of Luhansk)			
7/2/2021	4	Surface-to-air missile system (9K35 <i>Strela-10</i> )				
	9	Tank (six T-64 and three T-72)	In a compound near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-			
	18	Towed howitzer (eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and ten 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm)	west of Luhansk)			
9/2/2021	5	Tank (T-64)	In a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk)	Patrol		

### Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>7</sup>

Date	No.	Туре	Location	Source of observation		
Government-controlled areas						
9/02/2021	2	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) Near a residential area of Heorhiievka (27km south-west of Donetsk)		Patrol		
Non-government-controlled areas						
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2)		Mini-UAV		
8/2/2021	2	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80)	In a compound near Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk)			
	1	Anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted atop a truck	west of Editalisk)			

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.


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### Table of ceasefire violations as of 9 February 20218

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera in Avdiivka (government- controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	0.8-1.2km E	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	9-Feb, 05:17
SMM camera at	1-3km S	Recorded	1	Projectile	WNW to ESE	N/K	8-Feb, 21:11
Donetsk Filtration	1-3km S	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	8-Feb, 21:37
Station (15km N of Donetsk)	2-4km S	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	8-Feb, 21:48
About 6km NW of	2-3km SW	Heard	4	Explosion	Outgoing	N/K	9-Feb, 12:50
Horlivka (non-	3-4km W	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	9-Feb, 12:59
government- controlled, 39km NE of Donetsk)	3-4km W	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	9-Feb, 13:08
About 1km SSW of Myrne (non- government- controlled, 28km SW of Luhansk)	2-4km SE	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	9-Feb, 10:29- 10:49
	2-4km SE	Heard	38	Burst		HMG	9-Feb, 10:29- 10:49

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an "N/K"), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

#### Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions9



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).

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