

Daily Report 163/2020

10 July 2020¹


Summary

- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
- An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted damage to civilian infrastructure near Horlivka.
- Members of the armed formations continued to deny the Mission passage at checkpoints along official crossing routes in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.*
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske.
- The SMM saw civilians queuing to travel towards government-controlled and non-government-controlled areas at the entry-exit checkpoint in Stanytsia Luhanska.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³

Number of recorded explosions⁴



Map of recorded ceasefire violations

¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 9 July 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka, Petrivske, Shyrokyne, at the Oktiabr mine, in Stanytsia Luhanska and at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were non-operational.


³ Including explosions.

⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 9 July 2020



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005), IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 10/07/2020

In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (15), compared with the [previous reporting period](#) (35 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including almost all explosions, were recorded at south-easterly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), in areas east-south-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km south of Donetsk) and in areas south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 90 explosions, compared with the [previous reporting period](#) (no explosions). Almost all ceasefire violations, including almost all explosions, were recorded on the evening of 8 July – approximately between 19:50 and 21:30 – in areas north-east and south-west of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Damage to a water pipeline in Horlivka

In the north-western part of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted at least 50 impact craters assessed as recent and caused by (probable 82mm) mortar rounds fired from a south-westerly direction. Some of the craters were within a 15m radius of a water pipeline. In the vicinity of the craters, the UAV also spotted multiple fallen poles and electrical lines, and a burnt transformer box.

The UAV spotted shrapnel damage to the water pipeline in two locations (about 160m south-south-west and about 230m east-south-east of a known military-type position assessed as belonging to the armed formations). It also spotted ongoing repairs to the pipeline and two tractors, a truck, a towed generator and at least four workers nearby.

Near military-type positions located about 60m north of the pipeline, the UAV spotted the remains of two armoured combat vehicles (probable MT-LB variant) covered with freshly cut tree branches. At the site, it also spotted a mini-van and three heavy utility trucks parked among trees and burnt vegetation to the west and north of the road, as well as at least seven persons assessed as members of the armed formations.

Members of the armed formations continued to deny the SMM passage at checkpoints along the contact line

Members of the armed formations continued to deny the SMM passage at checkpoints along official crossing routes. These restrictions constitute an impediment to the implementation of the Mission's mandate.⁵

In Donetsk region, at a checkpoint near Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations [again](#) denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled areas, referring to the closure of the checkpoint.*

⁵ The Mission began facing repeated denials when attempting to cross into non-government-controlled areas at checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk region on 21 March and Luhansk region on 23 March. For more information, see SMM Daily and Spot Reports.

In Luhansk region, at a checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations [again](#) denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled areas, referring to restrictions due to COVID-19.*

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁶

On 9 July, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) near their checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

On the evening of 8 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded nine projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 5-7km east. On the same evening, while in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the Mission heard about 90 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 5-10km east-south-east. All of these ceasefire violations were assessed as outside the **disengagement area near Zolote** but within 5km of its periphery.

On 9 July, the Mission saw six members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) close to the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote. It saw two of them walking along road T-1316 inside the disengagement area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and then return.

On 7 July, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV [again](#) spotted 60 anti-tank mines close to the area’s south-eastern corner, assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

On the same day, in a residential area of Petrivske, about 450m east of a checkpoint of the armed formations about 500m east of the disengagement area’s north-eastern edge, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two persons, assessed as members of the armed formations, one of them assembling a weapon (assault rifle variant). Near the checkpoint, the UAV also spotted a person aiming a weapon (assault rifle variant) at the UAV (see also [SMM Daily Report 8 July 2020](#)).

On 9 July, while positioned near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

An SMM long-range UAV spotted 12 weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites at a compound in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region (for further details, see the table below).

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone⁷

⁶ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

⁷ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, including within residential areas (for further details, see the table below).

Presence of anti-tank mines near Popasna

On 8 July, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted a minefield of at least 300 anti-tank mines south of road T-0504 on the north-eastern edge of Popasna, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations in the area see [SMM Daily Report 8 May 2020](#)).

SMM facilitation of repairs to and maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure, and of demining activities

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to power lines between government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) and Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), near Berezhivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), near Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) and near Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 77km south of Donetsk), as well as to water infrastructure near non-government-controlled Pankivka (16km north of Luhansk), Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk) and Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable inspection of and repairs to water infrastructure between government-controlled Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk) and Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk); demining activities near government-controlled Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk), Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk); and vegetation clearance, inspection and maintenance of railway tracks near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk). While positioned on the southern outskirts of Berezhivske to enable the works to water infrastructure between Novotoshkivske and Nyzhnie, the Mission heard five undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-6km north-east of its position, despite security guarantees having been provided for a localised ceasefire.

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints amid COVID-19 outbreak

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska was operational. While at the EECP at about 10:00 and 13:15, the Mission saw 50 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and 130 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) queuing to travel in the opposite direction.

From 07:00 to 18:00, the SMM camera south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge recorded about 588 people traveling from non-government-controlled to government-controlled areas and about 580 people traveling from government-controlled to non-government-controlled areas.

In Donetsk region, the SMM saw that the EECP near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) was closed. At 11:45, while at a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk), the Mission saw a convoy of three trucks and two cars of an international humanitarian organisation travelling from government-controlled to non-government-controlled areas. While at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka, the Mission saw no vehicular traffic and assessed that it was not operational. A member of the armed formations told the SMM that the checkpoint was closed and that only convoys of an international humanitarian organisation were allowed to cross. At 12:05, while at the abovementioned checkpoint, the Mission saw a convoy of five trucks of an international humanitarian organisation (with Ukrainian licence plates) and two cars (one with “DPR” plates) travelling from government-controlled to non-government-controlled areas. At 13:45, while at the same checkpoint, the SMM saw the same convoy consisting of three trucks and two cars previously observed at the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Berezove, travelling from government-controlled to non-government-controlled areas.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report 9 July 2020](#)). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

- At a checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations [again](#) denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled areas, referring to restrictions due to COVID-19.
- At a checkpoint near Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations [again](#) denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled areas, referring to the closure of the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- On 8 July, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk).⁸

⁸ The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV's position.

Table of weapons

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
08/07/2020	11	Tank (probable T-64)	At a compound in Lutuhyne (20km south-west of Luhansk)	Long-range UAV
	1	Self-propelled howitzer (2S5 <i>Giatsint-S</i> , 152mm)		

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁹

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
09/07/2020	1	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB variant)	Near Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk)	Patrol
	4	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-60)	In a residential area close to the EECP in Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk)	
	1	Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM variant)	In a residential area of Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk)	

Table of ceasefire violations as of 9 July 2020¹⁰

⁹ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	2-4km ESE	Recorded	1	Muzzle flash		N/K	8-Jul, 21:39
	2-4km ESE	Recorded	1	Projectile	E to W (subsequent to the previous event)	N/K	8-Jul, 21:39
	3-5km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Impact (subsequent to the previous event)	N/K	8-Jul, 21:39
	3-5km ESE	Recorded	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	8-Jul, 21:40
	3-5km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	8-Jul, 21:47
	2-4km ESE	Recorded	2	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	8-Jul, 21:48
	4-6km ESE	Recorded	1	Projectile	SSW to NNE (also recorded by SMM camera at DFS)	N/K	8-Jul, 21:56
	3-5km ESE	Recorded	6	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	8-Jul, 21:57
	3-5km ESE	Recorded	1	Projectile	N to S	N/K	8-Jul, 21:57
	3-5km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	8-Jul, 21:59
	3-5km ESE	Recorded	1	Projectile	N to S	N/K	8-Jul, 21:59
	3-5km SE	Recorded	2	Projectile	W to E	N/K	8-Jul, 23:26
	3-5km SE	Recorded	2	Projectile	W to E	N/K	9-Jul, 00:21
	3-5km SE	Recorded	1	Projectile	W to E	N/K	9-Jul, 02:27
	3-5km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined (also recorded by SMM camera at DFS)	N/K	9-Jul, 03:03
SMM camera in Berezove (government-controlled, 31km SW of Donetsk)	3-5km SSE	Recorded	1	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	9-Jul, 00:48
	3-5km SSE	Recorded	1	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	9-Jul, 01:55
SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 77km S of Donetsk)	3-5km SSE	Recorded	1	Muzzle flash		N/K	8-Jul, 23:51
SMM camera 1.5km NE of Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km S of Donetsk)	4-6km ESE	Recorded	1	Projectile	In vertical flight	N/K	8-Jul, 23:29
SMM camera at entry-exit checkpoint in Hnutove (government-controlled, 84km S of Donetsk)	2-4km ESE	Recorded	7	Projectile	In vertical flight	N/K	8-Jul, 21:47
Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km NE of Donetsk)	4-6km SW	Heard	4	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	8-Jul, 20:27-20:32
	4-6km SW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	8-Jul, 21:14

¹⁰ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.


Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km NE of Donetsk)	2-5km NE	Heard	4	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	9-Jul, 15:29-15:31
SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km W of Luhansk)	5-7km E	Recorded	7	Projectile	S to N (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	8-Jul, 21:15
	5-7km E	Recorded	2	Projectile	S to N (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	8-Jul, 21:16
N edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km W of Luhansk)	5-10km ESE	Heard	87	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote)	N/K	8-Jul, 19:50-21:30
S edge of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km NW of Luhansk)	4-6km NE	Heard	5	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	9-Jul, 11:27-11:45

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹¹

¹¹ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as

Daily report noted settlements

10 July 2020



SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well).