

Daily Report 251/2020

21 October 2020¹


Summary

- The SMM recorded three ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 19 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During night hours, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted people inside the latter two disengagement areas.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure, including repairs to water infrastructure near Pankivka and to enable construction work north and south of the bridge in Shchastia, in government-controlled and non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 pandemic, including at an entry-exit checkpoint in Luhansk region.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³

Number of recorded explosions⁴



Map of recorded ceasefire violations

¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 20 October 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and Berezove were not operational.


³ Including explosions.

⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 20 October 2020



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 21/10/2020

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded three ceasefire violations, all undetermined explosions, in areas north and south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), one of which was within a 5km radius of the station (see below). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded 19 ceasefire violations, the majority of which were within a 5km radius of the DFS.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission also recorded no ceasefire violations. The last time the SMM recorded a ceasefire violation in the region was on 15 October (see [SMM Daily Report 17 October 2020](#)).

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 1,738 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 467 explosions, 20 projectiles in flight, 15 muzzle flashes, 22 illumination flares and 1,214 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

While positioned in government-controlled areas of the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

On the night of 19-20 October, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a person inside a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near the area's north-eastern corner. The same UAV spotted a person inside a former position of the armed formations near the disengagement area's eastern edge, about 1.4km north of its south-eastern corner.

On 20 October, inside the disengagement area, about 1km north of its southern edge, the SMM observed four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) as well as eight workers from non-government-controlled areas checking road T-1316 and its eastern and western shoulders. It also observed four men from non-government-controlled areas in military-type clothing with demining equipment leaving the area near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the area.

On the same day, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the area, the Mission saw five members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them), all of whom entered the disengagement area, walked north and then returned.

On the night of 19-20 October, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted a person inside a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near the area's southern edge, about 1.5km east of its south-western corner.

On 20 October, while positioned near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the SMM observed 15 tanks in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region (for further information, see the table below).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁶

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including in a residential area, and in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region (for further information, see the table below).

Anti-tank mines and demining activities near Vesela Hora

On 19 October, about 1.5km north-west of Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) and about 30m west of road H-21, an SMM mini-UAV spotted eight anti-tank mines laid in a single row, assessed as belonging to the armed formations (for previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report 25 April 2019](#)).

On the same day, about 2km north-west of Vesela Hora and about 1.5km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), the same UAV spotted one large and five small craters (2m and less than 1m in diameter, respectively) on road H-21, as well as an additional large crater (2m in diameter) about 15m north of the road. About 400m further south-west of these, the same UAV also spotted two rows of five small circular craters across the road's southern lane. Another 700m south-west, the UAV additionally spotted ten shallow circular depressions in the same road and, in a field about 100m further south, two rows of about 24 fresh holes with a crater (1m in diameter) at the northern end of each row. All of these craters, holes and depressions were assessed as caused by activities related to the removal of previously reported mines or as the result of controlled detonations (for previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report 25 April 2019](#)).

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable construction work south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, north of Shchastia, and near Vesela Hora, south of the bridge in Shchastia.

It also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); repairs to water infrastructure near Pankivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk); maintenance of road T-1316 near Zolote – inside as well as north and south of the disengagement area – and road H-21 south of Shchastia; and demining activities near Hirske (government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk).

North of the bridge in Shchastia, at the junction of roads H-21 and T-1309, about 90m north-west of the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed forces, the Mission saw 14 workers with heavy equipment unloading construction material, reportedly for the construction of containers. Near a checkpoint of the armed formations about 2.5km east of Vesela Hora and about 3km south-

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

east of the bridge, the SMM saw 28 workers from non-government-controlled areas laying asphalt and installing poles, reportedly for street lights.

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. While positioned about 500m north-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 500-600m south-east (assessed as within a 5km radius of the station). Ceasefire violations occurring near the SMM, including when facilitating localised ceasefires to enable the repair and maintenance of critical civilian infrastructure, continue to put the security of patrols at risk and to hinder the implementation of the Mission's mandate.

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter the COVID-19 pandemic

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska remained non-operational.⁷

On 20 October, while at the EECP at about 09:00, 11:00 and 15:00 the Mission saw in total 220 people (145 women and 75 men, mixed ages) queuing to travel towards non-government-controlled areas.

On the same day, a representative of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine told the Mission that on 20 October, three people (women in their sixties) had been allowed to exit government-controlled areas, while on 19 October, nine people (women in their forties to sixties) had been allowed to do so. He added that two of those nine people had returned to government-controlled areas, saying that they had not been allowed to enter non-government-controlled areas by members of the armed formations.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report 12 October 2020](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

⁷ Notice about the EECP's temporary closure from 15 October to 31 October 2020 was published on the website of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 13 October.

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- On the evening of 19 October, an SMM long-range UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Hrodivka (government-controlled, 43km north-west of Donetsk), as well as GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between government-controlled Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk) and Mykolaivka (37km north-west of Donetsk).⁸
- On 20 October, on two separate occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) and the south-eastern corner of the disengagement area near Petrivske.

⁸ The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

Table of weapons

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
19/10/2020	15	Tank (probable T-64)	Near Lozuvatske (35km north-west of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁹

Date	No.	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
19/10/2020	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-variant)	In residential areas of Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV
	3	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-variant)		
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70)	In a compound in a residential area of Kurakhivka (32km west of Donetsk)	
	1	Combat reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2)		
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-variant)	Near Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk)	
20/10/2020	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70)	Near Zolote (60km west of Luhansk)	Patrol
Non-government-controlled areas				
19/10/2020	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-variant)	Near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk)	Mini-UAV


⁹ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 20 October 2020¹⁰

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
About 500m NE of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km N of Donetsk)	500-600m SE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	20-Oct, 11:37
About 1km NW of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk)	7-9km SW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	20-Oct, 09:02
	6-8km SW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	20-Oct, 14:22

¹⁰ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹¹



¹¹ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours,)