

Daily Report 196/2020

18 August 2020¹


Summary

- The SMM recorded no ceasefire violations in Donetsk region (compared with 108 in the previous 24 hours) and three in Luhansk region (compared with none in the previous 24 hours).
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. Inside the disengagement area near Zolote, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle observed a person during evening hours.
- The Mission visited two border crossing points in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable the maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 outbreak, including at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at a border crossing point near non-government controlled Izvaryne.*

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³

Number of recorded explosions⁴




¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 17 August 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and near Shyrokyne were not operational.

³ Including explosions.

⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.


Map of recorded ceasefire violations



Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 17 August 2020



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 18/08/2020

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. During the [previous 24 hours](#), it recorded 108 ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded three ceasefire violations, all outgoing explosions in an area north-north-west of Kruhlyk (non-government-controlled, 31km south-west of Luhansk) assessed as a live-fire exercise outside the security zone (see table below). During the [previous 24 hours](#), it recorded no ceasefire violations.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 477 ceasefire violations, both in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 87 explosions, two projectiles in flight, five illumination flares and 383 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

Inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) on the southern edge of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On the evening of 15 August, **inside the disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a person inside a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near the area’s north-eastern corner.

During the day on 17 August, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), three of whom it saw entering and walking about 350m north inside the disengagement area and then returning.

On the same day, outside the disengagement area, about 250m south of its southern edge, the SMM saw six workers with a truck, excavator-loader, grader, roller, excavator, tractor and bulldozer conducting groundworks.

On 17 August, while positioned at two locations near **the disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation. The SMM also noted that the [previously reported](#) wooden log and electrical wiring stretching across the road between Petrivske and Bohdaniivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) were no longer present.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the Mission saw tanks in two training areas in non-

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

government-controlled areas of Luhansk region and self-propelled howitzers in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region (for further details, see the table below).

Weapons storage sites

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

17 August

The SMM noted that one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 *Gvozdika*, 122mm) was again missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone⁶

The Mission observed armoured combat vehicles in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (for further details, see the table below).

Presence of mines near Pikuzy, Donetsk region

On 15 August, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted ten anti-tank mines (part of a larger minefield) near the western edge of Pikuzy (non-government-controlled, 92km south of Donetsk), south of road T-0519. The same UAV also again spotted four anti-tank mines attached to a board laid across a road leading from Pikuzy to Talakivka (government-controlled, 90km south of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Reports of [22 April](#) and [4 August 2020](#)).

SMM facilitation of maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable preparations for construction works south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above) and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk). During the day on 17 August, while positioned about 100m north of Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard an explosion from a westerly direction, assessed as a controlled explosion.

The Mission also continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to localised ceasefires to enable vegetation clearance, inspection and maintenance of railway tracks near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); repairs to power lines near Vesela Hora and between Zolote 5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk) and Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk); repairs to water infrastructure near Yashchykove (non-government-controlled, 46km west of Luhansk); maintenance of the sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk); and demining activities on the northern side of the bridge in Shchastia.

The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Border areas outside government control

On 17 August, while at the border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the Mission observed two buses (with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. After about seven minutes, a member of the armed formation told the SMM to leave the area.*

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM noted that it appeared to be closed and there were no personnel present.

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter COVID-19 outbreak

In Donetsk region, the SMM saw that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and the checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were operational.

While at the EECP near Novotroitske between 09:15 and 10:55, the Mission saw a bus with about 30 people (mixed genders and ages) entering government-controlled areas and three buses (about 25-30 people each, mixed genders and ages) and ten people (mixed genders and ages) traveling in the opposite direction. On the same day, while at the EECP, between 12:20 and 13:40, the SMM saw three cars traveling towards non-government controlled areas.

While at the EECP, a man (in his fifties) told the SMM that he had been unable to enter non-government-controlled areas because he was not on a list of people allowed entry. Six other civilians (mixed genders and ages) also told the Mission they had been staying in tents between one night and three weeks at the EECP while waiting to be allowed to cross into non-government-controlled areas, for the same reason.

At the checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka between 08:36 and 12:15 and between 13:04 and 15:15, the Mission saw about 20 cars and 60 people (mixed genders and ages) traveling towards government-controlled areas and about 20 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing to travel in the same direction. The SMM observed two cars and five people (mixed genders and ages) traveling in the opposite direction.

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the EECP in Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational.

While at the EECP between 13:10 and 14:45, the SMM saw about 1,100 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and about 150 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction. The Mission saw that a golf cart was transporting people between the EECP and the new section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Denial

- At a border crossing point in Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the Mission full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- On 15 August, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between Nyzhnie (government-controlled, 56km north-west of Luhansk) and Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk).⁷

⁷ The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV's position.

Table of weapons

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
17/08/2020	7	Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm)	Near Dachenske (49km north-west of Donetsk)	Patrol
	4	Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm)	Near Hryhorivka (formerly Leninske, 46km north-west of Donetsk)	
Non-government-controlled areas				
17/08/2020	3	Tank (T-64)	Near a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk)	Patrol
	4	Tank (T-72)	Near a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk)	

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁸

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
15/08/2020	10	Infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1)	Near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV
	1	Armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined)	Near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk)	
17/08/2020	2	Armoured personnel carriers (BTR-70)	Near Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk)	Patrol
	5	Armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2)		


⁸ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 17 August 2020⁹

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
About 1.5km N of Kruhlyk (non-government-controlled, 31km SW of Luhansk)	500m NNW	Heard	3	Explosion	Outgoing	N/K	17-Aug, 12:25-12:34

⁹ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹⁰



¹⁰ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well.)