


Daily Report 28/2021

5 February 2021¹

Summary

- The SMM recorded six ceasefire violations in Donetsk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded no ceasefire violations in the region.
- The Mission recorded no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded nine ceasefire violations in the region.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and again saw containers and construction works near the southern edge of the area near Zolote.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable operation of critical civilian infrastructure and demining activities.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at five entry-exit checkpoints and four corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM monitored a gathering in Kyiv in relation to recent closures of broadcasting networks.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at a railway station in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk), Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations²



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 4 February 2021. All times are in Eastern European Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational, and weather conditions limited the observational capabilities of some of the other SMM cameras.

³ Including explosions.

⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 4 February 2021



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 05/02/2021

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded six ceasefire violations – all undetermined explosions in an area south-south-west of Kurdiuivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk). In the [previous reporting period](#), it recorded no ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. In the [previous reporting period](#), it recorded nine ceasefire violations in the region.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded at least 8,077 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 2,982 explosions, 1,040 projectiles in flight, 99 muzzle flashes, 60 illumination flares and at least 3,896 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

Inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) on the southern edge of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

While positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM again saw five containers on the southern edge of the road leading eastward towards Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), inside a fenced perimeter south of the area’s southern edge. Inside the disengagement area, it also observed a sixth container 60-70m north of the other containers, on the western side of road T-1316. The Mission also observed six workers with heavy equipment moving concrete blocks from the northern side of the road to its southern side, at the fenced perimeter’s edge (for previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 4 February 2021](#)).

While positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw five members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), three of whom walked inside the area to about 350m north of its southern edge and returned, accompanied both upon entering and returning by three people in protective medical gear.

While positioned at three locations near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a vehicle with three men dressed in military-type clothing and a trailer in tow travelling from Petrivske in a westerly direction on road C-051532 leading towards Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk).

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage areas, the SMM observed six towed howitzers and three pieces of artillery at a railway station in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, government-controlled, 55km north-west of Donetsk) (for further information, see the table below)*.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn⁶

At two heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region
4 February

The SMM noted that nine multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 *Grad*, 122mm) and 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 *Gvozдика*, 122mm) were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁷

The Mission observed armoured combat vehicles in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region (for further information, see the table below).

SMM facilitation of operation of critical civilian infrastructure and demining

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable demining activities in agricultural fields near government-controlled Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Myrna Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk).

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Donetsk region, the Mission saw that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) was operational but did not observe any civilian traffic. It also noted that the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations near Kremiets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk) remained closed.

The SMM also saw that the EECP near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) was operational but did not observe any civilian traffic.

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational, with pedestrians queuing to travel towards non-government-controlled areas at the EECP and queuing to travel in both directions at the checkpoint.

The SMM also noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were operational but that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were not.

⁶ The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

⁷ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

While positioned near the latter checkpoint, the SMM heard an explosion assessed as a controlled detonation.

SMM monitored a gathering in Kyiv in relation to recent closures of TV broadcasters

On 4 February in Kyiv, the Mission monitored a gathering of about 50 men (the majority in their twenties) outside the office of a TV station at 101A Zhylianska Street, some of whom wore clothing with insignia of the C14 or Right Sector movements and carried red and black flags. During the gathering, it observed the men moving towards the office building while police attempted to stop them from entering, which led to a scuffle. Subsequently, the SMM observed two participants being treated by medical staff for eye injuries, reportedly caused by gas or a sprayed substance. It saw about 60 law enforcement officers near the gathering.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report of 2 February 2021](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Denial:

- At a railway station in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, government-controlled, 55km north-west of Donetsk), two members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces denied the Mission access.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:⁸

- On 4 February, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Putylyne (government-controlled, 44km north-west of Luhansk).

⁸ For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV's position.

Table of weapons

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
4/2/2021	6	Towed howitzer (2A36 <i>Giatsint-B</i> , 152mm)	At a railway station in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk)	Patrol
	3	Artillery piece (type undetermined)		

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁹

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
4/2/2021	2	Infantry fighting vehicle (BTR-4)	Near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk)	Patrol
	2	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70)	Near the disengagement area near Zolote (60km west of Luhansk)	


⁹ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 4 February 2021¹⁰

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
About 2km SE of Kurdiumivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk)	5-7km SSW	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	4-Feb, 10:40
	5-7km SSW	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	4-Feb, 10:47
	5-7km SSW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	4-Feb, 10:52

¹⁰ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹¹



¹¹ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).