

Daily Report 149/2020

24 June 2020¹


Summary

- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations both in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM found its camera near Shyrokyne destroyed and the camera mast damaged, assessed as caused by a round from an undetermined weapon.
- Members of the armed formations continued to deny the Mission passage at checkpoints along official crossing routes in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.*
- The Mission continued monitoring all three disengagement areas.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable the assessment, maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure, as well as demining activities.
- The SMM saw civilians travelling towards government- and non-government-controlled areas through the entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³

Number of recorded explosions⁴




¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 23 June 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Petrivske, Krasnohorivka, Shyrokyne and at the Oktiabr mine remained non-operational.


³ Including explosions.

⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.


Map of recorded ceasefire violations



Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 23 June 2020



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 24/06/2020

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 40), compared with the [previous reporting period](#) (60 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (see below).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 35), compared with the [previous reporting period](#) (about 2,170 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at north-easterly directions of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

SMM camera near Shyrokyne destroyed and the camera mast damaged

On 22 June, the SMM conducted multiple mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flights over the location of its camera about 1km south-west of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk), and imagery revealed parts of the camera's mast lying on the ground outside its enclosing fence, west of the camera. On the top section of the broken mast, the UAV imagery revealed shrapnel damage.

On 23 June, the SMM saw that its camera mast had been broken off at a height of about 16m from the ground, and parts of it were lying on the concrete pad below the mast, along with the destroyed camera body. The Mission saw that a steel support cable (1cm in diameter) east of the mast was torn. It also saw fragmentation and scorch marks on some of the damaged parts of the mast. The SMM assessed all the damage as caused by a round from an undetermined weapon fired from a north-easterly direction (see also [SMM Spot Report 33/2020](#) and [SMM Daily Report 23 June 2020](#)).

Members of the armed formations continued to deny the SMM passage at checkpoints along the contact line in Donetsk and Luhansk regions

Members of the armed formations continued to deny the SMM passage at checkpoints in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions along official crossing routes. These restrictions constitute an impediment to the implementation of the Mission's mandate.⁵

In Donetsk region, at a checkpoint north of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), an SMM patrol was [again](#) unable to proceed towards non-government-controlled areas due to the presence of spikes laid across the road and of a mine hazard sign.*

At a checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations [again](#) denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled areas, citing a lack of permission from superiors.*

In Luhansk region, at a checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations [again](#) denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled areas, referring to COVID-19.*

⁵ The Mission began facing repeated denials when attempting to cross into non-government-controlled areas at checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk region on 21 March and Luhansk region on 23 March. For more information, see SMM Daily and Spot Reports.

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁶

On 23 June, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) near the checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

On the night of 22-23 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 20 projectiles in flight and a muzzle flash at an assessed range of 2-4km east, assessed as outside the **disengagement area near Zolote** but within 5km of its periphery. It also recorded 21 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-4km east-south-east, which were unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area.

On 23 June, while positioned at two locations close to the area, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery. Throughout the day, the Mission saw five members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) near the southern edge of the disengagement area, two of whom were walking along road T-1316 inside the area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and back.

On the evening of 22 June, the SMM camera about 2km east of Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) recorded two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of about 2-4km south-east, which were unable to be assessed as inside or outside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk).

On 23 June, while positioned at two locations close to the disengagement area near Petrivske, the SMM observed a calm situation.

Presence of mines near Sakhanka

On 22 June, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted about 16 anti-tank mines lying across a road about 2.5km south-west of Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 97km south of Donetsk), assessed as belonging to the armed formations (for previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report 9 May 2020](#)).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. It observed three multiple launch rocket systems in violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.

The Mission also observed 87 weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, all in training areas (for further details, see the tables below).

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone⁷

⁶ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles on both sides of the contact line in Donetsk region (for further details, see the table below).

On 19 June, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of recent extensions to trenches on the western outskirts of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 92km south of Donetsk) (not seen in imagery from 7 June 2020) and about 3.5km south of Pikuzy (about 35m long, first seen in imagery from 26 March 2020), assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

On 22 June, in fields about 2km north-east of Shyrokyne, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a new trench extension about 200m long (not seen in imagery from 7 June 2020). On the eastern outskirts of Shyrokyne, another SMM mini-UAV spotted a newly dug trench about 35m long, as well as two people assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel digging another trench about 65m long, about 80m north of the previous trench. All of the aforementioned were assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

SMM facilitation of maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to power lines near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and between government-controlled (Talakovka (90km south of Donetsk) and Chernenko (86km south of Donetsk); repairs to water infrastructure near Shumy (government-controlled, 41km north of Donetsk); vegetation clearance, inspection, and maintenance of railway tracks near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); as well as demining activities near government-controlled Stepove (30km north-east of Luhansk), Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk) and Hirske (63km west of Luhansk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. While positioned at three locations near the DFS, the SMM heard and saw two explosions assessed as impacts of undetermined weapons. The SMM also heard ten undetermined explosions, as well as shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire. All these ceasefire violations were assessed as within a 5km radius of the station.

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints amid COVID-19 outbreak

In Donetsk region, the SMM saw that the checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka was open. While present at the checkpoint from 14:37 to 15:03, the SMM saw about 200 people (mixed ages and genders) and about 140 cars queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas. A member of the armed formations (visibly armed) at the checkpoint told the SMM that civilians were being allowed to travel towards government-controlled areas but not in the opposite direction. He also said that civilians from non-government-controlled areas denied entry into government-controlled areas at the corresponding checkpoint near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk), north of the EECP near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west

⁷ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

of Donetsk), would not be subject to quarantine upon their return to non-government-controlled areas.

While present at the corresponding checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Berezove from 15:13 to 15:33, the Mission saw 15 people (aged 60-80, mixed genders) and three cars queuing to travel to government-controlled areas.

The Mission saw that the EECF near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) remained closed.

In Luhansk region, while at the EECF near Stanytsia Luhanska from 09:00 to 14:40, the Mission saw that it was open and that a total of about 23 people (mixed ages and genders) were queuing to travel towards non-government-controlled areas and about 157 people (mixed ages and genders) were queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas. It also saw a mobile COVID-19 testing post consisting of an ambulance and one medical and two administrative personnel testing people travelling to government-controlled areas.

At the EECF near Stanytsia Luhanska, State Border Guard Service of Ukraine personnel told the Mission that pedestrians could travel without pre-approval with the possession of a valid form of identification and an electronic permit, and that those entering government-controlled areas were required to install a mobile application which tracks their self-isolation. Additionally, he added that those who were not able to install the application would still be allowed entry to government-controlled areas and instead would spend two weeks under observation at an inpatient healthcare facility in Stanytsia Luhanska or in another city. Exceptionally, students taking final school exams and their guardians would be allowed entrance if they tested negatively on the spot.

While at the parking lot located about 300m south of the bridge, the SMM saw an ambulance. It also saw pedestrians crossing the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge in both directions.

At the shelter of an international organization south of the checkpoint, the SMM saw two medical personnel checking and measuring the temperatures of people travelling towards non-government-controlled areas.

The Mission continued monitoring in Dnipro, Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report of 22 June 2020](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk

regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Denial of access:

- At a checkpoint north of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), an SMM patrol was [again](#) unable to proceed towards non-government-controlled areas due to the presence of spikes laid across the road and of a mine hazard sign.
- At a checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations [again](#) denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled areas, citing lack of permission from superiors.
- At a checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations [again](#) denied the SMM passage towards non-government-controlled areas, referring to COVID-19.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- An SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over the south-western edge of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk).⁸

⁸ The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV's position.

Table of weapons

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
21/06/2020	3	Multiple launch rocket system (type undetermined)	In a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk)	Aerial imagery

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
21/06/2020	2	Tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk), where the imagery also revealed the presence of about 28 armoured combat vehicles ⁹ (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 22 June 2020).	Aerial imagery
	11	Towed artillery (type undetermined)		
	16	Self-propelled artillery (type undetermined)		
	26	Tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 3 June 2020).	
	12	Tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk), where imagery also revealed the presence of about 49 armoured combat vehicles ¹⁰ (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 22 June 2020).	
	8	Self-propelled artillery (type undetermined)		
	12	Towed artillery (type undetermined)		

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone¹¹

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
19/06/2020	2	Armoured combat vehicle	Near Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk)	Aerial imagery
Non-government-controlled areas				
19/06/2020	1	Probable armoured combat vehicle	At a compound near Bezimenne (100km south of Donetsk)	Aerial imagery

⁹ The armoured combat vehicles mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

¹⁰ The armoured combat vehicles mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

¹¹ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 23 June 2020¹²

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	3-5km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	23-Jun, 00:53
SMM camera 2km E of Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km SW of Donetsk)	2-4km SE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined (unable to assess whether inside or outside the Petrivske disengagement area)	N/K	22-Jun, 21:52
	2-4km SE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined (unable to assess whether inside or outside the Petrivske disengagement area)	N/K	22-Jun, 22:32
SMM camera at Donetsk Filtration Station (15km N of Donetsk)	2-3km SSW	Recorded	1	Projectile	W to E (also recorded by the SMM camera in Avdiivka)	N/K	23-Jun, 00:06
	0.5-1km SE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	23-Jun, 00:31
	2-3km SSW	Recorded	1	Projectile	W to E (also recorded by the SMM camera in Avdiivka)	N/K	23-Jun, 01:34
SMM camera at entry-exit checkpoint in Hnutove (government-controlled, 84km S of Donetsk)	2-5km ENE	Recorded	1	Projectile	N to S	N/K	22-Jun, 23:22
	2-5km ENE	Recorded	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	23-Jun, 00:38
About 1km NW of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk)	2km WSW	Heard	5	Burst		Small arms	23-Jun, 09:52-09:54
	2-3km SW	Heard and saw	2	Explosion	Impact	N/K	23-Jun, 09:57-09:58
	2-3km SW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	23-Jun, 10:04
	2km SW	Heard	6	Burst		Small arms	23-Jun, 10:05-10:06
	1-3km SW	Heard	71	Shot		Small arms	23-Jun, 10:09-10:15
	1-2km SW	Heard	1	Burst		HMG	23-Jun, 10:18

¹² The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.


	1-2km SW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	23-Jun, 10:18
	1-2km SW	Heard	1	Burst		Small arms	23-Jun, 10:18
	1-3km SW	Heard	5	Burst		HMG	23-Jun, 10:21-10:33
	1-3km WSW	Heard	118	Shot		HMG	23-Jun, 10:21-10:33
	1-3km SW	Heard	55	Shot		HMG	23-Jun, 10:55-10:57
	2-3km SW	Heard	35	Shot		HMG	23-Jun, 11:02-11:04
	2-3km SW	Heard	17	Shot		HMG	23-Jun, 11:02-11:04
About 2.6km SE of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	2-3km SE	Heard	2	Burst		HMG	23-Jun, 09:53
	2-3km SE	Heard	4	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	23-Jun, 09:56-09:59
	2-3km SE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	23-Jun, 10:18
	2-3km SE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	23-Jun, 10:41
	3-4km SW	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	23-Jun, 14:28
	3-4km SW	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	23-Jun, 14:33
S of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	1-2km NW	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	23-Jun, 09:52
About 2.3km SE of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 99km S of Donetsk)	2-3km NNE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	23-Jun, 11:15
	2-3km NNE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	23-Jun, 11:32
	2-3km NNE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	23-Jun, 11:46
	2-3km NNE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	23-Jun, 12:07
	2-3km NNE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	23-Jun, 12:21
About 2km SE Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 24km N of Donetsk)	2km NE	Heard and saw	5	Explosion	Outgoing	N/K	23-Jun, 09:55-10:10
	4-5km E	Heard and saw	5	Explosion	Impact (subsequent to previous event)	N/K	23-Jun, 09:55-10:10
Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km NE of Donetsk)	4-5km E	Heard	5	Shot		Small arms	22-Jun, 19:40
	4-5km E	Heard	5	Shot		Small arms	22-Jun, 19:45
	4-5km SE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	22-Jun, 20:15
	4-5km SE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	22-Jun, 20:17
	4-5km S	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	23-Jun, 14:36
SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km W of Luhansk)	2-4km E	Recorded	1	Projectile	N to S (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	22-Jun, 23:30
	2-4km E	Recorded	3	Projectile	N to S (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	22-Jun, 23:31

2-4km E	Recorded	2	Projectile	N to S (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	22-Jun, 23:32
2-4km E	Recorded	2	Projectile	N to S (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	22-Jun, 23:33
2-4km E	Recorded	1	Projectile	N to S (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	22-Jun, 23:39
2-4km E	Recorded	1	Projectile	NW to SE (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	22-Jun, 23:40
2-4km E	Recorded	1	Projectile	N to S (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	22-Jun, 23:40
2-4km E	Recorded	1	Projectile	N to S (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	22-Jun, 23:41
2-4km E	Recorded	1	Muzzle flash	Assessed as outside the disengagement area	N/K	22-Jun, 23:41
2-4km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area)	N/K	22-Jun, 23:44
2-4km E	Recorded	1	Projectile	N to S (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	22-Jun, 23:45
2-4km E	Recorded	1	Projectile	NW to SE (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	22-Jun, 23:45
2-4km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area)	N/K	22-Jun, 23:53
2-4km E	Recorded	1	Projectile	N to S (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	22-Jun, 23:57
2-4km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area)	N/K	23-Jun, 00:07
2-4km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined (unable to assess whether inside or outside	N/K	23-Jun, 00:15

					the disengagement area)		
2-4km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area)	N/K	23-Jun, 00:22	
2-4km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area)	N/K	23-Jun, 00:23	
2-4km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area)	N/K	23-Jun, 00:27	
2-4km E	Recorded	1	Projectile	N to S (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	23-Jun, 00:32	
2-4km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area)	N/K	23-Jun, 00:34	
2-4km ESE	Recorded	2	Explosion	Undetermined (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area)	N/K	23-Jun, 00:37	
2-4km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area)	N/K	23-Jun, 00:40	
2-4km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area)	N/K	23-Jun, 00:49	
2-4km ESE	Recorded	9	Explosion	Undetermined (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area)	N/K	23-Jun, 01:09	
2-4km E	Recorded	3	Projectile	N to S (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	23-Jun, 01:17	

	2-4km E	Recorded	1	Projectile	N to S (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	23-Jun, 01:18
SSE edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km W of Luhansk)	4-6km SE	Heard	5	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	22-Jun, 17:50-18:45
	4-6km SE	Heard	3	Burst		HMG	22-Jun, 17:50-18:45
3km W of Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km NW of Luhansk)	2-4km SE	Heard	8	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area)	N/K	23-Jun, 09:30-09:35
1km S of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km W of Luhansk)	2-4km NE	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area)	N/K	23-Jun, 13:32-13:53

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹³



¹³The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well).