



Daily Report 192/2020

13 August 2020¹

Summary

- The SMM recorded no ceasefire violations in Donetsk or Luhansk regions.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. Inside the disengagement area near Zolote, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle observed people during evening hours.
- The SMM spotted for the first time anti-tank mines on a road near non-government-controlled Sokilnyky, Luhansk region.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable the maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM monitored areas near a border crossing point in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 outbreak, including at an entry-exit checkpoint in Luhansk region.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 12 August 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

Ceasefire violations^{2,3}

The SMM recorded no ceasefire violations in Donetsk or Luhansk regions, for the fifth time since it began systematic data collection.⁴ During the [previous reporting period](#), it recorded four ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region. The Mission had previously recorded no ceasefire violations in both regions between the evenings of 7 and 9 August (see [SMM Daily Report 10 August 2020](#)).

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 262 ceasefire violations, in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 46 explosions, two projectiles in flight, three illumination flares and 211 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

On 12 August, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) on the southern edge of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk). The Mission also saw six workers from government-controlled areas cleaning the shoulders of the road between the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska and the northern edge of the new span of the bridge.

On the evening of 11 August, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three people inside former positions of the armed formations near the area’s eastern edge and about 1.5km north of its south-eastern corner, and three people inside former positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces south of the railway track, as well as about 530m and 1.7km west-south-west of the area’s north-eastern corner.

On the same day, outside the disengagement area near Zolote, about 60m north of its northern edge and about 600m east of its north-eastern corner, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a military utility truck under camouflage netting, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 12 August, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), three of whom were walking inside the disengagement area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and back, accompanied by four people in protective garments.

On the same day, outside the disengagement area, about 500m south of its southern edge, the SMM saw eight workers with a truck, an excavator-loader, two bulldozers, a steamroller

² During the reporting period, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations, therefore the report does not contain the chart presenting trends or the map of ceasefire violations.

³ During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and near Shyrokyne were not operational.

⁴ The SMM’s systematic data compilation began on 1 March 2015. Previous ceasefire violation information can be found in daily reports prior to that date.

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

and a tractor, levelling and graveling the ground on both sides of road T-1316, as well as conducting groundworks, reportedly to lay communication cables.

On 5 August, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed that a new cover had been placed over a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 800m north of its southern edge and about 1.9km east of its western edge.

Outside the disengagement area, about 100m south of its southern edge, and 700m and 1km west-south-west of its south-eastern corner, the imagery also revealed a recently built trench (about 45m long), a new temporary structure, as well as a recent trench extension (about 100m long), all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. (None were visible in imagery from 23 July 2020, see also table below.)

On 12 August, while positioned at four locations close to the disengagement area near Petrivske, the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the Mission saw tanks at a railway station in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region (for further details, see the table below).

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone⁶

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone on both sides of the contact line (for further details, see the table below).

On 5 August, about 7.5km south-east of Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and about 3km south-south-east of the disengagement area near Petrivske, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of two recent trench extensions (about 45m and 115m long) assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (not visible in imagery from 23 July 2020).

On 11 August, about 250m north of the destroyed Donetsk international airport (8km north-west of Donetsk) and about 2.5km south-west of Opytne (government-controlled, 12km north-west of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted a new trench system (about 150m in length), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Presence of mines

On 11 August, near the western outskirts of Sokilnyky (non-government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time five anti-tank mines across the road leading towards Krymske (government-controlled, 42km north-west of Luhansk), assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted that 12 anti-tank mines [previously observed](#) on a walkway next to a road about 170m west-north-west of the Siverskyi Donets river near Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) had been removed.

The same UAV also [again](#) spotted 36 anti-tank mines laid across road H-21 about 150m south-east of the bridge in Shchastia, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

SMM facilitation of maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable preparations for construction works south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above), near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) and south of the bridge in Shchastia.

The Mission also continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to water infrastructure near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and between non-government-controlled Berezivske (53km north-west of Luhansk) and Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk) as well as to enable repairs to power lines in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and near Vesela Hora.

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to localised ceasefires to enable vegetation clearance, inspection and maintenance of railway tracks near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk), as well as demining activities near government-controlled Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk) and Hirske (63km west of Luhansk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation near the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter COVID-19 outbreak

On 12 August, in Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the EECP in Stanytsia Luhanska was operational.

On 12 August, while positioned at the EECP at 8:58 and 10:20, the SMM saw about 450 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and about 230 people queuing in the opposite direction.⁷ Throughout the day, the SMM observed two golf carts operating between the new section of the bridge and the EECP.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 55 minutes, the SMM observed 21 cars (including 13 with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (one with “DPR” plates) and seven pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) entering

⁷ In [SMM Daily Report 12 August](#), the respective sentence in this section should have read: “While at the EECP at 8:55 and 10:35, the Mission saw about 840 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and about 245 people queuing in the opposite direction”.

Ukraine. During the same time, it also observed 14 cars (including six with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM also monitored areas along the border outside government control near Manych (76km east of Donetsk), Komyshuvakha (75km east of Donetsk), Novoukrainske (77km east of Donetsk) and Tarany (74km east of Donetsk).

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report 10 August 2020](#)). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- On the evening and night of 11-12 August, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between non-government-controlled Kyslyche (formerly Oktiabrske, 18km south-east of Donetsk) and Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, 23km north-east of Donetsk) and between the destroyed Donetsk international airport (8km north-west of Donetsk) and non-government-controlled Kruta Balka (16km north of Donetsk).⁸

⁸ The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometers from the UAV’s position.

Table of weapons

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
12/08/2020	4	Tank (T-64)	At a railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk)	Patrol

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁹

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
05/08/2020	-	Two recent trench extensions (45m and 100m long) and a temporary structure (not seen in imagery from 23 July 2020)	Near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), about 100m south of the disengagement area near Petrivske	Aerial imagery
	-	Two recent trench extensions (115m and 45m long) (not seen in imagery from 23 July 2020)	About 7.5km south-east of Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk)	
10/08/2020	12	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2)	At a compound near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk)	Mini-UAV
	1	Armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2)		
	1	Armoured combat vehicle		
	1	Armoured combat vehicle (BRDM variant)	In a residential area in Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk)	
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant)	In a residential area near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk)	
11/08/2020	1	Probable armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2)	Near Vozdvyzhenka (formerly Krasnyi Pakhar, 66km north-east of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)	Near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk)	
	4	Probable infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)	Near occupied residential houses in Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk)	
	2	Armoured personnel carriers (BTR variant)	Near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk)	
	-	New trench system (about 150m long)	About 250m north of the destroyed Donetsk International airport (8km north-west of Donetsk)	
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB)	Near occupied residential houses in Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk)	Mini-UAV
Non-government-controlled areas				
11/08/2020	1	Probable armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant)	At a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2)		

⁹ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹⁰



¹⁰ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well.)