

Daily Report 29/2021


6 February 2021¹

Summary


- The SMM recorded eight ceasefire violations in Donetsk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded six ceasefire violations in the region.
- The Mission recorded two ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded no ceasefire violations in the region.
- The SMM saw fresh damage caused by shelling to three civilian properties, and six fresh impact craters in non-government-controlled Syhnalne, Donetsk region.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and again saw containers inside and near the southern edge of the area near Zolote.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable the operation and inspection of and repairs to critical civilian infrastructure and demining activities. It recorded an explosion near the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), near the time when a bus with DFS workers was driving from the station to Yasynuvata.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at four entry-exit checkpoints and three corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³



Number of recorded explosions⁴



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 5 February 2021. All times are in Eastern European Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational, and weather conditions limited the observational capabilities of some of the other SMM cameras.


³ Including explosions.

⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.


Map of recorded ceasefire violations

OSCE Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 5 February 2021



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 06/02/2021

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded eight ceasefire violations, including three undetermined explosions, one of which occurred near the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (see below). The majority of ceasefire violations was recorded in areas east of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 99km south of Donetsk). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded six ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded two ceasefire violations – both undetermined explosions recorded in areas east of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below). In the [previous reporting period](#), it recorded no ceasefire violations in the region.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded at least 8,087 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 2,987 explosions, 1,040 projectiles in flight, 99 muzzle flashes, 60 illumination flares and at least 3,901 bursts and shots).

Shelling damage to civilian properties and impact craters in Syhnalne, Donetsk region

On 4 February, the Mission followed up on reports of damage to three houses in Syhnalne (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). It also observed six impact craters (of which three probable) in cultivated fields between 25-45m east and west of the settlement. The properties and fields are located between 100m-550m east of the contact line.

At 12 Haharina Street, the Mission observed a fresh hole (about 1m in diameter) in the west-facing part of the roof of an inhabited one-storey house. The Mission assessed the damage as caused by rounds of an undetermined weapon fired from a westerly direction. The house's owner (a woman in her sixties) told the SMM that on 3 February, upon returning home after visiting relatives, she had seen that her house had been damaged.

About 70m further west, at 15 Haharina Street, the Mission observed an impact crater (about 25cm in diameter) in the yard, about 10m south of an inhabited one-storey house, as well as damage to a wooden fence about 10m south of the house. It also observed a fresh hole (30cm in diameter) in the western wall of a shed located about 10m north of the house. The SMM assessed all the aforementioned damage to be fresh and caused by probable 82mm mortar rounds fired from a westerly direction.

About 60m further west, at 16 Haharina Street, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted freshly damaged pieces of wood lying on the ground next to the western side of a residential house. It assessed the damage as caused by a probable 82mm mortar round but could not assess the direction of fire.

The same UAV also spotted three impact craters in a field about 25m west of the house at 16 Haharina Street. The UAV also spotted three probable impact craters in a field about 40m east of a house at 3 Pionerska Street. All six craters were assessed as fresh and caused by probable 82mm mortar rounds fired from a westerly direction.

While following up on the aforementioned damage in the settlement, a woman (in her forties), living at 3 Pionerska Street, and a man (in his fifties), living at 4 Pionerska Street, separately told the SMM that on the afternoon of the 2 February, they had heard shelling.

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

Inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) on the southern edge of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On 5 February, while positioned in the southern part of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the Mission heard two undetermined explosions, at an assessed distance of 1-2km north-east, assessed as outside the **disengagement area near Zolote** but within 5km of its periphery.

On the same day, while positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the SMM saw six containers on the southern edge of the road leading eastward towards Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), of which five were inside a fenced perimeter south of the area’s southern edge. The Mission also observed 12 workers with heavy equipment moving concrete blocks from the northern side of the road leading eastward towards Zolote-5/Mykhailivka to its southern side, at the fenced perimeter’s edge (for previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 5 February 2021](#)).

On 4 February, inside the disengagement area, about 350m north of its southern edge, the SMM [again](#) saw a container on the western edge of road T-1316.

On 5 February, while positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), two of whom walked inside the area to about 350m north of its southern edge and returned.

While positioned at three locations near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage areas, the SMM observed three tanks in a training area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region (for further information, see the table below).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁶

The Mission observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region (for further information, see the table below).

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Presence of unexploded ordnance near Hranitne, Donetsk region

On 5 February, the SMM saw for the first time a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as a rocket-propelled grenade, about 2m south of road T-0512, in the southern outskirts of Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of operation and inspection of and repairs to critical civilian infrastructure and of demining

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. While positioned in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM recorded an undetermined explosion, assessed as within a 5km radius from the station, near the time when a bus with DFS workers was driving on road M-04 towards Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). While positioned in the southern part of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard an explosion assessed as a controlled detonation.

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable inspection and repair to water infrastructure near Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk); and demining activities in agricultural fields near government-controlled Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Myrna Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk).

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Donetsk region, the SMM saw that the EECP near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were operational and saw civilian traffic passing through them in both directions.

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska was operational and saw civilian traffic passing through it in both directions.

The SMM also noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were operational but that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were not.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (non-government controlled, 78km east of Donetsk) for about 1 hour and 35 minutes, the Mission observed 22 cars (12 with “DPR” plates), two trucks (both with “DPR” plates, one with covered cargo, and one refrigerator truck), three buses (all with “DPR” plates, in total with about 50 passengers, mixed genders and ages) and 11 people (four women, six men, mixed ages, and one boy, about ten years old) entering Ukraine. At the same time, the SMM saw 19 cars (12 with “DPR” plates), a covered cargo truck, a bus (with “DPR” plates and about 30 passengers, mixed genders and ages) and eight people (two women and six men, mixed ages) exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report of 2 February 2021](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Table of weapons

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
5/2/2021	3	Tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)	Patrol

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁷

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
4/2/2021	1	Anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted atop a truck	Near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk)	Mini-UAV
	6	Infantry fighting vehicle (five BMP-1 and one BMP variant)		


⁷ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 5 February 2021⁸

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera 1.5km NE of Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km S of Donetsk)	3-5km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	5-Feb, 04:22
	3-5km SE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	5-Feb, 04:22
About 1km NW of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk)	3-4km NNE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	5-Feb, 09:30
About 2.5km SE of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 99km S of Donetsk)	2km NNE	Heard	5	Shot		Small arms	5-Feb, 12:20
SW edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government controlled, 61km W of Luhansk)	1-2km NE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	5-Feb, 11:43
	1-2km NE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	5-Feb, 12:04

⁸ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions⁹



⁹ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).