
# Daily Report 286/2020

01 December 2020<sup>1</sup>

#### **Summary**

- The SMM recorded eight ceasefire violations in Donetsk region. In the previous 24 hours, the Mission recorded 76 ceasefire violations in the region.
- The SMM recorded no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, as in the previous 24 hours.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During evening and night hours, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted people inside the latter two areas.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at six entryexit checkpoints and five checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at a border crossing point outside government control near Dovzhanske, Luhansk region, and at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Kreminets, Donetsk region.\*

#### Ceasefire violations<sup>2</sup>




<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 30 November 2020. All times are in Easten European Time.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Including explosions

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Including from unidentified weapons

#### Map of recorded ceasefire violations



In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded eight ceasefire violations, including six undetermined explosions, two of which occurred on the morning of 30 November in an area south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (see below). In the <u>previous 24 hours</u>, the Mission recorded 76 ceasefire violations in the region, including nine outgoing explosions within a 5km radius of the DFS.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations, as in the <u>previous 24 hours</u>. The last time the Mission recorded ceasefire violations in the region was on the night of  $\underline{27-28}$  November.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 2,764 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 1,070 explosions, 85 projectiles in flight, 33 muzzle flashes, 27 illumination flares and 1,549 bursts and shots).

#### Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske<sup>5</sup>

Inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) south of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On the evening of 28 November, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three people: one inside a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, south of the railway track, about 800m south-west of the railway bridge, and two in a former position of the armed formations near the area's eastern edge, about 1.5km north of its south-eastern corner.

On 30 November, the SMM saw two members of the armed formations (men in their twenties and thirties, wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) inside the area, about 330m north of its southern edge, and one member of the armed formations (man in his thirties, wearing an armband with "JCCC" written on it) near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the area.

On the night of 28-29 November, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted a person inside a former position of the armed formations near the area's south-eastern corner.

On 30 November, while positioned at three locations near the area, the Mission observed a calm situation.

#### Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the Mission saw three self-propelled howitzers and ten tanks in a training area in non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region (for further information, see the table below).

#### Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>6</sup>

The Mission observed armoured combat vehicles in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region and non-government-controlled areas of both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (for further information, see the table below).

### Anti-tank mines near Vodiane and demining activities near Chernenko, Pavlopil and Lebedynske in Donetsk region

On 27 November, in two locations in fields about 2.5km and 1km south-east of Vodiane (government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 30 and 34 anti-tank mines, respectively, assessed as part of larger minefields. The same UAV also again spotted 60 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62), assessed as part of a larger minefield, near a residential area on Vodiane's eastern edge. All these mines were assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Reports of 21 January 2020, 1 August 2020 and 13 November 2020).

On 30 November, the SMM saw three de-miners of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU) using metal detectors in a field near Chernenko (government-controlled, 86km south of Donetsk) and two de-miners with metal detectors in the northern outskirts of Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km south of Donetsk), at the junction with the road to Chernenko. The Mission also saw three members of the SESU in a field in the north-western outskirts of Pavlopil (government-controlled, 84km south of Donetsk), at least one of whom was carrying a metal detector.

On the same day, south of road M-14 between government-controlled Lebedynske (99km south of Donetsk) and Sopyne (101km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed about 20 people in clothing bearing the logo of an international organization unloading demining tools and equipment from a vehicle.

# SMM facilitation of repairs to and maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway inspection and maintenance near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); repairs to water infrastructure near Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk); inspection and maintenance of and repairs to power lines near Smile (non-government-controlled, 31km north-west of Luhansk); as well as demining activities near government-controlled Heivka (government-controlled, 27km north-west of Luhansk) and between government-controlled Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. While positioned near the station, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed distance of 1km south-south-west, assessed as within a 5km radius of the station.

### Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Donetsk region, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoints (EECP) near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) and Hnutove were operational but did not observe any civilian traffic.

The Mission also observed that the EECP near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were operational, with pedestrians and vehicles passing through in both directions.

The SMM also noted that the checkpoint of the armed formations near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk) was closed.

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational, with pedestrian traffic passing through in both directions.

The SMM also noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were operational but that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia remained closed.

Near the latter checkpoint of the armed formations, the Mission observed 11 workers reconstructing a concrete fence.

#### Border areas outside government control

On 28 November at 23:29, about 4km west-north-west of Kovske (91km south of Donetsk) and about 5km from the border with the Russian Federation, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an electronic warfare system (R-330Zh *Zhitel*).

On 30 November, while at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the Mission observed two cars (with "LPR" plates) entering Ukraine and two cars (with "LPR" plates) exiting Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations (man in his thirties) told the SMM to leave the area.\*

On the same day, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk), for about 15 minutes, the SMM saw that it appeared to be closed, with no personnel present.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

# \*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

#### Denials:

- At a checkpoint of the armed formations near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), a visibly armed member of the armed formations (man in his twenties) denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled Donetsk city, referring to the closure of the checkpoint.
- At a border crossing point in Dovzhanske (non-government-controlled, 84km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations (man in his thirties) asked the Mission to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

#### Other impediments:

- On the evening of 28 November, an SMM long-range UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference twice, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over areas between non-government-controlled Vitava (85km south of Donetsk) and Kachkarske (91km south of Donetsk) as well as between non-government-controlled Sakhanka (97km south of Donetsk) and Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 92km south of Donetsk).<sup>7</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV's positions.

#### Table of weapons

# Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapons	Location	Source of observation				
Non-government-controlled areas								
29/11/2020	3	Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm)	In a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk), where the UAV also	Mini-UAV				
	10	Tank (T-72)	spotted ten infantry fighting vehicles (five BMP-1 and five BMP-2) <sup>8</sup>					

## Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>9</sup>

Date	No.	Туре	Location	Source of observation				
Government-controlled areas								
29/11/2020	2	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)  Near Petrivske (24km north of Donetsk)		Long-range UAV				
Non-government-controlled areas								
25/11/2020	29	Armoured combat vehicle	In a training area near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014	Aerial imagery				
28/11/2020	1	Armoured personnel carrier (MT - LB)	Near a residential area of Stare (formerly Chervonyi Prapor, 58km west of Luhansk)	Long-range UAV				
30/11/2020	2	Armoured personnel carrier (BMP variant)	In a compound near a residential area of Luhansk city	Mini-UAV				

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 $<sup>^{8}</sup>$  The armoured combat vehicles mentioned in this table are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

#### Table of ceasefire violations as of 30 November 2020<sup>10</sup>

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-	1-3km ESE	Recorded	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	29-Nov, 20:05
controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	1-3km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	29-Nov, 20:06
SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-	1-3km S	Recorded	2	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	29-Nov, 22:54
controlled, 77km S of Donetsk)	2-4km E	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	30-Nov, 06:10
SE edge of Avdiivka (government- controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	1km SSW	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	30-Nov, 09:05

The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an "N/K"), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

#### Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions 11



<sup>11</sup> The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations ment ioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during day light hours and also patrols in this settlement during day light hours).