

Daily Report 211/2020

4 September 2020¹


Summary

- The SMM recorded five ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and 23 in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded 13 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and two in Luhansk region.
- Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Dovhe, Luhansk region.*
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During evening hours, SMM UAVs spotted people inside the latter two areas.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 outbreak, including at the entry-exit checkpoint in Luhansk region.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³

Number of recorded explosions⁴




¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 3 September 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and near Shyrokyne were not operational.


³ Including explosions.

⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.


Map of recorded ceasefire violations



Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 3 September 2020



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 04/09/2020

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded five ceasefire violations, all explosions in areas near the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (see also below). During the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded 13 ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded 23 ceasefire violations, 17 of which were bursts of small-arms fire directed at a Mission mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) (see below). During the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded two ceasefire violations.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 936 ceasefire violations, both in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 159 explosions, two projectiles in flight, 13 illumination flares and 762 bursts and shots).

Small-arms fire directed at SMM mini-UAV near Dovhe, Luhansk region*

On 3 September, while positioned on south-western edge of Dovhe to conduct a mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard 17 single bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 600m east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 650m south-east of the SMM's position. The SMM immediately landed the UAV and left the area.

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske

During the day on 3 September, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) near the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On the evening of 2 September, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted a person near a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near the area's north-eastern corner and another near a former position of the armed formations near the area's eastern edge, about 1.4km north of the its south-eastern corner.

On 3 September, about 200m south of the disengagement area's southern edge, the Mission saw six workers with heavy equipment preparing the surface of the road and conducting groundwork, assessed as for laying communication cables.

On the same day, the SMM saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) and a person carrying disinfecting equipment enter the disengagement area, walk up to 350m north of its southern edge and return. Throughout the day, the Mission saw six members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area.

Also on 3 September, while positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km north-west of Luhansk) to facilitate repairs (see below), the Mission heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 3-4km north-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery.

On the evening of 2 September, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted a person near former positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 500m east-north-east of the area's south-western corner and two more near a former position of the armed formations near the area's south-eastern corner.

On 3 September, while positioned at three locations near the disengagement area, the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The Mission observed a multiple-launch rocket system in violation of withdrawal lines in a training area in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁵

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in government-controlled areas of both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (for further details, see the table below).

On 1 September, on south-western edge of Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk), an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a new 600m trench from south-south-east to north-north-west, assessed as a consolidation of two positions belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (not seen in imagery from 1 September 2020).

On 3 September, in a compound on the north-western edge of non-government-controlled Luhansk city, the Mission saw about 25 members of the armed formations standing in two rows, facing four other members of the armed formations (at least two of whom were wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them), as well as five large boxes under camouflage netting, assessed as possible communication equipment. Outside the compound, the SMM saw 11 cars, two military-type trucks and two members of the armed formations with batons regulating traffic.

Probable anti-personnel mine near Petrivske and unexploded ordnance between Boikivske and Staromarivka

On 2 September, about 800m north of Petrivske, in a field about 20m east of the road between Petrivske and Styla (non-government-controlled, 34km south of Donetsk), which is frequently used by SMM patrols, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable anti-personnel mine (MON-200), assessed as belonging to the armed formations (for previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 19 June 2020](#)).

On 2 September, about 2km east-north-east of Staromarivka (62km south of Donetsk), on a road leading to Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, non-government-controlled, 67km south-east of Donetsk), the Mission saw six mortar fins (four 120mm and two 82mm) protruding from the asphalt, as well as an unexploded rocket (220mm), assessed as an

⁵ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

unexploded ordnance (UXO), embedded nearby in the road. The UXO was assessed as not recent.

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable preparations for construction works south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above) and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway maintenance in Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk) and repairs to water infrastructure near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk) and near Pankivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk).

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable maintenance and repair of power lines in Verkhnotoretske (government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk), near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.

The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. While positioned in Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion within a 5km radius of the station.

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter COVID-19 outbreak

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint in Stanytsia Luhanska was operational.

While at the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska at about 8:50 and 11:10, the SMM observed a total of 460 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas (mixed genders and ages) and a total of 270 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction. The SMM also observed two golf carts operating between the new section of the bridge and the EECP.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to

areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report of 1 September 2020](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- On 2 September, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) and Myronivka (government-controlled, 64km north-east of Donetsk).⁶
- On 3 September, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Dovhe (non-government-controlled, 22km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 17 bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as directed at its UAV. The SMM landed the UAV safely and left the area (see above).

⁶ The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV's position.

Table of weapons

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

| Date | No. of weapons | Type of weapon | Location | Source of observation |
|--|----------------|---|---|-----------------------|
| Non-government-controlled areas | | | | |
| 02/09/2020 | 1 | Multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 <i>Grad</i> , 122mm) | In a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) | Long-range UAV |

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

| Date | No. of weapons | Type of weapon | Location | Source of observation |
|--|----------------|--|---|-----------------------|
| Government-controlled areas | | | | |
| 02/09/2020 | 2 | Surface-to-air missile system (9K35 <i>Strela-10</i>) | In a compound close to the residential area of Kalynove (35km north of Donetsk) | Long-range UAV |
| Non-government-controlled areas | | | | |
| 02/09/2020 | 9 | Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm) | In a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk), where imagery also revealed the presence of seven armoured personnel carriers (MT-LB) and 18 infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1) ⁷ (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 28 August 2020) | Long-range UAV |
| | 12 | Towed howitzer (D-30 <i>Lyagushka</i> , 122mm) | | |
| | 1 | Tank (T-64) | | |
| | 4 | Surface-to-air missile system (9K35 <i>Strela-10</i>) | | |

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁸

| Date | No. | Type | Location | Source of observation |
|---------------------------------------|-----|--|---|-----------------------|
| Government-controlled areas | | | | |
| 02/09/2020 | 3 | Armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) | Near Vozdvyzhenka (formerly Krasnyi Pakhar, 66km north-east of Donetsk) | Long-range UAV |
| Non-government-controlled area | | | | |
| 03/09/2020 | 1 | Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM variant) | Donetsk city | Patrol |

⁷ The armoured combat vehicles mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.


⁸ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 3 September 2020⁹

| SMM position | Event location | Means | No. | Observation | Description | Weapon | Date, time |
|---|----------------|-------|-----|-------------|---|------------|--------------------|
| About 500m NE of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km N of Donetsk) | 1km SE | Heard | 1 | Explosion | Undetermined | N/K | 3-Sep, 12:03 |
| About 2.3km N of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km N of Donetsk) | 2km SE | Heard | 1 | Explosion | Undetermined | N/K | 3-Sep, 13:00 |
| | 2-3km SE | Heard | 1 | Explosion | Undetermined | N/K | 3-Sep, 13:45 |
| | 2-3km SE | Heard | 1 | Explosion | Undetermined | N/K | 3-Sep, 13:58 |
| | 2-3km SE | Heard | 1 | Explosion | Undetermined | N/K | 3-Sep, 14:00 |
| NW edge of Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km W of Luhansk) | 7-10km SSW | Heard | 1 | Explosion | Undetermined | N/K | 3-Sep, 10:10 |
| | 7-10km SSW | Heard | 4 | Burst | | HMG | 3-Sep, 10:12 |
| SW edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km W of Luhansk) | 3-4km NE | Heard | 1 | Explosion | Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area) | N/K | 3-Sep, 11:21 |
| SW edge of Dovhe (non-government-controlled, 22km NW of Luhansk) | 600m E | Heard | 17 | Burst | | Small arms | 3-Sep, 12:09-12:10 |

⁹ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹⁰



¹⁰ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well.)