

# Daily Report 164/2020

11 July 2020<sup>1</sup>


## Summary

- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- Members of the armed formations continued to deny the Mission passage at checkpoints along official crossing routes in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.\*
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske.
- The SMM saw civilians queuing to travel towards government-controlled and non-government-controlled areas at the entry-exit checkpoint in Stanytsia Luhanska.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable the assessment, maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure as well as demining activities.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.\*

## Ceasefire violations<sup>2</sup>

Number of recorded ceasefire violations<sup>3</sup>

Number of recorded explosions<sup>4</sup>



## Map of recorded ceasefire violations

<sup>1</sup> Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 10 July 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

<sup>2</sup> For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka, Petrivske, near Shyrokyne and at the Oktiabr mine were non-operational.


<sup>3</sup> Including explosions.

<sup>4</sup> Including from unidentified weapons.




Organization for Security and  
Co-operation in Europe  
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

## Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 10 July 2020



### Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- ..... Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005), IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 11/07/2020

In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 55), compared with the [previous reporting period](#) (15 explosions). Almost all ceasefire violations, including all explosions, were recorded at south-easterly and south-westerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (see below) and in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however fewer explosions (13), compared with the [previous reporting period](#) (about 90 explosions). Almost all ceasefire violations, including more than half of the explosions, were recorded at northerly and north-easterly directions of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

### Members of the armed formations continued to deny the SMM passage at checkpoints along the contact line

Members of the armed formations continued to deny the SMM passage at checkpoints along official crossing routes. These restrictions constitute an impediment to the implementation of the Mission's mandate.<sup>5</sup>

In Donetsk region, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnohyrokiivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations [again](#) denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled areas, referring to restrictions due to COVID-19.\*

At a checkpoint near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations [again](#) denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled areas, referring to restrictions due to COVID-19. The Mission continued to observe the presence of a metal barrier and spikes laid across the road, and of a mine hazard sign.\*

In Luhansk region, at a checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations [again](#) denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled areas, referring to restrictions due to COVID-19.\*

### Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske<sup>6</sup>

On 10 July, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) the Mission saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) near their checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

On the same day, while positioned at two locations near the **disengagement area near Zolote**, the SMM heard and saw five undetermined explosions and heard three undetermined explosions and about 115 bursts of small-arms and heavy machine-gun-fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery.

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<sup>5</sup> The Mission began facing repeated denials when attempting to cross into non-government-controlled areas at checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk region on 21 March and Luhansk region on 23 March. For more information, see SMM Daily and Spot Reports.

<sup>6</sup> Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

During the day on 10 July, the Mission saw six members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) close to the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote. It saw one of them walking along road T-1316 inside the disengagement area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and then return.

On the night of 9-10 July, the SMM camera 2km east of Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) recorded an illumination flare at an assessed range of 3-5km south-east, assessed as outside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) but within 5km of its periphery.

On 10 July, while positioned near Bohdanivka, the Mission observed a calm situation.

### **Withdrawal of weapons**

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted one weapon in violation of its withdrawal lines, near residential houses in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region.

An SMM long-range UAV also spotted 24 weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites at a training area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region (for further details, see the tables below).

### **Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone<sup>7</sup>**

The SMM observed seven armoured combat vehicles in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including within residential areas (for further details, see the table below).

### **SMM facilitation of repairs to and maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure, and of demining activities**

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to power lines between government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) and Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), near Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk) and near Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable inspection of and repairs to water infrastructure between government-controlled Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk) and Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk) and near Pankivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk); demining activities near government-controlled areas of Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk), Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk); as well as vegetation clearance, inspection and maintenance of railway tracks near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk).

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<sup>7</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. While positioned at two locations near the DFS, the SMM heard and saw an impact of an undetermined weapon and heard eight explosions, including one assessed as an outgoing mortar round and one assessed as outgoing, as well as about 135 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all assessed as within a 5km radius of the DFS.

### Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints amid COVID-19 outbreak

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska was operational. While at the EECP at about 10:00 and 13:15, the Mission saw about 150 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and about 100 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) queuing to travel in the opposite direction.

From 07:00 to 18:00, the SMM camera south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge recorded about 620 people traveling from non-government-controlled to government-controlled areas and about 726 people traveling from government-controlled to non-government-controlled areas.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

### \*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

*The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report 9 July 2020](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.*

#### Denial of access:

- At a checkpoint west of Verkhnohshyrokiivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations [again](#) denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled areas, referring to restrictions due to COVID-19.
- At a checkpoint near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations [again](#) denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled areas, referring to restrictions due to COVID-19. The Mission continued to observe the presence of a metal barrier and spikes laid across the road, and of a mine hazard sign.
- At a checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations [again](#) denied the SMM passage

towards non-government-controlled areas, referring to restrictions due to COVID-19.

*Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:*

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- On 9 July, an SMM long-range UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk), as well as GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Andriivka (government-controlled, 57km north of Donetsk).<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV's position.

## Table of weapons

### Weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
<b>Government-controlled areas</b>				
09/07/2020	1	Surface-to-air missile system (9K35 <i>Strela-10</i> )	Near residential houses in Mykolaivka (57km north of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV

### Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
<b>Non-government-controlled areas</b>				
09/07/2020	24	Tank (undetermined variant)	In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV

### **Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>9</sup>**

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
<b>Government-controlled areas</b>				
09/07/2020	3	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2)	Near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk)	Long-range UAV
	1	Armoured combat vehicle	Near residential houses in Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk)	
10/07/2020	3	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)	In Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk)	Patrol

<sup>9</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

**Table of ceasefire violations as of 10 July 2020<sup>10</sup>**


SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera 2km E of Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km SW of Donetsk)	3-5km SE	Recorded	1	Illumination flare	In vertical flight (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	10-Jul, 00:04
SMM camera at Donetsk Filtration Station (15km N of Donetsk)	1-3km SSW	Recorded	2	Projectile	In vertical flight (also recorded by two SMM cameras in Avdiivka)	N/K	10-Jul, 00:33
	1-3km SSW	Recorded	5	Projectile	In vertical flight (also recorded by two SMM cameras Avdiivka)	N/K	10-Jul, 01:20
SMM camera 1.5km NE of Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km S of Donetsk)	3-5km ESE	Recorded	1	Projectile	NNW to SSE	N/K	9-Jul, 23:14
SMM camera at entry-exit checkpoint in Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km S of Donetsk)	2-4km E	Recorded	2	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	9-Jul, 23:11
About 1km NW of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk)	1-2km WSW	Heard	1	Shot		Small arms	10-Jul, 09:58
	1-2km WSW	Heard and saw	1	Explosion	Impact	N/K	10-Jul, 10:01
	2-4km WSW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	10-Jul, 10:25
	2-4km WSW	Heard	38	Shot		Small arms	10-Jul, 11:00-11:04
	2-4km WSW	Heard	34	Burst		Small arms	10-Jul, 11:00-11:04
	2-3km WSW	Heard	6	Shot		Small arms	10-Jul, 10:57
	1.5-3km WSW	Heard	25	Shot		Small arms	10-Jul, 11:07-11:09
	1.5-3km WSW	Heard	13	Burst		Small arms	10-Jul, 11:07-11:09
	5-8km WSW	Heard	5	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	10-Jul, 11:10-11:13

<sup>10</sup> The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.



	1-2km WSW	Heard	1	Shot		Small arms	10-Jul, 14:37
	1.5-2.5km WSW	Heard	4	Shot		Small arms	10-Jul, 14:41
SE edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	2-3km E	Heard	1	Shot		Small arms	10-Jul, 08:54
	1-1.2km SSE	Heard	1	Explosion	Outgoing	Mortar (type N/K)	10-Jul, 09:09
	1-3km SSE	Heard	1	Explosion	Outgoing	N/K	10-Jul, 10:00
	1-1.5km SSE	Heard	1	Burst		Small arms	10-Jul, 11:00-11:04
	1-1.5km SSE	Heard	7	Shot		Small arms	10-Jul, 11:00-11:04
	1-1.5km SSE	Heard	2	Shot		Small arms	10-Jul, 11:07
Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km NE of Donetsk)	3-5km SE	Heard	20	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	9-Jul, 19:21-19:40
	1-3km SE	Heard	1	Explosion	Outgoing	N/K	9-Jul, 19:21
	4-5km SE	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	9-Jul, 19:48-19:49
	3-5km SE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	9-Jul, 19:50
	2-3km SE	Heard	2	Explosion	Outgoing	N/K	9-Jul, 20:01-20:02
	2-3km SE	Heard	9	Explosion	Outgoing	N/K	9-Jul, 20:03-20:09
	3-5km SE	Heard	6	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	9-Jul, 20:21-20:33
	1-2km SE	Heard	4	Explosion	Outgoing	N/K	9-Jul, 20:46-20:57
SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km NW of Luhansk)	2-3km SSW	Recorded	1	Muzzle flash		N/K	9-Jul, 22:34
	2-4km SSW	Recorded	3	Explosion	Airburst	N/K	9-Jul, 22:34
	2-4km SSW	Recorded	2	Explosion	Airburst	N/K	9-Jul, 22:40
Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 58km W of Luhansk)	2-3km NE	Heard	8	Burst	Assessed as outside the disengagement area	Small arms	10-Jul, 11:24-11:45
W edge of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km NW of Luhansk)	2-4km NW	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	10-Jul, 11:37-12:08
	2-4km NW	Heard	106	Burst	Assessed as outside the disengagement area	HMG	10-Jul, 11:37-12:08
	1km N	Heard and saw	5	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	10-Jul, 12:15

### Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions<sup>11</sup>



<sup>11</sup> The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well).