

OSCCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

# **Daily Report 16/2021**

22 January 2021<sup>1</sup>


## **Summary**

- The SMM recorded 39 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded seven ceasefire violations in the region.
- The Mission recorded no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, as in the previous • reporting period.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and observed people inside the area near Petrivske during daytime.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable • assessment and operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at two entry-. exit checkpoints and three corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.\*

## Ceasefire violations<sup>2</sup>

#### Number of recorded ceasefire violations<sup>3</sup>

# Number of recorded explosions<sup>4</sup>




<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 21 January 2021. All times are in Eastern European Time.

 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$  For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and Zolote were not operational.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Including explosions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Including from unidentified weapons.

# Map of recorded ceasefire violations



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In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded 39 ceasefire violations – all but one of which were undetermined explosions. Almost all ceasefire violations occurred in areas north of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (see below). In the <u>previous reporting period</u>, the SMM recorded seven ceasefire violations in the region.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations, as in the <u>previous reporting</u> <u>period</u>. The last time the Mission recorded ceasefire violations in the region was on the evening of <u>17 January</u>.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded at least 6,360 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 2,706 explosions, 911 projectiles in flight, 90 muzzle flashes, 55 illumination flares and at least 2,598 bursts and shots).

## Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske<sup>5</sup>

The SMM saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), on the southern edge of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

Near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them), all of whom entered the area to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned, accompanied by four people in protective medical gear.

During the day on 20 January, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (nongovernment-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a person near a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 120m north of the area's southern edge and 1.5km east of its western edge. The same UAV also spotted two people near former positions of the armed formations near the area's south-eastern corner.

#### Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the SMM saw a tank, being transported on a truck, in a residential government-controlled area of Donetsk region (for further information, see the table below).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

#### Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>6</sup>

The Mission observed armoured combat vehicles on both sides of the contact line in Donetsk region and in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, including in a residential area. In a non-government-controlled residential area of Luhansk region, it also spotted an anti-aircraft gun (for further information, see the table below).

#### Recent impact craters near Zaichenko and Pikuzy, Donetsk region

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 16 January of a recent impact crater (about 4m in diameter) and five smaller recent impact craters within a 20m radius of the larger one, all in a field about 500m east of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 93km south of Donetsk). The same imagery also revealed the presence of several recent impact craters in fields 2km and 3.2km south-west of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 92km south of Donetsk). All these craters were not visible in imagery from 8 November 2020. In all cases, the SMM could not determine the type of weapon or the direction of fire.

#### Facilitation of maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. While positioned in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions, all assessed as within a 5km radius of the station.

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to a localised ceasefire to enable an assessment of the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

#### Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge was operational, with pedestrians queuing to travel in both directions.

The Mission also noted that the entry-exit checkpoints near Zolote and Shchastia (governmentcontrolled, 20km north of Luhansk) were operational but that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were not.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

\*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see <u>SMM Daily Report of 12 January 2021</u>). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

# *Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:*

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

# Other impediments:<sup>7</sup>

- On 20 January, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between non-government-controlled Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk) and Novoselivka (55km south of Donetsk), between non-government-controlled Bezimenne (100km south of Donetsk) and Markyne (94km south of Donetsk), and between non-government-controlled Siedovo-Vasylivka (89km south of Donetsk) and Hrekovo-Oleksandrivka (72km south-east of Donetsk).
- On the same day, the same UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over areas between non-government-controlled Markyne and Siedovo-Vasylivka.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

# Table of weapons

# Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation				
Government-controlled areas								
21/1/2021	1	Tank (T-64)	On a moving truck in a residential area of Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk)	Patrol				

# Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>8</sup>


Date	No.	Туре	Location	Source of observation		
		Government-controlle	ed areas			
20/1/2021	2	Armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined)	Near Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV		
20/1/2021	1	Probable armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB S)	Near Hnutove (90km south of Donetsk)			
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR- 80) Near Vesele (21km north of Donetsk)				
21/1/2021	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2)	Near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government- controlled, 41km south of Donetsk)	Patrol		
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR- 70)	In a residential area near Zolote- 1/Soniachnyi (61km west of Luhansk)			
	3	Armoured personnel carrier (one BTR-80 and two undetermined variants)	Near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk)			
		Non-government-contro	olled areas			
20/1/2021	1	Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2)	In a compound near Bezimenne (100km south of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV		
21/1/2021	1	Anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm)	In a residential area near Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk)	Patrol		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera in Krasnohorivka (government- controlled, 21km W of Donetsk)	2-3km SE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	21-Jan, 10:07
Railway station in Yasynuvata (non-	5-7km NW	Heard	10	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	21-Jan, 11:18- 11:30
government- controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk)	5-7km NW	Heard	5	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	21-Jan, 11:30- 11:40
Vasylivka (non- government- controlled, 20km N of Donetsk)	3-4km NNW	Heard	10	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	21-Jan, 12:33- 12:45
	3-4km NNW	Heard	12	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	21-Jan, 12:45- 13:00
About 2km ENE of Chernenko (government- controlled, 86km S of Donetsk)	4-5km SSE	Heard	1	Burst		HMG	21-Jan, 10:06

Table of ceasefire violations as of 21 January 2021<sup>9</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an "N/K"), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.



# Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions<sup>10</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).