

Daily Report 209/2020

2 September 2020¹

Summary


- The SMM recorded no ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and 63 in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded one ceasefire violation in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During evening hours, SMM unmanned aerial vehicles observed people inside the latter two disengagement areas.
- The SMM spotted ongoing construction works at positions near Shchastia, Luhansk region and construction materials at a position inside the Petrivske disengagement area near its south-eastern corner.
- The SMM spotted for the first time anti-tank mines on a road near the Trudivski area of Donetsk city.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 outbreak, including at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³



Number of recorded explosions⁴



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 1 September 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and near Shyrokyne were not operational.

³ Including explosions.

⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 1 September 2020



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 02/09/2020

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. During the [previous reporting period](#), it recorded one ceasefire violation.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded 63 ceasefire violations, including an undetermined explosion, all in areas east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) (see below). During the [previous reporting period](#), it recorded no ceasefire violations.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 893 ceasefire violations, both in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 149 explosions, two projectiles in flight, 13 illumination flares and 729 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske

On 1 September, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) between the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) and the checkpoint south of it.

On the evening of 31 August, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two people inside a former position of the armed formations near its eastern edge, about 1.4km north of its south-eastern corner.

During the day on 1 September, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw five members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), three of whom (one in a hazmat suit, carrying a canister with a spraying device) walked inside the disengagement area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned. At this location, the SMM observed the person wearing the hazmat suit spraying a disinfecting substance from the canister onto an SMM vehicle traveling towards non-government-controlled areas.

On the same day, also outside the disengagement area, about 500m south of its southern edge, the SMM saw workers with heavy construction equipment taking measurements, welding and conducting groundwork.

On 30 August, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted construction materials with wooden logs and sandbags piled near a position of the armed formations near the area’s south-eastern corner (not seen in imagery from 20 August 2020).

On the evening of 31 August, also inside the disengagement area, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two people inside a former position of the armed formations near its south-eastern corner.

On 1 September, while positioned at two locations close to the disengagement area, the Mission observed a calm situation.

Presence of mines in Trudivski area of Donetsk city and near Shchastia, Luhansk region

On 28 August, on the western edge of the Trudivski area of Donetsk city's Petrovskiy district (non-government-controlled), an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time two rows of ten anti-tank mines, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, blocking a road leading west to Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) (not seen in imagery from 21 August 2020) (for previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 5 May 2020](#)).

On 31 August, about 2km east of Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV [again](#) spotted three rows of 36 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, laid across road H21, about 150m south-east of the bridge in Shchastia.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁵

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft guns in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region (for further details, see the table below).

On 31 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted piles of construction materials and ongoing improvements to active military positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 330m apart on the northern and southern sides of the bridge in Shchastia (not seen in imagery from 21 August 2020).

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

On 1 September, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable preparations for construction works south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above) and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia.

On the same day, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway track inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance in Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); repairs to water infrastructure near non-government-controlled Pankivka (16km north of Luhansk) and Yashchykove (46km west of Luhansk); maintenance of and repairs to power lines near non-government-controlled Berezivske (53km north-west of Luhansk), Holubivske (51km west of Luhansk), Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk) and Vesela Hora; and demining activities in areas near government-controlled Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk), Hirske (63km west of Luhansk), and Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk).

⁵ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter COVID-19 outbreak

In Donetsk region, on 31 August, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were operational (for observations related to the latter see [SMM Daily Report of 1 September 2020](#)).

While at the EECP between 09:00 and 09:40 and between 10:50 and 15:05, the SMM saw in total 16 people (ten women and five men, mixed ages, and one girl), two cars and two minivans (about seven passengers each, mixed genders and ages) entering government-controlled areas. The Mission also saw 11 people (six women and two men, mixed ages, and three children), seven cars, a bus (about 25 passengers, mixed genders and ages) traveling towards non-governmental-controlled areas and 32 people (19 women and three men, mixed ages, and three boys and seven girls, all under 16 years old) queuing in the same direction.

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the EECP in Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational.

While at the EECP at about 08:45 and 10:45, the Mission observed in total 480 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and in total 300 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction.

On the same day, while at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge at 13:20, the Mission saw two people (women, mixed ages) queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and about ten people (six women and four men, mixed ages) traveling in the opposite direction.

Throughout the day, the SMM saw a golf cart transporting people between the EECP and the new section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, as well as a shuttle bus operating between the checkpoint of the armed formations and a bus stop about 1.8km south of the bridge.

Security situation in south-east Kherson region

On 1 September, the SMM observed a calm situation at checkpoints near Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson) and Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson), between Kherson region and Crimea, as well as in the surrounding areas of Henichesk (176 km east of Kherson), Strilkove (193km south-east of Kherson), Valok (205km south-east of Kherson) and Skadovsk (62km south of Kherson), all in south-east Kherson region.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report of 1 September 2020](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- On the evening of 31 August, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over non-government-controlled areas between Shyroka Balka (34km north-east of Donetsk) and Spartak (9km north of Donetsk), and over areas near Staromykhailivka (15km west of Donetsk). On the night between 31 August and 1 September, the same UAV experience dual GPS signal interference, assessed as jamming, while flying over Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk).
- On 1 September, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk).⁶

⁶ The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone


Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
31/08/2020	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80)	Near Novomykhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV
	2	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)	Near Stepne (29km south-west of Donetsk)	
	1	Armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined)		
	1	Anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm)	Near Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk)	
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)		
	1	Armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined)	Near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk)	
	3	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)	In a military compound near Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk)	
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB variant)		
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)	Near Yurivka (35km north of Donetsk)	
01/09/2020	3	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70)	Near Lomakyne (93km south of Donetsk)	Patrol
Non-government-controlled areas				
30/08/2020	1	Anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm)	In two compounds near Luhansk city	Mini-UAV
	2	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80)		
	2	Combat engineering vehicle (IMR-2)		
	2	Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2)		
	3	Armoured personnel carrier (one BTR-80 and two MT-LB)		

Table of ceasefire violations as of 1 September 2020⁷

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
E edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km W of Luhansk)	2-3km SE	Heard	10	Burst		Small arms	1-Sep, 16:30-16:45
	2-3km SE	Heard	14	Shot		Small arms	1-Sep, 16:30-16:45
	3-5km E	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	1-Sep, 16:30-16:45
	2-3km SE	Heard	21	Shot		Small arms	1-Sep, 16:55-17:15
	2-3km SE	Heard	1	Burst		Small arms	1-Sep, 16:55-17:15
	1-2km E	Heard	16	Shot		Small arms	1-Sep, 17:23-18:05

⁷ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions⁸



⁸ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well.)