
Daily Report 179/2020

29 July 2020¹

Summary

- The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, compared with the previous reporting period, and again no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
- From 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM recorded a total of 121 ceasefire violations.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicles observed people in the disengagement area near Zolote during evening hours.
- The SMM again saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines as well as beyond respective withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites at the airfield in non-government-controlled Peremozhne, Luhansk region.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and maintenance of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 outbreak, including at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints in Luhansk region.
- The SMM observed a calm situation in south-east Kherson region.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*




¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 28 July 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske, near Shyrokyne and at the Oktiabr mine were not operational.

³ Including explosions.

⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations



In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, all explosions (ten), compared with the <u>previous reporting period</u> (25 explosions). All ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-east and south of Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations for the second consecutive day.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM recorded a total of 121 ceasefire violations, all in Donetsk region (including 31 explosions and 90 bursts and shots of small-arms-fire).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

On 28 July, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) between the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) and their checkpoint south of it.

On the evening of 27 July, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a person inside a former position of the armed formations about 1.7km north of the area's south-eastern corner. The same UAV spotted a person inside a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 500m west-south-west of its north-eastern corner.

On 28 July, outside the disengagement area, about 300m south of the area's southern edge, the SMM saw six workers from non-government-controlled areas clearing vegetation from the eastern side of road T-1316 and a bulldozer levelling the surface of the road's western side.

Throughout the day, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw six members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them), two of whom were walking along road T-1316 inside the area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned.

On 27 July, outside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), about 380m south of its southern edge and close to <u>previously reported</u> trench extensions, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a refurbished trench, inside which it also spotted two newly constructed firing positions, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (not visible in imagery from 5 July 2020). Also outside the disengagement area, about 280m north-west of the area's north-western edge, the same UAV spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (BMP variant) about 150m north of the road leading from Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) to Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk).

On 28 July, while positioned at four locations close to the disengagement area, the Mission observed a calm situation.

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. It saw seven weapons in violation of withdrawal lines at the airfield in Peremozhne (non-government-controlled, 19km south of Luhansk).⁶

At the same airfield, the Mission observed seven weapons beyond respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites (for further details, see the tables below).

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone⁷

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone in government-controlled areas of both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including in a residential area of Donetsk region, as well as an anti-aircraft gun in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region (for further details, see the table below).

SMM facilitation of operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to water infrastructure near Yashchykove (non-government-controlled, 46km west of Luhansk) and Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and Shumy (government-controlled, 41km north of Donetsk); repairs to power and gas lines in government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) and Troitske (69km west of Luhansk); the assessment and maintenance of gas lines near Zalizne and Nelipivka (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk); and the assessment and maintenance of power lines near Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk).

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable vegetation clearance, inspection and maintenance of railway tracks near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); demining activities near government-controlled Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk) (including to support access to agricultural land), Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk), Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk) and Hirske (63km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter COVID-19 outbreak

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational. While at the EECP at 09:00 and 14:20, the Mission saw about 200 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and about 100 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite

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⁶ Formerly Luhansk International Airport.

⁷ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

direction. The Mission saw that a golf cart was operating between the EECP and the new section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

While at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge at 11:05, the SMM saw about 120 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and about 135 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction. The Mission saw a shuttle bus operating between the checkpoint and a bus stop about 1.8km south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

In the afternoon, while positioned north of the Stanystia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw an international organization transferring humanitarian aid across the bridge. The Mission saw two vehicles (SUV) with the logo of an international organization, two trucks and a forklift arriving at the northern edge of the new section of bridge. It saw nine representatives of the international organization unloading 20 pallets close to the new section of the bridge and transporting them towards non-government-controlled areas, and then returning.

SMM observed calm situation in south-east Kherson region

On 26 July, the SMM observed a calm situation in south-east Kherson region, at a checkpoint near Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson), between Kherson region and Crimea.

Peaceful gathering in Lviv

On 27 July, in Lviv, the SMM monitored a peaceful gathering of about 200 people (mixed genders and ages), which started in front of the monument of Taras Shevchenko on Svobody Avenue and continued near the building of Lviv Regional State Administration at 18 Vynnychenka Street. The Mission heard participants expressing messages critical of the outcomes of the recent meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group and of the government's approach towards certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. About 20 police officers secured the site.

The Mission continued monitoring in Chernivtsi, Dnipro, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Odessa and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments — which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 14 July 2020). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- On two occasions, an SMM mini-UAV UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 77km south of Donetsk).⁸
- An SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Fedorivka (government-controlled, 71km south of Donetsk).
- An SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Novoselivka (government-controlled, 66km south of Donetsk).

⁸ The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV's position.

Table of weapons

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

| Date | No. of weapons | Type of weapon | Location | Source of observation | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------|---|--|-----------------------|--|--|
| Non-government-controlled areas | | | | | | |
| 27/07/2020 | 2 | Towed howitzer (one D-30 <i>Lyagushka</i> , 122mm and one 2A65 <i>Msta-B</i> , 152mm) | | Patrol | | |
| | 1 | Multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 <i>Grad</i> , 122mm) | On the apron and runway of the airfield in Peremozhne (19km south | | | |
| | 2 | Self-propelled howitzer (one 2S3 <i>Akatsiya</i> , 152mm and one 2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm) | of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 28 July 2020) | | | |
| | 2 | Anti-tank gun (one BS-3, 100mm and one MT-12 <i>Rapira</i> , 100mm) | | | | |

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

| Date | No. | Туре | Location | Source of observation | | |
|---------------------------------|-----|---|---|-----------------------|--|--|
| Non-government-controlled areas | | | | | | |
| 27/07/2020 | 2 | Tank (one T-64 and one T-72) | On the apron and runway of the airfield in Peremozhne (19km south | Patrol | | |
| | 3 | Mortar (type undetermined) | of Luhansk), where the patrol also saw three armoured personnel carriers, two armoured reconnaissance vehicles and three | | | |
| | 2 | Surface-to-air missile system (one 9K33 <i>Osa</i> and one <i>Strela-10</i>) | infantry fighting vehicles (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 28 July 2020)9 | | | |

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⁹ The armoured combat vehicles mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of military presence in the security $zone^{10}$

| Date | No. | Туре | Location | Source of observation | | |
|-----------------------------|--|---|--|-----------------------|--|--|
| Government-controlled areas | | | | | | |
| 27/07/2020 | 1 | Probable infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) | Near Pavlopil (84km south of Donetsk) | | | |
| | 1 | Armoured combat vehicle | Near Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk) | Long-range | | |
| | 2 | Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) In a residential area of Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk) | | UAV | | |
| | 1 | Armoured combat vehicle Near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk) | | | | |
| | 1 | Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) Near Hranitne (60km south of Donetsk) | | Mini-UAV | | |
| | 3 | Infantry fighting vehicle (one BMP-1 and two BMP variant) Near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) | | | | |
| | - | Two newly constructed firing positions, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces | About 380m south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) | Willin-UAV | | |
| 28/07/2020 | 1 | Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-60) | Near Bobrove (56km north-west of Luhansk) | Patrol | | |
| | 1 | Armoured combat vehicle | Near Shyrokyne (100km south of Donetsk) | | | |
| | | Non-government-c | ontrolled areas | | | |
| 27/07/2020 | 27/07/2020 1 Anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) In a compound on the eastern edge of Luhansk city | | | Mini-UAV | | |


 10 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 28 July 2020¹¹

| SMM position | Event location | Means | No. | Observation | Description | Weapon | Date, time |
|--|----------------|-------|-----|-------------|--------------|--------|------------------|
| About 1km NW of the railway station in Yasynuvata (nongovernment-controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk) | 6-8km SW | Heard | 2 | Explosion | Undetermined | N/K | 28-Jul, 10:24 |
| About 1km NE of | 4-6km NE | Heard | 2 | Explosion | Undetermined | N/K | 28-Jul, 09:27 |
| Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government- controlled, 42km NE of | 4-6km NE | Heard | 2 | Explosion | Undetermined | N/K | 28-Jul, 10:20 |
| Donetsk) | 4-6km S | Heard | 4 | Explosion | Undetermined | N/K | 28-Jul, 14:05 |

¹¹ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an "N/K"), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹²



¹² The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well).