


Daily Report 289/2020

4 December 2020¹

Summary

- The SMM recorded 79 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded ten ceasefire violations in the region.
- The Mission recorded no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 52 ceasefire violations in the region.
- A member of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine was injured on 1 September by the detonation of an explosive device near Stanytsia Luhanska.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske and observed a calm situation in all three areas.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at four entry-exit checkpoints and four checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission monitored developments in Zakarpattia.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

Ceasefire violations²



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 3 December 2020. All times are in Eastern European Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and at the parking lot south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were not operational.

³ Including explosions.


⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 3 December 2020



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005), IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 04/12/2020

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 79 ceasefire violations, including 26 undetermined explosions at north-easterly directions of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk) and 14 undetermined explosions at easterly and southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (see below). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded ten ceasefire violations in the region, in areas near the DFS, half of which were undetermined explosions.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations. In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded 52 ceasefire violations in the region, including 15 undetermined explosions.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 2,925 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 1,157 explosions, 89 projectiles in flight, 33 muzzle flashes, 36 illumination flares and 1,610 bursts and shots).

Member of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine injured by the detonation of an explosive device near Stanytsia Luhanska

The SMM followed up on reports of a member of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU) (man in his thirties) who was injured by the detonation of an explosive device while extinguishing a fire inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) on 1 September.

On 2 December, the man told the SMM that on the afternoon of 1 September, he had been extinguishing a fire about 600m north-east of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) when he heard six explosive devices going off, one of which had injured his neck. On 6 November, staff at a hospital in Stanytsia Luhanska told the SMM that on 1 September, a member of the SESU (man in his thirties) had been admitted with a neck injury.

On 30 November, a police officer in Stanytsia Luhanska told the SMM that an investigation had been launched into an incident on 1 September in which a member of the SESU had suffered a shrapnel injury to his neck while extinguishing a fire near Stanytsia Luhanska. On 2 September, an officer of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that there had been a fire on 1 September near the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge which had caused explosive devices to detonate, and that as a result, a member of the SESU was injured on his neck while extinguishing the fire.

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

On 3 December, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska**, the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) on the southern edge of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

On the same day, the Mission saw a member of the armed formations (wearing an armband with “JCCC” written on it) near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). About 30m east of the checkpoint, on the eastern edge of road T-1316, the SMM saw an excavator clearing vegetation.

On 3 December, while positioned at four locations near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁶

The SMM saw an armoured combat vehicle in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region (for further information, see the table below).

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to power lines near Smile (non-government-controlled, 31km north-west of Luhansk) and in the Trudivski area of Donetsk city's Petrovskyi district (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), as well as demining activities near government-controlled Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. While positioned at two locations close to the station, the SMM recorded 35 ceasefire violations, including 14 undetermined explosions, all within a 5km radius of the station, two of which occurred near the time a convoy with DFS workers was driving towards Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) on road M-04.

While positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 23 explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km east-south-east, assessed as pre-announced controlled detonations of unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Donetsk region, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) was operational but did not observe any civilian traffic and that the corresponding checkpoint near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk) was closed. It also saw that the checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) was closed.

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska was operational, with pedestrians queueing to travel in both directions. At the tent of an international organization near the EECP, the SMM saw two people (men in their thirties) who told the

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SMM that they had been stranded there overnight. One of them told the SMM that he could not demonstrate that he lived in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.

The Mission noted that the EECs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were operational but that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia remained closed. About 2km north-west of the latter checkpoint, the SMM saw three workers on a tractor driving towards the checkpoint.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for 30 minutes, the Mission observed eight cars (with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine and four cars (with “DPR” plates) and a pedestrian (woman in her thirties) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM observed no cars or pedestrians entering or exiting Ukraine.

The SMM met with interlocutors in Zakarpattia region

On 4 December, in Berehove (174km south-west of Ivano-Frankivsk), representatives (mixed genders and ages) of the Ferenc Rákóczi II Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute told the SMM that the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) had conducted a search at the Institute’s premises on 30 November.

On the same day, a representative (man, in his forties) of the *Democratic Union of Hungarians of Ukraine* told the SMM that they had received an anonymous email with threats on the morning of 4 December and that they had reported it to the SBU and police.

Also on the same day, a representative (man, in his forties) of a Ukrainian patriotic organization residing in Zakarpattia region told the SMM over the phone that the Hungarian anthem had been sung within the local population along with the Ukrainian anthem for many years and that there had been no issues in the past.

The SMM will continue to follow up.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Dnipro, Lviv, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see [SMM Daily Report 1 December 2020](#)). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following

[the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other Impediments:

- On 3 December, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle experienced GPS signal interference twice, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).⁷

⁷ The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV's position.

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁸

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
3/12/2020	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-60)	Near Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk)	Patrol


⁸ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 3 December 2020⁹

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera 1.5km NE of Hnutove (government- controlled, 90km S of Donetsk)	5km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 00:54
SMM camera 1km SW of Shyrokyne (government- controlled, 100km S of Donetsk)	6km NNE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 00:34
	6km NNE	Recorded	1	Illumination flare		N/K	3-Dec, 00:34
	6km NNE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 00:35
	6km NNE	Recorded	2	Illumination flare		N/K	3-Dec, 00:35
	6km NNE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 00:36
	6km NNE	Recorded	3	Illumination flare		N/K	3-Dec, 00:36
	6km NNE	Recorded	1	Illumination flare		N/K	3-Dec, 00:37
	6km NNE	Recorded	1	Illumination flare		N/K	3-Dec, 00:38
	6km NNE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 01:03
	6km NNE	Recorded	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 01:04
	6km NNE	Recorded	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 01:05
	6km NNE	Recorded	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 01:06
	6km NNE	Recorded	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 01:07
	6km NNE	Recorded	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 01:08
	6km NNE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 01:09
	6km NNE	Recorded	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 01:10
	6km NNE	Recorded	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 01:11
	6km NNE	Recorded	1	Illumination flare		N/K	3-Dec, 01:11
	6km NNE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 01:12
	6km NNE	Recorded	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 05:36
About 2.5km SE of Avdiivka (government- controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	2-3km E	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 08:17
	2-3km E	Heard	10	Shot		Small arms	3-Dec, 08:20-08:23
	2-3km ESE	Heard	4	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 09:47
	2-3km ESE	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 09:52
	2-3km ESE	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 09:57
	4-5km SW	Heard	4	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 12:34-12:35
	2-3km SE	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 13:35
2-3km SE	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 13:43	
About 500m NE of Kamianka (government- controlled, 20km N of Donetsk)	2-3km S	Heard	11	Shot		HMG	3-Dec, 08:20
	3-5km NE	Heard	4	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Dec, 12:25

⁹ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹⁰



¹⁰ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).