Daily Report 158/2020

4 July 2020¹


Summary

- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
- The SMM observed recent impact craters in Kruta Balka and damage to residential buildings in Yasynuvata.
- Members of the armed formations continued to deny the Mission passage at checkpoints along official crossing routes in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.*
- The Mission continued monitoring all three disengagement areas: It observed people inside the disengagement area near Zolote during evening hours.
- The SMM saw civilians queuing to travel towards government- and non-government-controlled areas at the entry-exit checkpoint in Stanytsia Luhanska.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³

Number of recorded explosions⁴




¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 3 July 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka, Petrivske, Shyrokyne, and Svitlodarsk were non-operational. The SMM cameras near Oktiabr mine stopped being operational after the detonation of an undetermined projectile recorded at 19:10hrs on 30 June 2020.

³ Including explosions.

⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations



In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 70), compared with the <u>previous reporting period</u> (about 35 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at south-easterly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km northeast of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 220), compared with the <u>previous reporting period</u> (17 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including explosions, were recorded at north-easterly directions of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).

Members of the armed formations continued to deny the SMM passage at checkpoints along the contact line

Members of the armed formations continued to deny the SMM passage at checkpoints along official crossing routes. These restrictions constitute an impediment to the implementation of the Mission's mandate.⁵

In Donetsk region, at a checkpoint near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km northeast of Donetsk), two members of the armed formations (both visibly armed) <u>again</u> denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled areas and refused to provide additional information. The SMM <u>continued</u> to observe the presence of a metal barrier and spikes laid across the road, and of a mine hazard sign.

In Luhansk region, at a checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), three members of the armed formations <u>again</u> denied the Mission passage towards non-government-controlled areas, referring to restrictions due to COVID-19.

Impact craters in Kruta Balka and damage to residential building in Yasynuvata

On 1 July, and SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted four probable mortar impact craters in fields about 700m south-west of Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk) and about 1km north-east of Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), assessed as caused by a probable 82mm mortar round (not seen in imagery from 18 May 2020). The SMM could not assess the direction of fire. The same UAV spotted damage, assessed as recent, to the roof and second-floor exterior of a two-storey residential building on the south-western edge of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) (not seen in imagery from 24 September 2019). The SMM could not assess the weapon used or direction of fire.

On 3 July, in Yasynuvata, the SMM observed a dent in an iron gate at a house on 108 Radianska Street, which it assessed was caused by the impact of a 7.62mm bullet fired from west-north-west. A male resident (in his forties or fifties) told the SMM that he had been home the same morning at 06:20 when he had heard a whistling sound and something hitting

⁵ The Mission began facing repeated denials when attempting to cross into non-government-controlled areas at checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk region on 21 March and Luhansk region on 23 March. For more information, see SMM Daily and Spot Reports.

the gate.

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁶

On 2 July, outside **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted three armoured combat vehicles within a residential area and about 170m north of the area's northern edge (see table below).

During the day on 3 July, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) near the checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

On the evening of 2 July, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-control, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM UAV spotted a person near a former position assessed as belonging to the armed formations on its eastern edge (about 660m south of its north-eastern corner). About 40m north-north-east, the UAV spotted three people near a former position of the armed formations.

The evening and night for 2-3 July, the SMM camera in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) recorded six undetermined explosions, 29 projectiles in flight and a muzzle flash at an assessed range of 3-5km east-south-east. During the same time, while in Popasna and Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 32 undetermined explosions. All of these ceasefire violations were assessed as outside the disengagements area but within 5km of its periphery.

On 3 July, the Mission saw six members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) close to the southern edge of the disengagement area, three of whom walked along road T-1316 inside the area up to about 350m north of its southern edge.

On 3 July, while positioned near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) to monitor the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone 7

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including within residential areas (for further details please see the table below).

In Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM spotted a small, black non-SMM UAV flying at about 40-50m altitude above a large complex. The Mission

⁶ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

⁷ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

saw military personnel at the gate of the complex with a controller in his hand; he told the SMM that it was a logistical base and that the controller was for the UAV.

On the evening of 2 July, about 1.7km south of Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted a utility truck (Ural type) near the tree line about 500m east-north-east of a forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The same UAV spotted that the truck moved west and then south from the tree line, stopping near railway tracks, about 500m east-south-east of aforementioned forward position, where a light utility vehicle and 12 people were also seen, assessed as probable Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, unloading timber from the rear of the truck. The SMM assessed it as construction of a new forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. About 160m further south-east, the UAV spotted a 10m trench and a bunker, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Shortly after, the light utility vehicle drove back and parked in a compound in the center of Novotoshkivske.

Demining activities near Hranitne

Approximately 6km south-west of Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw four people wearing clothing from an international organization conducting demining activities on the southern side of road T0512. The SMM also observed five minibuses parked nearby, all of them labelled "Humanitarian Demining."

SMM facilitation of repairs to and maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure, and of demining activities

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable the assessment of water pipes near Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk); repairs to water infrastructure near Pankivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk); vegetation clearance, inspection and maintenance of railway tracks near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); and demining activities near government-controlled Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk), Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk) and Hirske (63km west of Luhansk).

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to power lines near Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Luhansk), Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk and between government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) and Troitske (69km west of Luhansk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. While positioned at two locations near the DFS, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions as well as eight shots of small-arms fire and heard and saw two explosions assessed as impacts of 120mm mortar rounds, all assessed as within a 5km radius of the station.

Situation of civilians and measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints amid COVID-19 outbreak

In Donetsk region, the SMM saw that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) was operational but did not observe any traffic in either direction. The Mission observed that the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations near Horlivka was closed.* The SMM also saw that the EECP near

Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km south of Donetsk) was operational but that there was no traffic in either direction.

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the EECP in Stanytsia Luhanska was operational. While at the EECP at about 10:10 and 13:00, the Mission saw a total of 125 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and 75 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) queuing to travel in the opposite direction.

While near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge at 12:20, the SMM saw no pedestrians travelling in either direction. At the checkpoint 200m south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed seven people (mixed gender and ages) near the bus stop as well as one ambulance and six representatives of an international organization near a container of the international organization nearby.

Between 07:00 and 18:30, the SMM cameras at the parking lot south of the bridge recorded 440 civilians crossing the Stanytsia Luhanska EECP from GCA towards NGCA and 585 civilians crossed the EECP from NGCA towards GCA.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments — which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see <u>SMM Daily Report 29 June 2020</u>). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Denial of access:

- At a checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations <u>again</u> denied the Mission passage towards non-government-controlled areas, referring to restrictions due to COVID-19
- At a checkpoint near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), two members of the armed formations (visibly armed) <u>again</u> denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled areas and refused to provide additional information. The SMM <u>continued</u> to observe the presence of a metal barrier and spikes laid across the road, and of a mine hazard sign.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

On 2 July, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) and Verkhnotoretske (government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk).8

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 $^{^8}$ The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres of the UAV's position.

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁹

Date	No.	Туре	Location	Source of observation					
Government-controlled areas									
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (MT - LB)	Near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk)						
02/07/2020	3	Armoured combat vehicle							
	6 Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2, two probable BMP-2 and two probable BMP-1)		Near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk)	Long-range UAV					
	3 Armoured combat vehicle		In a residential area of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), (see above)						
03/07/2020	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2)	In a residential area of Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk)	Patrol					

 9 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 3 July 2020^{10}

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date and time
SMM camera	2-4km SE	Recorded	2	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	3-Jul, 00:40
	2-4km ESE	Recorded	1	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	3-Jul, 00:54
in Avdiivka	3-5km ESE	Recorded	2	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	3-Jul, 00:54
(government- controlled,	2-4km SE	Recorded	1	Projectile	SSW to NNE	N/K	3-Jul, 00:58
17km N of	2-4km ESE	Recorded	1	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	3-Jul, 01:13
Donetsk)	2-4km ESE	Recorded	1	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	3-Jul, 02:06
	2-4km SE	Recorded	1	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	3-Jul, 02:07
SMM camera at Donetsk Filtration	1-3km SSW	Recorded	1	Projectile	In vertical flight	N/K	2-Jul, 22:10
Station (15km N of Donetsk)	1-3km SSW	Recorded	1	Projectile	NW to SE	N/K	2-Jul, 23:13
Tr of B officially	3-5km E	Recorded	1	Explosion	Airburst	N/K	2-Jul, 22:35
SMM camera	3-5km E	Recorded	1	Muzzle flash	T THE GULDS	N/K	2-Jul, 22:35
1.5km NE of	3-5km E	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	2-Jul, 22:35
Hnutove (government-	3-5km E	Recorded	3	Muzzle flash	Chacterininea	N/K	2-Jul, 22:45
controlled, 90km S of	3-5km E	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	2-Jul, 22:45
Donetsk)	3-5km E	Recorded	6	Muzzle flash	Chacterminea	N/K	2-Jul, 22:53
	3-5km E	Recorded	4	Projectile	NNE to SSW	N/K	
About 1km NW of the railway station in Yasynuvata	1.5km W	Heard and saw	2	Explosion	Impact	Mortar (120mm)	2-Jul, 22:59 3-Jul, 10:15
(non- government- controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk)	1-2km WSW	Heard	8	Shot		Small arms	3-Jul, 11:25
SE part of Avdiivka (government- controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	2-3km E	Heard	4	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Jul, 10:14
	2		•	r		==	2-Jul, 18:31-
Svitlodarsk (government- controlled, 57km NE of Donetsk)	2-4km SE	Heard	10	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	18:40
	2-4km SE	Heard	15	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	2-Jul, 18:44- 18:50
	2-4km SE	Heard	10	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	2-Jul, 18:52- 19:00
	2-4km SE	Heard	21	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	2-Jul, 19:00- 19:20

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
 $^{^{10}}$ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided—in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc.—are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an "N/K"), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

	2-4km SE	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	2-Jul, 19:25- 19:36
	1-3km SE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	2-Jul, 21:29
	2-4km SE	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	2-Jul, 22:56
	2 IKIII SE	Ticara		Expression	Chacterminea	1011	2 341, 22.30
SMM camera in Kriakivka	3-5km SSW	Recorded	17	Projectile	ESE to WNW	N/K	3-Jul, 03:03
(government- controlled,	3-5km SSW	Recorded	3	Projectile	ESE to WNW	N/K	3-Jul, 03:04
38km NW of Luhansk)	3-5km SSW	Recorded	2	Projectile	ESE to WNW	N/K	3-Jul, 03:05
	3-5km SE	Recorded	1	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	2-Jul, 22:45
	3 JAMESE	recorded	1	Trojectne	In vertical flight (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement	1011	2 841, 22.13
	3-5km ESE	Recorded	1	Projectile	area)	N/K	2-Jul, 22:45
					NE to SW (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement		
	3-5km ESE	Recorded	12	Projectile	area)	N/K	2-Jul, 23:16
	3-5km ESE	Recorded	3	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area)	N/K	2-Jul, 23:25
	3 JKIII EIJE	recorded	3	Expression	(assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement	17/12	2 Jul, 23.23
SMM camera on N edge of	3-5km ESE	Recorded	1	Muzzle flash	area)	N/K	2-Jul, 23:30
Popasna (government- controlled, 69km W of Luhansk)					NE to SW (subsequent to the previous event, assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement		
	3-5km ESE	Recorded	1	Projectile	area) Impact	N/K	2-Jul, 23:30
					(subsequent to the previous event, assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement		
	3-5km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	area)	N/K	2-Jul, 23:30
					NE to SW (assessed as outside the Zolote disen gagement		
	3-5km ESE	Recorded	13	Projectile	In vertical flight	N/K	2-Jul, 23:38
	3-5km ESE	Recorded	2	Projectile	(assessed as outside the Zolote	N/K	2-Jul, 23:38

	1				disengagement		1 1
					area)		
					WNW to ESE (assessed as		
					outside the Zolote		
	2.51 FOR				disengagement	N. 07	2 7 1 22 44
	3-5km ESE	Recorded	1	Projectile	area) Undetermined	N/K	2-Jul, 23:41
					(assessed as outside the		
					Zolote		
	3-5km ESE	Recorded	2	Explosion	disengagement area)	N/K	3-Jul, 01:35
	3-5km SSE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Jul, 02:05
					Undetermined		
					(assessed as		
					outside the disengagement		2-Jul, 18:30-
N edge of	5-7km SE	Heard	2	Explosion	area)	N/K	19:35
Popasna							
(government- controlled,							
69km W of Luhansk)	10-15km SE	Heard	42	Evalusion	Undetermined	N/K	2-Jul, 18:30-
Luransk)	10-13KIII SE	неага	42	Explosion	Undetermined	IN/ K	19:35
	5-10km SE	Heard	8	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Jul, 01:35- 02:07
					Undetermined (assessed as		
	13-15km				outside the disengagement		3-Jul, 05:50-
	NNW	Heard	25	Explosion	area)	N/K	06:05
	3-5km NE	Heard	20	Explosion	Outgoing	N/K	3-Jul, 05:50- 06:05
	3-3KIII IVL	Ticard	20	Lapiosion	Outgoing	TVIX	3-Jul, 05:50-
IZ - 400-1-	12-17km NE	Heard	12	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	06:05
Kadiivka (formerly	2-3km N	Heard	15	Explosion	Outgoing	N/K	3-Jul, 05:50- 06:05
Stakhanov, non-	2-3KIII IV	Ticard	13	Lapiosion	Outgoing	TV/IX	00.03
government- controlled,					Undetermined (assessed as		
50km W of Luhansk)					outside the		
	13-15km NNW	Heard	5	Explosion	disengagement area)	N/K	3-Jul, 06:18- 06:40
							3-Jul, 06:18-
	12-17km NE	Heard	25	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	06:40
	2-3km N	Heard	2	Explosion	Outgoing	N/K	3-Jul, 06:18- 06:40
							3-Jul, 06:18-
	3-5km NE	Heard	1	Explosion	Outgoing	N/K	06:40
	3-5km NE	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Jul, 06:18- 06:40

	12-17km NE	Heard	8	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Jul, 06:40- 06:55
	3-5km NE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Jul, 06:40- 06:55
	12-17km NE	Heard	45	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Jul, 07:45- 08:00

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions 11



¹¹ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well).